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Abstract
Historians of Louis XIV’s reign have debated evolutions in the king’s administration.
Such studies, despite heterogenous conclusions, better define our understanding of absolutist
authority in the ancien régime as manifested through a process of so-called bureaucratic
centralization. Scholars debate to what extent the monarchy achieved centralization amid the
interests of individuals and corporations suspended in traditional hierarchies and socio-cultural
expectations. Recently, scholars have posited that Louis’s government accommodated the
concerns of its ministers through gratifications and social advancement compelling obedience to
the Bourbon dynastic state. This dissertation considers for the first time how a politics of
accommodation characterized the Crown’s rapport with a selection of diplomats in the years of
Louis XIV’s personal rule.
Specifically, I examine five ambassadors serving Louis XIV in the Republic of Venice.
Focusing on French ambassadors in Venice accomplishes three tasks. First, ambassadors’ stories
highlight how dynasticism perfused the personal ambitions of diplomats as much as it did those
of the Crown. The dynastic imperative informed the choices of individuals within the diplomatic
corps, and a desire to advance personal fortune and family honor fueled their participation in
Louis’s foreign ministry. Secondly, diplomats’ correspondence from Venice elucidates French
politics with Venice, other Italian states, and within the commercial and maritime spheres of the
Mediterranean Sea. I consider how centralization facilitated or impeded Louis’s hegemonic
strategies in Italy and in the sea. Finally, I argue that the Venetians maintained diplomatic
relevance for the French until 1702. Traditional narratives claim that Venice “declined” on the
international stage by the mid-seventeenth century, but I underscore that Louis XIV viewed
Venice as a robust polity critical to the success of dynastic politics throughout most of his reign.
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Comments on Terminology and Conventions
1.) The terms “louisquatorzien” and “ludovician” are employed in this work. They are
conventional adjectival forms meant to denote characteristics, events, and details
associated with Louis XIV’s reign.
2.) The terms “diplomat,” “diplomacy,” and “diplomatic” are employed in this dissertation. I
am fully aware that these terms were not yet in use in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.
3.) The term ordinary ambassador (ambassadeur ordinaire) referred to resident ambassadors
who remained in their posts for extended missions. The term extraordinary ambassador
(ambassadeur extraordinaire) referred to an ambassador sent on special and often
immediate missions. Extraordinary ambassadors did not normally remain at the site of
their embassy for extended periods.
4.) The term incognito (unkown or as-yet-unrecognized) was an official appellation utilized
in the early-modern period to describe ambassadors arriving early in the state to which
they were assigned to serve. Diplomats remained incognito – having no rights to
extraterritorial protection and its attendant privileges – until after the state ceremonies in
which they presented credentials and received official recognition of their representative
status.
5.) When referencing the principal ambassadors of each chapter I will call them most often
by their family names rather than their titles or appanages, hence “Bonsy” rather than
“the Bishop of Beziers.” I do use titles at intervals to avoid monotony.
6.) Historical actors, especially popes, doges, and Ottoman sultans, changed frequently in the
decades I examine. I have provided lists of these actors in the end matter.
7.) In an effort to avoid confusion, the names and titles of rulers and other historical actors
are rendered in their languages. I use “Felipe IV” for the king of Spain, “Benedetto” for
the Venetian savvio del consiglio, rather than “Benedict,” etc. Popes, however, retain the
conventional English rendering of their names.
8.) Where I mention “Italy,” “Italians,” “Italian princes,” or “German princes” I am referring
to the geographic regions as they were known in the early-modern period and the people
groups associated with them. Additionally, the majority of geographic place names are
rendered in their common English spelling, thus, “Mantua” rather than “Mantova,” and
Rome instead of “Roma,” etc.
9.) At times I use “Venice” and “Venetians” to indicate the place, its people, and its sociopolitical institutions. When it is appropriate I specify nuances such as the “Venetian
senate” or “Venice’s populace,” etc.
10.)The term “stato da mar” (literally sea state) refers to the territories beyond Italy across
the waters of the Adriatic, Ionian, and Mediterranean Seas under the dominion of the
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Venetian government. The “terraferma” (literally fixed land) was the appellation
Venetians used to refer to territories on the Northern Italian mainland under their rule.
11.) Where the terms “relazione,” “relazioni” appear they refer to detailed final reports
Venetian ambassadors were to write and then read aloud before the Venetian collegio
upon returning home to Venice from their embassies. These reports did not figure into
French diplomatic praxis (“relations”) until mention of them appears after 1683, and then
only in one instance that I am aware of.
12.) The names of wars in which France was involved I call by the most common English
name when used in other secondary literature focusing on France. Where wars are
mentioned in which France was not directly involved, such as the “Candian War” or the
“Morean War,” I employ conventional appellations used in secondary literature focusing
on the state in question.
13.)As this dissertation focuses largely on a French perspective, place names, truces, and
treaties use the French spelling: thus “Strasbourg” rather than “Strasburg” and
“Ratisbonne” instead of Regensburg, etc.
14.) In Chapters 3 and following readers will encounter the terms “chambres de réunions,”
“réunions,” or “politics of réunions.” These terms refer to the controversial means
through which Louis XIV and his administration undertook a series of territorial
acquisitions on the kingdom’s eastern frontiers with the Holy Roman Empire and the
Spanish Netherlands. After the Treaties of Nijmegen (1678) and Saint-Germain-en-Laye
(1679) that ended the Dutch War (1672-1679) the king authorized the establishment of a
number of chambres de réunions. In these courts, or chambers, French lawyers produced
documentation containing often-tenuous proofs of French rights to territories in imperial
and Spanish dominions related to earlier treaties or addendums to acquisitions through
recent wars. They were to expand French land even further through allegedly legal
precedent without recourse to war. These “réunions à la couronne” (reunions to the
Crown) shocked Europeans through the audacity of a king who believed he could
convene courts of law to dictate over other European sovereigns’ territorial rights.
Subsequent violent invasions of Strasbourg (1681) and the Duchy of Luxembourg (1682)
among others that the chambres sanctioned further outraged Europeans against the
French in the early 1680s. Scholars still debate which of Louis’s ministers may have
devised this method of expansionism. The war minister, the Marquis de Louvois, and the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis de Croissy, have been suggested.
15.) All translations from the original French or Italian sources are fully my own. I accept
responsibility for any faults in meaning or nuance.
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In Regards to Venetian Government Institutions
Venetian patricians were entitled to a seat in the maggior consiglio (Great Council) and to a vote
in state affairs undertaken in consiglio. This body numbered between 2,000 members in the
sixteenth century to 1,000 members by 1797. Venice’s government and society became
increasingly dominated, however, by the decisions and authority of smaller councils like the
collegio and the Ten by the late seventeenth century. Many of the same prominent Venetian
families regularly came to hold seats in these deliberative councils forming what Filippo De
Vivo has called a “conservative oligarchy” that vexed the broader aristocratic population.
Readers will encounter the following Venetian government officials and institutions throughout
this work. I attempt briefly to explain their functions below for clarity.1
1. Il Doge (the duke): Doges were the elected heads of the Venetian state, and they represented
the incarnate image of the republic. They held little delineated executive power, but they held
much authority in terms of their capacity to persuade and to advise in councils. The prominent
families from which they were drawn placed them within factions espousing the direction of
foreign and domestic policies at any given moment. Foreign ambassadors had personal access to
Doges only during state occasions to which they were invited.
2. Il senato (senate): Because the maggior consiglio was too numerous to make all state
decisions quickly, the senate, variously comprising up to 300 elected men, evolved to facilitate
more efficient policy making. The same senators often held seats for decades. It was in the senate
that debates and votes regarding foreign and domestic policies occurred.
3. Il collegio (the college): The composition of this body changed over time, but it held between
23 and 26 members who effectively controlled the Venetian state. The collegio normally
comprised the Doge, 6 dogal counselors, 6 savii grandi, the 3 heads of the quarantia criminale,
3 state inquisitors, and 3 chiefs of the Council of Ten. It was the collegio that determined
important affairs that should be passed to the senate for votes. The collegio was also the body
that controlled diplomacy. Foreign diplomats negotiated with the senate via the collegio, and
they only ever appeared in person for official audiences before the collegio. It should also be
noted that the savii grandi set the agenda for both the collegio and the senate. Members of the
other councils informed the savii of business and information to be passed between councils.
Their privileged access to knowledge and its transmission between councils gave them great
authority within the government. Venetian ambassadors read their relazioni – concluding reports
of their embassies - aloud to the collegio upon their return to the republic.

1

On Venice’s government institutions see Filippo De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking
Early Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28, 30-31, 33-36, 37-40 passim, 74-75; Frederic C.
Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 253-258 passim, 428430.
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4. Il consiglio dei dieci (Council of Ten): Founded in 1310, the Ten were charged with
safeguarding the state and especially, although ironically, the privileges of the patriciate over
whom they often acted as judges. This council’s role included the prosecution and judgment of
cases related to the patriciate and to the collection of all secret and classified information related
to affairs of state and state security. The Ten also controlled the state archives. By the
seventeenth century the Ten were involved in almost every aspect of state business, and their
power within the government was a source of tension among the state’s nobility. They
communicated regularly with Venetian ambassadors at foreign courts. The information the Ten
collected was transmitted really on a “need to know” basis to entities like the collegio and the
senate. Theoretically the intelligence the Ten collected was only rarely to pass among the
broader Venetian government bodies.
5. Gli inquisitori di stato (State Inquisitors): Founded in 1539 at the behest of the Council of
Ten, the 3 state inquisitors were drawn from among the Ten and functioned as an even more
restrictive instrument of that council. The inquisitors’ business was to collect information about
those within Venice and abroad who had or who were believed to have compromised Venetian
state information and security. Through their numerous spies and informants in Venice — known
as confidenti — they sought at once to root out and squelch the leakage of intelligence and to
collect knowledge of use to the Ten and thus to state security. Venetian ambassadors interacted
with the inquisitors and became, in their turn, spies. The Ten and the inquisitors employed
secretive and sometimes brutal tactics to garner information or to safeguard state secrets.
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Chronology of Ambassadors, Chargés d’affaires, and Consuls in Venice during the
“Personal Rule” of Louis XIV, 1661-1715.2

Ambassadors and Chargés d’affaires:
Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers, ambassadeur ordinaire

(1662-1665)

Paul Vedoa consul de la nation française and chargé d’affaires

(1665-1668)

The Président de Saint-André, ambassadeur ordinaire3

(1668-1671)

The Comte d’Avaux, ambassadeur ordinaire4

(1672-1674)

Pailleroles, chargé d’affaires

(1674-1675)

Jean-François d’Estrades, Abbé de Moissac
(known as the Abbé d’Estrades), ambassadeur ordinaire

(1675-1678)

Pinchesne, chargé d’Affaires5

(1678-1679)

The Sieur de Varangeville, ambassadeur ordinaire

(1679-1682)

Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot, ambassadeur ordinaire6

(1682-1685)

Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantalet, ambassadeur ordinaire

(1685-1701)

César, Cardinal d’Estrées, ambassadeur extraordinaire

(1701-1702)

Hennequin, Sieur de Charmont, ambassadeur ordinaire

(1701-1704)

Champigny, chargé d’affaires

(1704-1705)

The Abbé de Pomponne, ambassadeur ordinaire

(1705-1722)

2

N.B. Ambassadors discussed in this dissertation are bolded above. Dates following their names are the years they
served in Venice. This chronology does not take into account a number of extraordinary and incognito envoys that
Louis and his ministers sent to the republic most notably the Comte de Rebenac’s incognito embassy in 1691.
Additionally, listed in the following notes are the secretaries of ambassadors of which I am aware.
3
Abraham-Nicolas, Amelot de la Houssaie (1634-1706) served as secretary to the Président de Saint-André. He
should not be confused with the ambassador, Michel-Antoine, sieur d’Amelot. They were possibly related by
marriage.
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Alexandre-Toussaint Limojon de Saint-Didier (1630-1689) served as secretary to the Comte d’Avaux.
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François-Martin, sieur de Pinschesne served in Venice and Turin as secretary to the Abbé d’Estrades.
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Roger de Piles (1635-1709) served as secretary to the sieur d’Amelot.
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(1679-1718)

xviii

Maps of Venice Indicating Sites Relative to French Ambassadors

Fig. 1 The map above is Hendrik van Loon’s 1695 Venise, Ville Capitale de la plus Célèbre, et Illustre République
de l’Europe; it is taken from Nicolas de Fer’s 1720, Atlas ou Recueil des Cartes Géographiques. The map was
dedicated to the Dauphin. The black-circled zone to the top left-center indicates the confines of the lista dei francesi,
the extraterritorial zone protected under French immunities, in the sestiere of Cannaregio.
A.) The site of the French embassy during the reign of Louis XIV.
B.) The church and piazza of the Madonna dell’Orto
C.) Relative site of the church and the piazza of San Francesco della Vigna
D.) The Venetian arsenal.
E.) Relative site of Santa Maria Gloriosa. Attached to the church was the Franciscan monastery (colloquially ai
frari).
F.) Saint Mark’s Square and environs. In this area were the buildings of Venice’s government institutions, the
Broglio, and prisons (cachots noirs).
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Fig.2 Detail from Ludovico Ughi’s 1729 Iconografica Rappresentazione della Inclita Città di Venezia al Reggio
Serenissimo Domino Veneto. The arrow indicates the position of the palazzo of the French embassy.

Fig.3 Façade of the actual Palazzo Paloral. Pursuing the rio into the distance
one arrives at the piazza della Madonna dell’Orto.

xx

Introduction
Louis XIV’s Foreign Policies and the Republic of Venice Reconsidered through Five
French Ambassadors.

Fig. 4

By the close of the seventeenth century the dynastic pretensions of Louis XIV provoked
the states of Europe into three wars. Within the kingdom of France a rigid royal court and an
increasingly entrenched bureaucratic administration characterized the later decades of Louis’s
reign. Ludovician rule became synonymous inside and outside of France with bullying foreign
policies, economic turmoil, a miserable populace, and a crusty dévot court. These legacies
progressively defined the rule of a sextuagenarian monarch enshrined-qua-entombed in the
rituals of Versailles.1 Contrastingly, in Paris a younger coterie flocked around the Dauphin in a
milieu distanced from the king. In the capital the Dauphin’s circle was often to be found at the
1

Georgia Cowart, “Carnival in Venice or Protest in Paris? Louis XIV and the Politics of Subversion at the Paris
Opéra,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 54, No. 2 (2001), 265-266. See Fig. 4 for the frontispiece to
Campra’s work.
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académie royale de musique. Here artistic representations of Italian culture - especially the
Venetian carnival - provided an ideological foil to Louis XIV’s absolutist regime and the
militaristic imperatives of Bourbon dynasticism that informed the preceding decades of French
culture.2
André Campra’s opéra-ballet, Le carnaval de Venise, appeared at the académie on 28
February 1699 on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession. This piece, with its subtle
satirization of a megalomaniacal Louis XIV, according to Georgia Cowart, epitomized the
disillusionment of French subjects as the reign and the century dragged on. The subjects of the
king in the piece’s prologue can ultimately find solace from their cares only in the fantasy of the
republic’s famed carnival and its culture of masks. Likewise, Parisian theatergoers away from
Versailles looked for an escape in the hedonism and mythologized freedoms of the republic and
through its artistic representation.3 Such idealized entertainments, however, masked a marked
juxtaposition with the king’s actual diplomatic relations with the Republic of Saint Mark. As the
seventeenth century ended, from Louis XIV’s perspective, the long amicable rapport between
France and “cette république” – that republic – as the king condescendingly referred to Venice,
outlived its usefulness. This had not always been the case.
2
Cowart, “Carnival in Venice or Protest in Paris?” 269, 272-273. Jean-François Regnard wrote the libretto for the
piece. Jean Duron, “Introduction,” in Le Carnaval de Venise (1699) de André Campra et Jean-François Regnard:
livret, études, et commentaires, ed. Jean Duron (Wavre, Belgium: Marduga, 2010), 10. Louis XIV expelled Italian
actors from France in 1697 considering them politically and religio-culturally subversive. The appearance of
Italianate themes on Parisian stages before approving members of the royal family flew in the face of the king’s
attempted censorship. Cowart, 267, 272-273; Guy Boquet, “Les Comediens Italiens a Paris au temps de Louis XIV,”
Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine T26e, no. 3 (1979), 435-436, 438.
3
Cowart, 280, 295-296. Campra’s piece is set in contemporary Paris, but the characters devise an entertainment set
in Venice to escape their travails. The theme of Venetian pleasures and the city’s alleged freedoms remained a
theme for the Parisian artistic milieu. Campra himself took up the subject of Venice again in 1710 with his opéraballet, Les Fêtes Vénitiennes. Subsequent artistic mediums also utilized Italianate themes as counterpoises to
absolutist propaganda such as Antoine Watteau’s representations on canvas of the commedia dell’arte. Ibid., 266267. Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure: Louis XIV and the Politics of Spectacle (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2008), xviii, xxiii; Boquet, “Les comédiens Italiens à Paris,” 438; Maximilien Misson, Lettre XVII, à
Venise 14 Février 1688, in Nouveau Voyage d’Italie, Avec un Mémoire contenant des Avis utiles a ceux qui
voudront faire le mesme voyage, 4th Ed., Tome I (The Hague: Henry Van Hulderen, 1711), 239. Misson noted the
libertinism associated with seventeenth-century Venice.
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The aim of this dissertation then is to trace the trajectory and ultimate disintegration of
Franco-Venetian relations in the late seventeenth century through the diplomatic efforts and
experiences of five of Louis XIV’s ambassadors to Venice. Central to this investigation is a
focus on how the independent decisions of individual ambassadors posted to Venice informed
and delineated many choices in louisquatorzien foreign and domestic politics. The concretization
of dynastic foreign strategies into de facto action, in part, resulted from ambassadors’ decisions
distanced from the conseil d’en haut.4 Their actions on France’s periphery, however, were
central to French diplomacy. They were taken outside the king’s gaze in spite of a propaganda
“machine” upon which were predicated idealized notions that the reins of power were held in the
hands of the omniscient autocrat.5 If Louis was omniscient he was so because of the efforts of his
ministers.6
Traditional narratives depicting the resultant evolution of Louis XIV’s foreign policy
goals and the formation of the absolutist French bureaucracy should be viewed from French
ministers’ efforts outside of the kingdom as much as from those within. To understand more
fully the longue durée adaptations in Louis’s pretensions to territorial expansionism, historians
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The “high council.” It was in the conseil d’en haut where international affairs were most often discussed,
dispatches read, and official decisions taken. Lucien Bély, Louis XIV: le plus grand roi du monde (Paris: Éditions
Jean-Paul Gisserot, 2005), 85- 86.
5
Many scholars have discussed Louis XIV’s propaganda machine and its ultimate inability to maintain the fiction of
absolute rule both inside and, more recently, outside of France. See Nathan T. Whitman, “Myth and Politics:
Versailles and the Fountain of Latona,” in Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, ed. John C. Rule (Ohio: the Ohio
State University Press, 1969), 286-301; Jean-Marie Apostolidès, Le roi-machine: Spectacle et politique au temps de
Louis XIV (Paris: 1981); Louis Marin, Portrait of the King (University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Nicolas Henshall,
The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (London: 1992); Peter
Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven: 1994); Jeroën Duindam, Myths of Power: Norbert Elias and the
Early Modern European Court, trans. Lorri S. Granger and Gerard T. Moran (Amsterdam: 1994); Stanis Perez, “Les
Rides d’Apollon: l’évolution des portraits de Louis XIV,” in Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, no. 50/3
(2003), 62-95; Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure: Louis XIV and the Politics of Spectacle (Chicago: 2008); Colin
Jones, “The King’s Two Teeth,” in History Workshop Journal 65, issue 1, (2008): 79-95; Hendrick Ziegler, Louis
XIV et ses ennemis: Images, propagande et contestation (Paris: 2013), and Tony Claydon and Charles-Édouard
Levillain, eds., Louis XIV Outside In: Images of the Sun King Beyond France, 1661-1715 (Oxford: 2015); Ziegler,
“Image Battles under Louis XIV: Some Reflections,” in Claydon and Levillain.
6
John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), 166-167.
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must also peer diachronically through lenses held in the hands of the ambassadors posted outside
of France within states like Venice. Like domestic policies within Louis XIV’s kingdom,
Ludovician foreign policy comprised a series of quotidian accommodations and concessions visa-vis the states in which ambassadors were posted, the ambassadors themselves, French
ministries, and, ultimately, the king. Acting as decision makers outside of France, ambassadors
became central to policy compelling the monarch and his government to react to their choices
with lasting ramifications for French international relations and domestic institutions.
I investigate the careers and embassies of five particular ambassadors posted in Venice
during the decades of Louis XIV’s so-called “personal rule” (1661-1715). The diplomatic
rapport between France and Venice devolved from one of apparent sovereign equality and
expectant mutual benefit in the early 1660s as the personal rule began to one of scorn and nearrupture by 1702. For the rest of the eighteenth century relations with the republic ceased to be of
great consequence for French foreign affairs. With this contention in mind, I chose to delimit my
investigation to five significant embassies from 1662, when the king posted his first ambassador
to Venice after taking up the reins of government, through 1702 when the rapport withered.
Louis XIV officially posted nine ordinary ambassadors and one extraordinary
ambassador to the republic in the decades of his personal rule. Of these, the five ministers chosen
provide insight into remarkable moments in the history of Franco-Venetian diplomacy and
evidence of the broader claims I make throughout the dissertation. The six chapters of this study
focus on the experiences in Venice of Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1662-1665), JeanFrançois d’Estrades, Abbé of Moissac (1675-1678), Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot (16821685), Denis II de la Haye, Seigneur de Vantelet (1685-1701), and César, Cardinal d’Estrées
(1701-1702). Their roles as representatives of Louis XIV’s authority expands our understanding
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of developments in French policies with the Republic of Venice, the Habsburg monarchies, and
various states of Italy. Moreover, they partially open a window onto the French government’s
strategies to hegemonize maritime and commercial politics in the Mediterranean Sea. Affairs in
the Mediterranean as much as continental politics connected Louis XIV’s France and the
Venetian republic.
Why France and Venice?
Why study diplomatic relations between Louis XIV’s France and the Republic of
Venice? Was not Venice an irrelevant polity on the international stage by the late-seventeenth
century? It might seem that the great monarchies surrounding the Most Serene Republic eclipsed
and overshadowed it as a “secondary state.”7 Was not Louis XIV’s preeminence in Europe an
established verity? The ideological, military, and commercial expanse between the two states
seems insuperable through historical retrospection. The initial questions, however, are fraught.
Some have posited or suggested that the Republic of Venice was obviously in “decline” or
inconsequential by the last half of the century. In his well-known study, William Bouwsma
noted:
It can hardly be denied that Venice in the long run did not, and probably could
not, rise to the challenges with which she was confronted. By the second quarter
of the seventeenth century her decadence was evident, though less so to
contemporaries than to us. Yet her adjustment to novel conditions was more
successful, and some of its incidental accomplishments were more significant for
the future, than has often been recognized. To characterize the sixteenth century
as the decadence of Venice is premature, at the least. Venice retained her vigor
through the sixteenth century, her European importance through the first half of
the seventeenth, and, under improbable conditions, her independence until
Napoleon8
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David Parrott, “A ‘prince sovereign’ and the French Crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637,” in Royal and
Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, eds., Robert Oresko, G. C.
Gibbs, and Hamish M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 149.
8
William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty: Renaissance Values in the Age of the
Counter Reformation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 96. Italics are mine.
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I hope to demonstrate in part that characterizations of Venice’s “European importance” - read
diplomatic relevance - like Bouwsma’s to contemporaries should be extended instead at least to
the advent of the eighteenth century within the context of French foreign policy.
The mid-century Candian War (1645-1669) between Venice and the Turk depleted
Venice’s state coffers and cast doubt upon the state’s future authority in the Mediterranean Sea
and continental Europe to be sure.9 The war, however, did not portend with any certainty that the
republic was on a trajectory either of irrevocable dissolution or international irrelevance.10 On
the contrary, by 1699 at the end of the First Morean War (1684-1699) Venice had regained
almost all of its Mediterranean empire while simultaneously inspiring artistic representations of
its cultural and political renown upon stages as far afield as Paris. There existed, therefore, no
discernable synchronicity between the ultimate demise of the Republic of Venice in 1797 and the
events contemporaries observed in the last half of the seventeenth century.
Through an examination of Franco-Venetian diplomacy, I argue that the republic
remained decidedly pertinent in European international politics prompting Louis le Grand, who
came to dominate international affairs in the last half of the century, to maintain vigorous
diplomatic ties with it. From the perspective of a purported Venetian “decline” this counterpoint
is significant. European contemporaries still did not presuppose the inoperable death throes of

9

For one contemporary account of the war for Crete see Andrea Valier, Historia della Guerra di Candia (Venice:
Paolo Baglioni, 1679). See also: W. Bigge, La guerra di Candia fra 1667-1669 (Turin: 1901); Frederic C. Lane,
Venice a Maritime History, 409-410. In English the most in-depth treatment of the Venetian struggle to maintain a
Mediterranean empire in the mid and later century is Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turk in the
Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991); Guido Candiani, “Francia, Papato e
Venezia nella fase finale della Guerra di Candia,” in Atti dell’Instituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Tomo CLII
(1993-1994) – Classe di scienze morali, lettere ed arti, 829-872; Candiani, “Conflitti di intenti e di ragioni politiche,
di ambizioni e di interessi nel patriziato veneto durante la guerra di candia,” Studi Veneziani 36 (Pisa: Istituti
Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1998), 145-275. Candiani studies the Venetian struggle for its stato da mar
and the republic’s successful maintenance of vessels required to maintain them in I vascelli della Serenissima:
guerra, politica e costruzione navale à Venezia à l’età moderna, 1650-1720 (Venice: 2009).
10
Joanne Ferraro posits that generalized discussions of “decline” do not reflect the realities of the late-seventeenthcentury Venetian economy or the republic’s vigor in broader European and Mediterranean affairs. Ferraro, Venice:
History of the Floating City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 174-175, 176.
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the republic even while noting the government’s economic distress and internal socio-political
strife up to and after the First Morean War.11 The Englishman, Joseph Addison, for example,
observed in early 1702 to the Whig Lord Sommers, his patron and advisor to Louis XIV’s
adversary, King William III, that “Among all of these difficulties the republic will still maintain
itself, if policy can prevail upon force; for it is certain the Venetian senate is one of the wisest
councils in the world…. The preservation of the republic is that to which all other considerations
submit.”12
The Venetian state had not been the only European polity to experience turbulence and
uncertainty in the mid-seventeenth century.13 France too endured crises. The fraught regency of
Anne of Austria, the Frondes (1648-1652), endemic corruption in state finance, and the FrancoSpanish War left the kingdom in economic turmoil and internally unstable.14 The subsequent
long personal rule of Louis XIV only progressed gradually in the decades thereafter. Scholars
have understood that the personal rule of Louis XIV propelled France to the apogee of its
international and cultural authority. This did not happen overnight on 9 March 1661, and this
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That is not to say that there was no mention of Venetian difficulties among contemporaries. In his controversial
history. Amelot de la Houssaie dedicated Part V of Tome II, “Des Causes principales de la décadence de la
République de Venise,” to a discussion of the commercial and moral decline of the republic. He noted that among
the reasons was a shift to Atlantic trade, political and social corruption, and the republic’s seeming inability to create
a military force to protect its terraferma dominions. Amelot did not, however, suggest that the state was
inconsequential vis-a-vis European or Mediterranean affairs. He outlined the ongoing political alignments that
Venice maintained with European states. It should be noted, however, that his history was written and first published
in 1676 just after the loss of Crete and before the First Morean War when Venice aligned with Leopold I and began
the reclamation of its lost Mediterranean territories. Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du
Gouvernement de Venise, Tome II (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1705), 497 passim. For works concerning Venice
and its relations with the Ottomans from the time of the loss of Crete and through the First Morean War see: Jean
Georgelin, “La République de Venise et la fin du dominio del mare (1699-1718),” Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique
90 (1976): 193-219; Le relazioni fra Venezia e la Turchia dal 1670 al 1684 e la formazione della Sacra Lega,”
Archivio Veneto-Trentino 7, (1925): 1-46; S. Perini, “Venezia e la guerra di Morea (1684-1699),” Archivio Veneto
S5, no. 153 (1999): 45-91.
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Joseph Addison, Remarks on Several Parts of Italy, Etc, In the years 1701, 1702, 1703 (London: J. & R. Tonson,
1767), 63.
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For the classic argument for a general seventeenth-century crisis in Europe see Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle
for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: 1975).
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Jean-Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l’administration de Colbert (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846), 74.
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was not certain at Cardinal Mazarin’s death in spite of the international successes of the League
of the Rhine and the Peace of the Pyrenees.15 The untried Bourbon king’s individual ability to
rule over an economically and militarily exhausted kingdom was not yet assured despite his
subsequent mythologized prise de pouvoir.16 By 1661, therefore, both Venice and France were
weakened, war-weary, and, arguably, on the brink either of change or further ruin.
In that year, European governments waited to see how Louis XIV would fare as sole ruler
in a kingdom accustomed to canny first ministers. Coincidently they watched to see if Venice
could defend its sovereignty over the island of Crete and its stature as Queen of the Adriatic Sea.
Although territorially smaller, the Most Serene Republic of Venice remained an established
polity vaunting a time-honored conciliar government and a republican political ethos free of the
succession crises neighboring monarchies experienced in the middle of the century. The “myth”
of Venice’s stability and freedom undergirded industrial and commercial regrowth and a robust,
if not, as Richard Mackenney said, “ambiguous” political-cultural heritage among European
states still in the last half of the century.17 This mythologized stability, however, could not cover
the internal socio-political fractures – hence the ambiguity of stability – that French ambassadors
reported to the king from within the republic. Ultimately, the absolutist regime of Louis XIV and
the stability of the Most Serene Republic rested upon mythologies of power very much in vigor
as the century closed. Idealized projections of authority aimed at those excluded from
15

These achievements succeeded much internal strife even if successful for Mazarin’s foreign policy aims.
Condren, Louis XIV et le repos de l’Italie, 18-19, 22-23.
16
“The taking of power.” Wolf, Louis XIV, 134-135; Paul Sonnino, “The Sun King’s Anti-Machiavel,” in Rule, 346;
Jerome Janczukiewicz, “La Prise de pouvoir de Louis XIV: la construction du mythe,” Dix-Septième Siècle, no. 227
(2005/2) 243-264.
17
John Martin and Dennis Romano, “Introduction” in Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an
Italian City-State, 1297-1797 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 2; Richard Mackenney, “‘A Plot
Discover’d?’ Myth, Legend, and the “Spanish” Conspiracy against Venice in 1618,” in Martin and Romano, 209;
David Rosand, Myths of Venice: The Figuration of a State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001),
3-4; Vittorio Conti, “The Mechanisation of Virtue: Republican Rituals in Italian Political Thought in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, eds. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin
Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge Universuty Press, 2002), 74-76.
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governance were to mask the realities of economic and commercial fluctuation; the uncertainties
accompanying territorial expansionism and its losses; and the tensions between centralizing
government institutions and aristocracies covetous of their prerogatives.
France and Venice faced change and challenge in the last four decades of the century.
Both governments encountered simultaneous crises again at the dawn of the eighteenth. The
gloire (glory) that came to characterize Louis XIV’s reign by 1702 dimmed. French domestic
prosperity staggered after the War of the League of Augsburg as the Grand Alliance challenged
the king’s geopolitical dominance.18 After two protracted wars with the Ottoman Turks ending in
1699 - the year Campra’s Le Carnaval de Venise appeared in Paris - Venetian institutional and
economic distress threatened an increasingly costly French dynastic politics. Louis’s authority
was stretched to its limits as the final acceptance of Carlos II’s will in 1700 catapulted European
states into the War of the Spanish Succession. Venice’s international affinities had always been
of consequence to Ludovician policies in Italy and the Mediterranean Sea, but the republic’s
diplomatic attachments after the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz pitted it against Louis XIV by 1701.
During the First Morean War the republic regained much of its Mediterranean empire and
considerable prestige in the offing. Along the way, however, the Venetian treasury and militarynaval resources diminished and public debt surged ever upward.19 As it scrambled to reestablish
authority in its stato da mar, Venice’s government looked to allies who might help defend
Mediterranean interests against Ottoman hatred. An opprobrium, with no coincidental irony, that
French ambassadors in Constantinople intensified against the republic.20
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John C. Rule, “Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate,” in Rule, 78-79.
Lane, Venice: A Maritime History, 416-417.
20 ASV, IS-LAF, Busta 153, Inquisitors of State to Pisani, 21 Oct. 1702; Eva Boka and Katalin Vargyas, “Le
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Venice’s increasingly destabilized status by 1702 troubled Louis XIV because the
republic deferred to the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I. The senate claimed neutrality among
European dynastic affairs, but French ministers described a different reality. From 1683 to 1699,
Venetian neutrality became a fiction from the French perspective. Leopold assisted the Venetians
dividing Ottoman forces on land through his conquests in Hungary and the Balkans. Pursuant to
the Treaty of Carlowitz, Joseph Addison reported, “...the Venetians are under articles with the
Emperor to resign into his hands whatever they conquer of the Turkish dominions, that has been
formerly dismembered from the empire. And having already very much dissatisfy’d him in the
Frioul and Dalmatia, they dare not think of exasperating him further.”21
The Venetian senate begrudgingly, if quietly, cast its lot with Leopold. Additionally, the
troops and money of German princes aided Venice in successful naval battles during its
penultimate Mediterranean conflict. From the vantage of Louis XIV, his ambassadors, and other
European commentators, Venice was not a neutral state when the war for the Spanish throne
began in September 1702. Addison further noted correctly:
“...the common people of Italy, who run more into news and politicks than those
of other countries, have all of them something to exasperate them against the King
of France…. The Venetians will tell you of his leagues with the Turks…. That,
however,which I take to be the principal motive among most of the Italians, for
their favouring the Germans above the French, is this, that they are entirely
persuaded that it is for the interest of Italy to have Milan and Naples rather in the
hands of the first than of the other.”22
Venice’s government would not ally against Leopold in favor of French dynasticism affording
him assistance in the terraferma and the Adriatic Sea. It vexed Louis XIV not to be able to
control Venice’s foreign policies as he had sought to do with other Italian states.
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Ambassadors’ correspondence with the court, travel accounts, and other sources reveal,
therefore, an energetic, thriving Venetian state. Although beset with challenges, the republic’s
government gave Louis XIV’s dynastic politics in Italy and the Mediterranean Sea the proverbial
“run for the money” when it wanted during the forty years that I examine. Furthermore, the
Serenissima’s acidulous political environment and international interests received or aided in
forming robust French ambassadors who represented and informed Louis’s policies. Venice’s
senate could not be bullied in spite of the disparities in the size of its dominions and fewer
resources compared to those of the king. French policies were altered as a result of interactions
with diminutive states like the republic. For such reasons, the value of an investigation of
louisquatorzien relations with the Serenissima is timely and appreciable.
The International Connections of France and Venice
Louis XIV’s dynastic imperative informed and formed his international strategies.23
French diplomacy was meant to bolster Bourbon territorial expansionism and renown.
Additionally, Colbertist mercantilism with its commercial, industrial, and maritime innovations
fed the financial and military needs of the Bourbon state and its expansion.24 Diplomatic
relations too fed the demands of louisquatorzien institutions and worked either toward
international complicity or the appeasement, bullying, or outright subjugation of neighboring
states that would not be easily swayed to accept the king’s dynastic and hegemonic intentions.
An important systemic aspect of Louis’s rule, diplomacy delineated the policies that his
ambassadors were to press at foreign courts. Louis XIV believed foreign relations to be a chief
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On proprietary dynasticism see Herbert H. Rowen, “Louis XIV and Absolutism,” in Rule, 316; Rowen, The
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24 William F. Church, “Louis XIV and Reason of State,” in Rule, 379-380.
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concern for the monarch alone and central to the métier du Roi.25 Through royal instruction
ambassadors exported the skeletal requirements that Louis’s evolving expansionist framework
demanded. Officially ambassadors mediated and negotiated in favor of French policies vis-a-vis
the needs and concerns of international neighbors. Unofficially, these ministers worked behind
the scenes through political and industrial espionage and subterfuge in an effort to actualize
Louis’s administrative goals. It is significant to the story of Louis’s rule that many of the
successful foreign policy aims that ambassadors in Venice accomplished resulted from nefarious
intelligence practices rather than from the idealized official role of the ambassador as an
honorable simulacrum of the sovereign.
Venice proved to be rather impenetrable in relation to the louisquatorzien monolith
against which some other ships of “secondary states” like the Republic of Genoa crashed.
Responses of international neighbors like Venice to French foreign policy were often beyond
Louis XIV’s control, but his diplomats were expected to solidify the policies of their master.
Correspondingly, France’s neighboring states had their geopolitical ends to promote. Diplomacy
is a story of compromise and accommodation whenever possible accomplished within “...a set of
assumptions, institutions, and processes — a practice....26 This was the story with Louis XIV’s
ambassadors. The inability of these ambassadors consistently to persuade the Venetian
government’s total complicity through accepted diplomatic channels underscored that Louis
XIV’s authority was not absolute either over the abilities of the ministers he sanctioned or in the
demands of the international arena.
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Three principal international connections permeated and informed the “diplomatic
narrative” connecting Louis XIV’s France and the republic. These connections emerge from the
correspondence of the ambassadors; they were directly interwoven with the king’s territorial
expansionism, the push for commercial and maritime hegemony, or the protection of
louisquatorzien prestige and honor. First, France and the republic were connected through a
strategic “friendship.” Since the sixteenth century French kings looked to Venice as an ally in the
states’ mutual antagonism toward the Habsburgs.
Since the reign of Henri II the French considered Venice to be a counterpoise in the
Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea against the dynastic pretensions of Austrian and
Spanish monarchs.27 Venice too believed that friendly ties with France could offset the threat of
the two Habsburg states and their Italian satellites amid which it was wedged. This relationship
survived and strengthened under Louis XIII during the crises of the Valtellina through the
League of Avignon and the later Mantuan Succession.28 Mutual anti-Habsburg strategy held
sway from the sixteenth century until, as I argue further along, Louis XIV’s administration
disillusioned the republic’s government in its pleas for assistance against the Ottomans in the
Candian War.
Venetians’ affinity for the French moldered after desultory French forces failed to impede
the loss of Crete in 1668-1669 despite Venetian assistance in the king’s ongoing feud with Pope
Alexander VII. The republican government soon understood that the young monarch viewed its
collaboration, while often necessary, with an annoying condescension. From the 1670s and into
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the eighteenth century, the Venetian senate gained a mistrust for the territorially greedy king,
and, while upholding neutrality among European dynastic states’ interests, the republic veered
decidedly into a favorable rapport with Leopold I. Finally, an open alliance, the revived Holy
League, cemented Venice’s preference for the emperor from 1684 through the remainder of
Louis XIV’s reign; although the Venetians officially tried to downplay their anti-French
sentiment through the rhetoric of neutrality, this pact strengthened Leopold’s resolve against
French policies. It also partially determined Louis’s other strategies in Northern Italy and among
Mediterranean polities like the Republic of Ragusa and the Ottomans.
The triangulation between France, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire formed a second
facet of Franco-Venetian diplomacy. The manipulative strategies that Louis XIV and his
ambassadors employed against the Venetians in Constantinople throughout the last decades of
the century underscored the ongoing importance of Venice in Mediterranean and European
affairs. Louis XIV and his ministers were careful in the 1660s to avoid upsetting France’s longheld alliance with the Ottomans and offending Mehmet IV by lending overt military assistance to
Leopold I or the Venetians in their conflicts with the sultan. Louis dangled the possibility of
financial and military aid before Venice’s senate while he declared to his ambassador there that
he had no intention of sinking men and funds into a war that could provide little benefit to
France.29 Ultimately, it would also have damaged Franco-Ottoman relations.
Colbertist economic and maritime policies demanded a healthy relationship with the
Ottomans to bolster flagging French commercial interests in the Mediterranean. The renewal of
the trade capitulations in 1673 helped France toward this goal.30 Louis’s strategies regarding the
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sultan thereafter offended the emperor, the pope, and the Venetians. The republic’s senate looked
with bewilderment at the king’s machinations with the infidel and rage at his unwillingness to
counter the Turk during the 1683 siege of Vienna. Venetians saw Louis’s arrogant accord with
the Sultan as contrary to the values of a Christian prince and a menace to its own sovereignty
over the Adriatic Sea and surrounding Dalmatian territories.
French ambassadors in Constantinople undermined Ottoman sentiment against the
Venetians, and, as the republic began earnestly reclaiming its Mediterranean empire during the
Morean War, French diplomats to the sultan further inflamed anti-Venetian sentiment. French
ambassadors in Venice used the threat of possible Ottoman attacks against it to intimidate the
republic and its continued alliance with Leopold I and the papacy. One French ambassador in
Constantinople, the Marquis de Ferriol, however, claimed that Leopold I incited the Turk against
Venice to press his claims in Italy, but by 1702 the Venetian senate was concerned enough about
the threat French ambassadors to La Porte posed that it resentfully sent an extraordinary
ambassador to Versailles ultimately prostrating itself to accommodate the king.31 The
relationship between France, Venice and the Ottomans was distinctly related either to their
commercial or territorial interests in the Mediterranean Sea and their stance toward Leopold I.
Louis mobilized the Turk through diplomacy to destabilize the emperor and the Venetians to
press French policies in Europe, and, in response, these states drew closer together.32
Finally, Italian peninsular politics connected the tangled webs enmeshing France and
Venice. The rapport between France and Italian states at this time has received scholary
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attention.33 Recent investigations have benefitted in part from new appraisals of the history of
diplomacy and the broader history of the Mediterranean in the period. I believe that an increased
appreciation for the role that small, seemingly inconsequential states can play in the
development, application, or enervation of the authority, prestige, and credibility of large states
should drive further investigations among early modernists. Recent “modern” geopolitics reflect
such realities with violent precision and urgency; the meddling and manipulation of larger states
in the social, economic, military, religio-cultural, and political spheres of “small” states yield
unforeseen consequences no matter how ideologically self-assured and militarily superior a
larger state may be. Ludovician political interests among Italian states in the late seventeenth
century reflected such realities.
Scholarship has focused upon Louis XIV’s diplomatic and strategic rapports with states
like Parma, Modena, Mantua-Monferrato, Savoy, and Tuscany.34 On one hand, I have
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intentionally avoided treading upon the current and ongoing research of scholars working in
depth on these topics. On the other hand, Louis XIV’s instructions to and the correspondence of
French ambassadors revealed that the thrust of the king’s diplomatic approach to Venice was
aimed only indirectly, albeit with intention, at his policies with other Italian states. Ambassadors
in Venice were to keep abreast of news coming from these states and correspond with
ambassadors in them when necessary.
French ambassadors referenced the authority and influence that the republic’s
government - equaled only by that of the papacy - wielded over other Italian governments and
their international alignments. As French ties with Savoy and Tuscany were relatively strong
throughout much of the late seventeenth century and those of Venice with Savoy were almost
non-existent because of the two states’ long-time feud over Cyprus and arguments related to
ambassadorial precedence only sporadic communication relative to French interests with these
states appeared in the diplomatic records.35 Instead the king and the secretaries of foreign affairs
instructed ambassadors to prompt and to pressure the Venetian government’s collaboration and
complicity in French policies toward the papal court in an effort to guide other Italian polities.
Upon this second triangular rapport - France-Venice-Papacy - hinged a number of Louis
XIV’s domestic ecclesiastical and external political decisions. Much like the unofficial FrancoVenetian accord against Habsburg hegemony so too Venice’s government and that of France
supported one another against the ecclesiastical pretensions of the papacy since the late sixteenth
century.36 The questionable religious convictions of Henri IV and Venice’s 1606 interdict crisis
inter alia created an often-shared diplomatic block in the face of successive pontiffs’ claims over
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church doctrine, political interventions, and ecclesiastical nominations and jurisdiction surviving
well into Louis XIV’s reign.
The king and his ambassadors utilized a shared and traditional Venetian antipathy for the
papacy. The king watched with interest how the senate stubbornly dealt with its own quarrels
over jurisdiction with popes like Innocent XI. A compliant senate, through Venetian
ambassadors in Rome, could also bolster the king’s indirect control over states like the duchies
of Modena and Parma who superficially relied on the king for protection against the potential
encroachments of Spanish, papal, and imperial monarchs. Venetian cardinals in alignment with
those of France or others in the French camp might counter Francophobe members of the Sacred
College in papal politics while manipulating the outcomes of conclaves. Without fail
ambassadors’ parting instructions from secretaries of foreign affairs directed them to remind the
senate of Venetian cardinals’ traditional attachments to those of France at the Roman court.
The Marcian Republic, however, benefitted from papal funds, warships, and ideological
support in its conflicts with the Ottoman infidel throughout the later decades of the century to
such an extent that, in much the same vein as the Venetian rapport with Leopold I, the senate
became increasingly reluctant to vet wholesale French policies in Rome. The senate’s hesitation
grew as Louis XIV’s territorial acquisitions, military depredations across Europe, politics of
réunions, and machinations in the Mediterranean threatened to alter traditional Venetian spheres
of sovereignty in the sea and Northern Italy.
The king’s occupation of Casale in 1681 after its purchase from the Duke of Mantua in
conjunction with the already-held fortress of Pinerolo on the Savoyard border provided the king
leverage in Italy that frightened the Venetians. French protectionism of Parma, Mantua, and
Modena and the brutal bombardment of the city of Genoa in 1684 enraged Venetians and further
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tempered their willingness to assist the king in Roman politics. By 1683 Venice’s government
preferred alliance with Leopold I and the popes to the detriment of Louis’s expanding authority
in Italy as his control over international affairs faltered. With the 1689 election of the Venetian
Pope Alexander VIII, both France and the republic, however, experienced a rare accord with the
papacy that lasted through the terminal date of my investigation. This particular link binding the
two states weakened then contributing to the breakdown of significant diplomatic ties that
occurred by 1702.
The attention that ambassadors in Venice paid to these issues and to the republic’s
interventions in them underscored the continuous part Louis XIV expected Venice’s government
to play in French international aims; the republic’s “European importance,” pace Bouwsma,
endured well beyond “the first quarter of the seventeenth century.” The function of ambassadors
was decisive in facilitating the direction of these diplomatic ends. They acted as the vehicles
through which theoretical foreign policy emanating from the king and his secretaries manifested
into tangible action - or not - that then required subsequent royal reaction, response, and
adjustment.
Historiography
The French Dynastic State and the Politics of Accommodation
In a 2011 survey of French absolute monarchy Hervé Drévillon concluded, “…war and
diplomacy would appear...as the measure of an absolutism inscribed upon transnational reality
remaining to be explored.”37 My project is one response to such calls to explore ambassadors as
extensions of Louis XIV’s ministry of foreign affairs and to analyze the networks the ministry
employed to achieve royal aims. My study intersects with an extant literature that argues that
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louisquatorzien governance utilized traditional élite social networks to solidify royal authority
while expanding bureaucratic innovations at the ministerial level to bolster a distinctly dynastic
vision of the state. The dynastic imperative in seventeenth-century French social structures
informed not only royal motivations but also those of the ministerial clans and ambassadors
whose families received the king’s immediate patronage with its socio-cultural benefits.38 It is
timely for a study that investigates such administrative transformations as they emerged in the
work and functions of French diplomats serving beyond the borders of France within a
conversation about administrative centralization.
No one denies that Louis XIV’s authority can be characterized as absolute within France
in the context of seventeenth-century theoretical politics. Nor would scholars disagree that the
king’s control upon actual domestic governance was not literally absolute: all agree that there
were constraints to Louis’s power.39 The king, however, remained, in propaganda and theory if
not in overall practice, the fulcrum of power.40 No one challenged his rights as sovereign in
France. Be that as it may, the historiography of louisquatorzien absolute monarchy has been
divided into divergent categories. Since the nineteenth century some studies have argued that the
king’s administration provided the roots for the would-be modern nation-state while
simultaneously eroding the ancien régime monarchy - a trend linked to Alexis de Tocqueville’s
investigation.41 From this vantage a forward-thinking Louis XIV’s centralizing tendencies
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signaled a decided shift from feudal networks and administration harbingering the advent of the
post-revolutionary republican nation-state and providing the roots of modern bureaucratic praxis.
Later twentieth-century revisionist scholarship interpreted Louis’s approach to
governance differently. They saw developments in his admininstration as exchanges of
compromise and collaboration between the royal government and elite networks and
corporations throughout the kingdom. Scholars variously deployed a Marxian social emphasis on
classes and the particular pressures they placed upon the monarchy at the provincial-urban and
court patron-client levels.42 Such studies importantly eschewed earlier assumptions about the
teleological growth of the state. They preferred to reconsider the institutions of the monarchy on
their own terms without recourse to a state-building project that overlooked the ways in which
Louis XIV’s administration contended with traditional socio-political networks while embarking
on centralization. These studies placed the momentum of monarchical government within the
context of a royal admininstration trying to maintain control over numerous entities that
challenged it.
Most recently historians have begun to examine the process and politics of
accommodation between the royal center and the numerous individual, corporate, and
geographic peripheries throughout France. They have argued that it was, rather, the Crown that
imposed a model of fiscal, administrative, and socio-cultural adhesion-cum-centralization upon
state corporations that in turn were expected to comply with a totalizing royal authority. In these
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studies, the pressures of elite groups within a kingdom suspended in traditional early-modern
social hierarchies have been seen less as motivating forces demanding response from the Crown.
Instead, these scholars have argued that the Crown considered and facilitated individual and
coporate needs as a means of satisfying mutual socio-cultural expectations but always with the
understanding that the Crown’s concerns should dominate all others. Scholars sharing this
perspective have examined institutions like the court and royal ministries. Others have examined
the trend of accommodation in the church, army, guilds, and merchants and urban elites in cities
such as Marseille.43
Returning to Drévillon’s remark, my investigation of ambassadors expands upon such
studies of accommodation. Three of my subjects were of the high clergy and two were robe
nobles. Their stories further illustrate that the louisquatorzien dynastic state and its apparati
incorporated and responded to the individual expectations of these men for social advancement
within the existing hierarchical system that the dynastic monarchy oversaw. In return they
displayed unwavering loyalty to the Crown and compliance in the administrative tasks that
secretaries at the ministerial level set for them. The instructions they received from the monarch
and succeeding secretaries of foreign affairs demonstrate the diachronic centralizing, vertical
tendencies of royal authority that occurred within the ministry of foreign affairs - and from the
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late 1680s that of the marine too - in their work outside of France. In return, they expected, and
in these test cases, received advancement for themselves or members of their family within either
the Crown’s admininstration or the French aristocratic hierarchy.
The interpretation of Louis XIV’s administration as an “information state” has received
recent attention, and, here too, I believe that the volume, content, and frequent requests for all
types of intelligence between the ministry of foreign affairs and the ambassadors I survey
correspond to this characterization.44 I contend, however, that the volume of information did not
decline after Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s death in 1683. Information emanating from Venice actually
increased as triangular paper trails developed between diplomats, consuls, and both the ministries
of foreign affairs and the marine from 1688 onward.45 Along the way I also comment upon how
ambassadors fed the economic and cultural programs associated with the growth of
louisquatorzien dynasticism. Ambassadors’ individual choices and ministrations affected the
reaction of the Crown in foreign and domestic policy. Such realities lend further weight to our
understanding of how louisquatorzien bureaucratic developments and attempts at hegemonic
expansionism beyond France came to depend upon its ministers as much as ministers depended
upon the Crown for advancement.
Mediterranean Studies
By zooming in on louisquatorzien absolutism-cum-statecraft through diplomacy outside
of the kingdom, my topic follows the exportation of the king’s dynastic policies into the
contested spaces of the Mediterranean. Here I speak to a growing literature that has reevaluated
the significance of the Mediterranean Sea to French history. To put it another way, scholars have
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been putting France back into a literature that refutes Mediterranean decline in the early modern
period. Through a study of Franco-Venetian relations over four decades, I demonstrate one
instance of what Megan Armstrong and Gillian Weiss defined as “the Mediterranean as contact
zone and site of exchange.”46
To speak of Mediterranean studies is to evoke the monumental 1949 study of Fernand
Braudel, Méditerranée et le monde méditerranean à l’époque de Philippe II. In spite of scholarly
criticism of Braudel’s study “...as ahistorical, deterministic, and imperialist,”47 all agree that the
great annaliste opened a galvanizing conversation. A growing literature has shown the ongoing
relevance of the sea after the sixteenth century as a dynamic and volatile theater in which early
modern states still, one one hand, sparred for economic, cultural, religious, and maritime
supremacy. On the other hand, scholars have characterized the sea as a permeable membrane
across which ideas, goods, cultures, and individuals interacted, changed, and collaborated as
states utilized the sea to maintain, cement, or augment authority.48
No one would contest the primacy of the sea in the history of the Republic of Venice.
However, scholars have lamented and, in turn, began to remedy a relative inadequacy in
depictions of the sea’s role in the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. For
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decades it was assumed that after the “Age of Exploration” and into the later centuries of the
early modern period that the Atlantic Ocean came to dominate Western European states’ - inter
alia French - naval, commercial, and colonial interests. The Mediterranean was allegedly
“marginalized.”49 Discussions of this marginalization followed Braudel’s “Northern Invasion “
thesis arguing that the Dutch, French, and English “swarmed into the Mediterranean” destroying
the ancient socio-cultural diversities and trade networks in vigor from Gibraltar to the Levant.50
Reappraisals of the varied French interactions and experience in the nearer and further
Mediterranean Sea reveal that France was but one of many states in the seventeenth century
seeking dominance in the sea, but French commercial hegemony was far from confirmed until
the mid-eighteenth century.51 Even then the French were forced to contend with the British navy
to protect their short-lived commercial dominance in the sea.
Later French ascendance in the Mediterranean could not have occurred, however, without
the shifts in French international, institutional, commercial, and maritime policies that occurred
in the late seventeenth century as my study suggests. I show that, at least in the context of
Franco-Venetian relations, in the early 1660s Jean-Baptiste Colbert used ambassadors to import
through espionage Venetian artisanal and industrial resources that had already made the republic
rich for centuries throughout the Mediterranean and Europe. France had to steal from the small
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republic at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule. French commercial and maritime
interests in the Mediterranean in the 1660s and 1670s still lagged far behind those of other
European states as Colbert dealt with consular reforms, the augmentation of the merchant
marine, North African piracy, and the tempering of existing Dutch and English authority in the
sea during the Dutch War.52
I concur that it was not until the 1680s and after that French hegemonic interests in the
Mediterranean developed sufficiently that ambassadors were finally expected to negotiate with
the Venetian senate for the protection and respect of French merchant vessels. Likewise, they
lobbied to safeguard the fair treatment of French merchants and their wares in Venice’s stato da
mar dominions and the sealanes over which the republic was sovereign. Louis XIV rhetorically
claimed commercial primacy above other European states in the sea after the renewal of the 1673
capitulations with the Ottomans and the 1684 diplomatic triumph of the “affair of the sofa” at the
Ottoman court, but it would not be until 1702 that the king could boast with some accuracy that
he had discomfited Venice as one competitor in the Adriatic lending a further boost to the French
commercial ascent that occurred by mid-century. I argue that individual ambassadors and
consuls across the Mediterranan in states like Venice were critical instruments in constructing
the foundations for later French advantages in the sea.
The “New” Diplomatic History: Ambassadors as Individual Agents Provoking Political
Developments
My study’s focus on five ambassadors contributes also to the “new” diplomatic history.
This “new” study argues in part for investigations of individual diplomatic actors as agents of
political change in the broader institutional frameworks within which they functioned. Their
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experience as vehicles of the political process at the international level is critical.53
Ambassadors’ stories allow us to understand how broad geopolitical and historical narratives
developed. Traditional histories of early modern diplomacy of the early twentieth century,
handmaiden to political history and the study of international relations, focused upon the
development of the “balance-of-power” theses of scholars such as Garret Mattingly and Harold
Nicholson that posited the emergence of diplomacy as a means toward the maturation of modern
nation-states.54 Frequently, in these narratives, ambassadors as individuals and their
contributions were lost in discussions surrounding the titles denoting them - ambassador,
plenipotentiary, envoy, etc.55 The political developments that ambassadors’ labors and
weaknesses helped to construct overshadowed them as individual on-site builders affecting
change in international designs of Louis XIV as chief architect. Their quotidian lives and efforts
had lasting effects in this process.
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With the linguistic and cultural turn that occurred among historians from the 1980s,
conventional political and diplomatic history faced a decline. Historians saw older
metanarratives of diplomatic history as teleological arguments lacking nuance in regards to
diplomats and the methods they employed in their professions. As scholars of the history of
international relations, and diplomatic history in particular, have since brought the nature and the
development of the nation-state in the early modern period under scrutiny, studies have appeared
in which the cultures of the diplomatic process within the “society of princes” emerge.56 Such
studies have initiated a varied understanding of the importance of social networks to individual
diplomats and the institutional pressures affecting their work at the international level. As one
scholar of international relations, Paul Sharp, has pointed out, diplomats were in a binary
“predicament,” and, he concluded:
For this, we must look to more imaginative accounts that focus on what I
shall refer to as the subjective and objective articulations of this predicament. By
subjective, I mean how diplomats appear both to themselves and others from
vantage points within societies sending them and receiving them. By objective, I
mean how their predicament appears when they look at each other, or we see
them, as a class of people situated between those they represent.57
I acknowledge this predicament, and I seek to situate the five ambassadors I examine
within the socio-cultural confines of the louisquatorzien dynastic state and its systemic
expectations both from the vantage of the ambassadors themselves and the monarch they served.
Moreover, I consider the ambassadors from the perspective of the Venetian government with its
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sometimes-violent reaction to the methods French ambassadors employed as the Other in its
domestic environment. These ambassadors’ individual experiences indicate that international
processes not of their making and their own personal advancement required their expedition to
Venice. However, succeeding stages in the ever-changing international and domestic evolution
of Louis XIV’s policies resulted from their efforts in the republic in conjunction with those of
ambassadors at other posts and ministers back at the French court. This, in turn, effected the
progression of louisquatorzien dynastic policies and, thus, the nature of the king’s authority.
Dissertation Chapters and the Rationale Behind the Choice of Ambassadors
Chapter One sets the stage in Venice for the ambassadors examined. I describe the tightly
controlled Venetian socio-cultural and political context in which ambassadors functioned. I
consider the roles and tasks expected of ambassadors to give some idea of what they physically
did in service to Louis XIV. I describe the spaces in which ambassadors lived and worked
evoking their quotidian physical, emotional, and physiological trials and pleasures. The chapter
includes ambassadors’ testimonies regarding their private lives including the expenses they
accrued and how financial turmoil affected performance. Contextualizing ambassadors’
circumstances illuminates the developments in high politics described in the chapters of Parts
One through Three.
Following Chapter One I divide the dissertation into three distinct chronological Parts.
Vignettes introduce chapters and also signify the unpredictability inherent in an ambassador’s
experience and how events led directly to or demonstrated shifts in Louis XIV’s foreign policies
and international affairs. Part I’s chapters consider two embassies in Venice during the early
decades of Louis XIV’s “personal rule.” In the early 1660s Louis XIV and his ministers hoped to
take advantage of a period of peace in Western Europe to stabilize France’s domestic
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administration and flagging economy. In these decades ambassadors functioned within
relationships established prior to the moments in 1661 when Louis took up the reins of
government. In Chapter Two I investigate the embassy of Pierre de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers.
Bonsy was the first ambassador Louis XIV posted to Venice at the beginning of the “personal
rule.” Bonsy’s embassy in Venice elucidates the varied roles that ambassadors were meant to fill
beyond the kingdom in the early 1660s through social networks at the court established under
Cardinal Mazarin.
The chapter explores ways in which diplomats were connected with ministers, most
notably Jean-Baptiste Colbert. The bishop’s interventions in the war-wracked republic extends
our view of what French ministers just after Mazarin’s death considered matters of high foreign
policy as Louis and Colbert indicated the direction of a centralizing bureaucracy. Functioning
within an emerging administration, the bishop’s ministrations provoked considerable changes in
commercial, cultural, and international facets of Ludovician bureaucracy at Venetians’ expense.
The results of the bishop’s diverse connections in the administration provided the genesis for
embittered relations between the two states.
Chapter Three. the embassy of the Abbé d’Estrades, opens a window onto the effects that
the accompanying anxieties of a burgeoning aristocratic career occasioned in foreign policy. The
expenses associated with diplomatic service in Venice elicited errors of judgment in his service
to Louis XIV. Estrades cultivated a robust and far-reaching intelligence network among spies
throughout Italy. His personal appropriation of these networks, although expected in the system
of patron-client relations in vigor in the French bureaucracy, exhibited the inherent difficulties
and opportunities that mixing personal interests in Crown affairs could occasion in the Crown’s
international affairs.
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The Bishop of Beziers’s collaboration with various ministers back at the French court
deliberately obtained important benefits during the initial solidification of Louis XIV’s state
programs. Estrades, while forming intelligence links to benefit French politics, employed these
webs to insure his personal advancement in exchange for favors. One such favor, the abbé’s
undeclared abuse of royal authority in the attempted murder of a profligate composer, inspired a
diplomatic furor threatening Louis XIV’s reputation and Estrades’s future career. The chapter
culminates with Estrades’s frantic and penitent revelation of a further secret diplomatic
negotiation with consequences for his future, the possible expansion of French territory, and the
growing fear of Venetians for the dynastic and military intentions of Louis XIV in the shadow of
the peace of Nijmegen.
Chapters in Part II evoke the negative shift in Franco-Venetian diplomatic relations
throughout the 1680s. In this decade Louis XIV’s geopolitical dominance incited fear and
retaliation across Europe culminating in the War of the League of Augsburg. French ministers in
Venice experienced the government’s opprobrium toward the king’s bullying military and
diplomatic expansionism. Moreover, the republic’s senate entered the First Morean War through
which it began an aggressive reclamation of its Mediterranean empire. Naval successes against
the Ottomans and alliances through the Holy League added confidence to Venetians’ obliquial
treatment of French ambassadors.
Chapter Four demonstrates the extent of Venetian dissatisfaction with Louis XIV’s
foreign policies just after the Congress of Nijmegen. Through the complicated and tumultuous
embassy of the Sieur d’Amelot from 1682-1685 I consider the aggressive use of confidenti on
the part of the Venetian state inquisitors and the Council of Ten to harass Amelot and his
household. This signaled a violent repudiation of French foreign policy. The Venetian senate’s
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overt alliance with Leopold I in 1684 laid bare the contradictions in Venice’s traditional politics
of neutrality from the French perspective. I use Amelot’s embassy to suggest the emerging role
of ambassadors as functionaries comprising and manifesting the praxis of centralizing
administrative developments in Louis XIV’s ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of the
marine.
Chapter Five examines how the collaboration of Denis II de la Haye-Vantalet and the
French consul, Le Blond, illustrated the extent to which the role of the ambassador by 1688
further emerged as a professionalized function in concert with the increasingly similar role of the
consul. The changed interactions of these ministers in Venice to one of near equality by 1688
demonstrates the evolution in French bureaucratic institutions while highlighting the effects of
the Colbert clan’s dominance over the separate ministries of foreign affairs and the marine. The
chapter indicates the French government’s preoccupation with Louis XIV’s hegemonizing efforts
in Mediterranean commerce as the members of the Holy League repulsed and weakened the
Ottoman sultan’s maritime authority. Taken together, Chapters Four and Five, emphasize the
inability of French ambassadors to intimidate the Venetian government away from its
increasingly anti-French and pro-Habsburg foreign policies.
Part III considers the diplomatic circumstances that evolved between France and Venice
during the escalation of the War of the Spanish Succession. Chapter Six focuses on the
extraordinary embassy of Cardinal d’Estrées in 1701-1702. I examine the ways in which the
Venetian government betrayed its rhetoric of neutrality from the French perspective through
covert support of imperial armies in Northern Italy and the Adriatic Sea. Estrées attempted
during many months of secret negotiations in 1701 to persuade the senate to ally outright with
France to expel Leopold’s armies from Italy. I assert that Estrées utilized a politics of fear
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capitalizing upon the double execution of two French operatives ordered by the Venetian state
inquisitors in 1702 to assert Louis XIV’s dominance over Venetian politics and traditional
lordship of the Adriatic Sea.
I contend that circumstances during Estrées’s embassy further facilitated the advent of
French dominance in eighteenth-century Mediterranean commerce. Estrées’s exploitation of a
seemingly trivial event, I argue, altered eighteenth-century diplomatic relations between France
and Venice. Furthermore, I argue that scholars should examine the diplomatic stagnation
between Venice and individual European states like France to question Venetian diplomatic and
political “decline.” I argue for investigations of “decline” in specific diplomatic rapports rather
than the acceptance of retrospective narratives of Venice’s international diminishment.
Sources
This dissertation is not a dual history of French and Venetian diplomatic relations in the
late seventeenth century. Its focus, rather, is the evolution of French foreign and domestic policy
as seen through the example of individual ambassadors who crafted Louis’s ties to Venice.
Readers will find, therefore, that an analysis of the French perspective dominates throughout the
narrative. I explore, however, the Venetian government’s motivations in foreign, commercial,
and maritime politics with Louis XIV’s government.
Much of this work relies upon ambassadors’ correspondence with Louis XIV and the
French ministry of foreign affairs contained in the correspondances politiques of the Archives du
ministère des affaires étrangères at La Courneuve. Dispatches from ambassadors and the
responses from the king and secretaries of foreign affairs provided the material through which to
reconstruct Louis’s official and unofficial politics regarding the republic. These sources indicated
the king’s judgment in regards to ambassadors’ personal performance and independence of
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action while serving in Venice. Documents contained in the mémoires et documents at La
Courneuve proffered copies of letters sent from the king and foreign ministers to ambassadors or
directly to the Venetian senate not necessarily found in the registers of dispatches. The mémoires
et documents also provided complete Italian transcriptions of Benedetto Capello’s accounts of
confidential meetings held with Cesar d’Estrées for Chapter Six as well as various travel
accounts and memoirs describing conditions in Venice and Northern Italy.
Paris’s Bibliothèque Nationale de France houses the Mélanges Colbert containing
ambassadors’ correspondence with Jean-Baptiste Colbert. These sources open a window onto the
commercial and cultural tasks that Louis’s minister expected ambassadors in Venice to undertake
in the reinvigoration of French commerce and the king’s cultural programs in the 1660s. Private
letters from the Abbé d’Estrades and his father, the Marshal d’Estrades, found in the BnF’s
Clairambault series flesh out the personal motivations of Estrades in his role as ambassador. The
Archives Nationales’ affaires étrangères and marines yielded the sources to reconstruct French
Mediterranean commercial and maritime interests as well as the evolution of the collaborative
relationship between French ambassadors and consuls in Venice in the 1680s. Finally, the
archives at the Service historique de l’armée de terre at the Chateau of Vincennes provided
further insights into French military preoccupations in Northern Italy and the Mediterranean.
Contained in the official French diplomatic record were copies or original versions of the
Venetian senate’s responses to French ambassadors’ audiences and requests as well as copies of
the ambassadors’ statements to the senate. I also used copies of the king’s direct correspondence
with Venice’s government found at La Courneuve. This being the case, while in Venice’s
Archivio di Stato, I examined sources that offered insight into the republic’s classified concerns
and strategies in its dealings with Louis and his envoys. I utilized three particular classified
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intelligence trails found in the series of communications of the Venetian inquisitors of state with
ambassadors in Paris and with confidenti – spies – in Venice and Northern Italy. First, the
communicazioni degli ambasciatori and lettere dagli ambasciatori in Francia to the inquisitors
provided an understanding of Venetian ambassadors observations and ministrations from Paris to
the highest levels in the Venetian government. Secondly, the inquisitors’ lettere agli
ambasciatori in Francia detailed the inquisitors’ prompts and instructions to ambassadors
regarding matters of state security. Finally, the riferte dei confidenti and avvisi contained the
often-daily surveillance reports of intelligence operatives in Venice and Northern Italy set to spy
upon French ambassadors, their households, and their intelligence networks. It is hoped that the
conversation between these French and Venetian sources provides a clear depiction of a thorny
geopolitical rapport through the eyes of French ambassadors. This, despite Amelot de la
Houssaie’s ambiguous 1676 appraisal that “It is admitted...France is a little more in favor in
Venice than Spain, less than one might consider for anything concerning its (France’s)
ambassadors, more is to be desired there.”58
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Fig.5
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“...S’en allant ambassadeur du Roy à Venise”1:
French Ambassadors and the Late-Seventeenth-Century Diplomatic Cityscape of Venice
A cavaliere della stola d’oro – a Knight of the Golden Fleece – and sixty senators of the
highest rank clad in scarlet velvet received Louis XIV’s arriving resident ambassador to Venice.
The reception occurred in the Eremite church on the Island of Santo Spirito.2 After a ritual
invitation to enter the church the cavaliere and senators strode two-abreast to the center of the
nave where they found the French ambassador attending them. The church was filled with the
new ambassador’s entourage and many French guests living in Venice. The cavaliere greeted the
French envoy in Italian on behalf of the doge and senate. The ambassador responded in French
whereupon the Venetian extended his right hand to the ambassador positioning him on his right
flank; the senators similarly paired with a member of the French delegation.
The company progressed to ornately sculpted gondolas making the eight-mile voyage
back north to the city winding to the French embassy. Once at the ambassador’s domicile, the
troupe entered the building in similar fashion as it had left the church with the new ambassador
the last to exit his gondola. Following a ceremonial reception in the embassy the Venetian
delegates departed and the French ambassador extended his right hand assisting the cavaliere to
mount a gondola. The first day of the entrée ended with the embassy doors and gardens thrown
1
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open for Venetians of all classes to admire the latest in French interior adornments and to partake
of wine, candied fruits, iced creams, and music into the night.
The following day the cavaliere and senators returned early to the French embassy to
invite the ambassador to accompany them to the palazzo ducale. Once there, the cavaliere led
the ambassador through the open door of the sala del collegio to the doge and the twenty-two
assembled members of the collegio. The doge rose removing his cornet and the other members
followed suit. The French ambassador traversed the hall making nine révérences – low bows – as
he approached the tribune. Mounting to a seat beside the doge he doffed his hat, sat, and
pronounced an introductory harangue in French. A secretary of the collegio repeated the same in
Italian after which the envoy delivered lettres de créances – credentials - through which the king
of France acknowledged him as royal representative to the republic. The doge conversed briefly
with the ambassador before the envoy rose, donned his hat, and exitted the sala backwards
performing again nine révérences. The ritual return to the embassy was repeated except the doge
sent along rich gifts of pastries, liqueurs, and wines. Finally, the ambassador opened the embassy
for another evening feteing the Venetian public. The entrée ended; the French ambassador was
officially in residence.
The ceremonial entrée provides a fitting introduction. This chapter describes some of the
quotidian physical, socio-cultural, and psychological circumstances that French ambassadors
experienced upon arriving in Venice. The choreography of an ambassador’s official entrée into
the Most Serene Republic was engineered to welcome and acknowledge his status. The entrée,
however, also targeted the ambassador as the official representative of the French - foreign Other.3 Both cases were distinctly political.4
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As the rituals illustrate, the French ambassador as an individual was officially recognized
in a Venetian socio-cultural context. He was expected to adapt quickly to the functions his royal
master demanded.5 The pressure was on. As Ellen McClure described, “the ambassador would
seem to be a figure occupying the liminal space not just between two sovereigns but between the
universals of rational precepts and the infinite contingencies of international events.”6 They were
foreigners thrown into long hours of work punctuated with taxing state ceremonial and audiences
before the Venetian collegio and populace. They were the public image of the French king and
people. It must not be forgotten, however, that diplomatic sources do not always tell the whole
story, and here personal letters, memoirs, spies’ reports, and gazettes reveal that diplomats
enjoyed the pleasures of the republic as well as its perils.
This study asks the reader to consider five French ambassadors as independent,
individual actors.7 Like everyone, ambassadors were creatures of biological and historical
circumstance. They were prey to physical, environmental, and institutional constraints,
conventions, and prejudices. The five ambassadors whose embassies I study digested, adapted,
and reacted to the broader international webs into which they became enmeshed. They were also
expected to make critical decisions while enduring the day-to-day experiences associated with a
foreign socio-cultural milieu.8
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The present work investigates how the Bishop of Beziers, the Abbé d’Estrades, the Sieur
d’Amelot, the Sieur de la Haye-Vantelet, and the Cardinal d’Estrées adapted to and negotiated
within the Venetian context. This chapter aspires to the reification of similar circumstances
ambassadors encountered in Venice in contrast to the distinct political moments each addressed.
Ambassadors’ adaptational capacities illuminate facets of the evolution in louisquatorzien
domestic and foreign politics. Ultimately, from within the closed Venetian environment, these
men assisted in the construction of broader developments characterizing the histories of France,
Venice, and the Mediterranean Sea.
Spaces of Representation, Mediation, and Negotiation in Venice
Ambassadors were restricted in Venice, or, as Amelot de la Houssaie alleged in his 1676
Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, foreign emissaries were considered “hidden enemies and
honorable spies.”9 It was illegal for Venice’s patricians to fraternize with foreign envoys, and the
city’s embassies were off limits to Venetians.10 Official sources suggested that foreign envoys
spent much of their time in the embassies and government structures to which the Venetian
government invited them. The French embassy in the late seventeenth century was a discretely
imposing sixteenth-century palazzo in the sestiere of Cannaregio.11 Although the lateseventeenth-century embassy was little more than a mile from the palazzo ducale it seemed far-

9

Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, Tome I, 33.
Ibid., 33; The journal of the expatriated French Huguenot Maximilien Misson from his trip to Italy in 1687-1688
provides an invaluable perspective on Venetian society and culture. Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688,
254; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 151.
11
The palazzo exists today housing the Boscolo Venezia Hotel located at Fondamenta Madonna dell'Orto 3500,
30121 Venice, Italy. The hotel’s website boasts of its former diplomatic tenants. For some idea of the sumptuous
interiors see images on the hotel’s website, http://venezia.boscolohotels.com (see Fig.3 for an image of the façade). I
thank Ms. Mickey White who first told me that the French embassy had been in this building and who walked me
there. The embassy remained in this palazzo at least through the tenure of the Abbé de Bernis (1752-1754), but later
in the eighteenth century the French transferred to the Palazzo Surian still in Cannaregio. Baschet, Les Archives de
Venise, 451; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 114; Mémoires et lettres de François-Joachim de Pierre, Cardinal de
Bernis (1715-1758), Tome I, ed. Frédéric Masson (Paris: Société d’Éditions Littéraires et Artistiques, 1903), 418419 n. 3.
10

40

removed from the city’s spaces of political authority. Traveling by foot, sedan chair, or in one of
Venice’s reputed “thirty thousand gondolas” through labyrinthine canals, bridges, or rios
required time.12 The location of the residence of Venetian ambassadors in Paris changed at least
twice in the decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule, and they rented the spaces.13 The French
embassy in Venice, contrastingly, remained in the same rented palazzo until later in the
eighteenth century.
The designated area delineating the extraterritorial space associated with the French
embassy was sometimes referred to as the lista dei Francesi (see Fig.1).14 This included the
embassy proper, outbuildings attached to the ambassador’s household, and the walkways
surrounding these structures. Originally constructed for the Paloral family the palazzo opened in
front onto the rio della Madonna dell’Orto. Behind was a private garden laid out in the French
manner; beyond this the boundary of the fondamente nove with the island of Murano in view.
The embassy was situated almost equidistantly between the church and convent of Sant’Alvise to
the left of its portone – the main entrance - just beyond the rio de’ Zecchini and the church and
gardens of the Madonna dell’Orto to the right.15 Moving past the Madonna dell’Orto’s piazza
one arrived at the sacca della misericordia. The sources mention the Madonna dell’Orto
frequently as a space ambassadors used for devotion, negotiation, and espionage.16 The lista dei

12

Misson, Lettre XVI, à Venise 20 Janvier 1688, 201; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 115.
Prior to 1668 Venetian ambassadors rented an hotel particulier in the Faubourg Saint-Germain across the Seine
from the Louvre. See AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 84, Beziers to Lionne, 18 April 1664, F. 188v. In 1668 Giovanni
Morosini took up residence in the ancien Hotel Salé in the Marais. The Venetian embassy remained here until 1688.
This hotel currently houses the Musée Picasso. Later in the eighteenth century the Venetians used the Hotel de Brou.
Jean-Pierre Babelon, “La Maison du bourgeois gentilhomme: l’Hotel Salé, 5, rue de Thorigny, a Paris,” in Revue de
l’Art, no. 68 (1985), 23-24.
14
Baschet, Les archives de Venise, 451.
15
Misson, Lettre XVI, à Venise 20 Janvier 1688, 199.
16
The following are just two of many examples, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 29 Aug. 1682,
F. 99r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 19 June 1688, F. 157r.
13

41

Francesi stretched traditionally from the rio de’ Zecchini to the wall where the piazza della
Madonna dell’Orto began.17
Unfortunately, I have found no sources detailing the floorplan or number of rooms in the
embassy. It is clear that there were reception rooms on the pian nobile including a sumptuous
audience chamber. Here stood a respectfully vacant armchair – fauteuil – elevated on a dais
symbolizing the presence of Louis XIV.18 Below the dais sat an additional two fauteuils where
the ambassador received guests. The chamber included a royal portrait that changed over time
with fashion and as the monarch aged. Additionally there were portraits of members of the royal
family.19 Flanking the dais were two mirrors of solid silver inlaid with crystals above two silver
tables. Looking at ambassadors’ lists of wares accompanying them reveals that the other public
spaces of the embassy were richly appointed; furnishings, plate, and fabrics showcased the best
in French luxury production and artistry.20
Of the nine official ambassadors posted in Venice from 1662 to 1715, Cardinal d’Estrées
alone did not to reside in the embassy proper. The cardinal remained incognito throughout his
twenty months of service preferring to lodge at the Franciscan monastery of Santa Maria
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Gloriosa (known colloquially as ai frari).21 The Venetian Reverend-Father General of the
Franciscans, Vincenzo Coronelli, a long-time associate of Estrées, leant the cardinal his
chambers in the monastery. Residing in a space beyond the embassy allowed Estrées more easily
to maintain his incognito status. Moreover, the position of the frari in the heart of Venice with its
proximity to the ducal palace facilitated negotiations the cardinal undertook with the savvio del
consiglio, Benedetto Cappello. Estrées negotiated foreign policy too at Cappello’s bedside in his
home when Cappello’s gout made travel impossible for him.22
Beyond the embassy ambassadors participated in state functions like the festa della sensa
during which the annual sposalizio del mare – marriage of the sea – occurred. Dogal feasts,
public processions, and the celebrations surrounding Christmas took ambassadors to the Basilica
of San Marco, the doge’s palace, and onto the ducal gondola or bucintore.23 For Louis XIV it
was to be understood that French ambassadors outranked all others at these events save the papal
nuncio.24 Attendance at state functions allowed the diplomat access to the doge, senators, fellow
foreign envoys, and government officials affording opportunities to collect and pass intelligence.
Individual ambassadors thrived in different contexts. The ministers informally mingled
often wearing masks with Venetian patricians to avoid the censure of either party. The Bishop of
Beziers attended private gatherings and enjoyed the company of women whereas the Sieur de la
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Haye preferred going to mass routinely.25 Both attended public operas.26 None of the
ambassadors’ sources explicitly mentioned opera houses as locations for the collection of
information or unofficial negotiation. Neither did they mention the politically themed elements
of Venetian operas although recent scholarly work indicates that opera houses were undeniably
political spaces.27
Operas were dedicated to ambassadors during geopolitical turbulence in which Venice
aligned with different European states. During the last decade of the Candian War, for example,
Venice regarded Louis XIV as a potential ally against the Turks. The librettist and owners of the
theater San Luca dedicated the opera La Dori to the Bishop of Beziers on 1 January 1663.28 Later
in the early 1680s, when Venetians entered into an alliance with Leopold I and shunned French
ambassador Amelot, German princes were frequent opera dedicatees.29 Additionally, one of the
franchises accorded to French ambassadors in 1664 and thereafter was the privilege to rent boxes
in any of the city’s opera and commedia theaters.30 This might seem like a hospitable gesture.
Given the political nature of Venice's seventeenth-century opera houses and operatic narratives,
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and the close surveillance of ambassadors in general, designated boxes provided confidenti of the
inquisitors of state other means to supervise diplomats. That the doges drew lots for the
allocation of boxes for ambassadors to guard against problems of precedence too demonstrated
the political associations entertainments carried.31
No discussion of Venice would be complete without reference to carnevale.32 There are
only limited descriptions of the events associated with carnevale in their papers, but ambassadors
made numerous references to the celebrations and the many foreign princes and dignitaries
drawn to the city for them.33 Carnevale provided ambassadors with opportunities to engage with
Italian princelings like the Duke of Mantua and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The atmosphere of
the carnevale afforded French diplomats a brief respite from the constraints that spatial and
ceremonial restrictions imposed upon them, and Venice’s culture of the mask would have freed
ambassadors from the restraints of their formal duties.34
The sanctioned space of diplomatic negotiation in Venice was the palazzo ducale
specifically the sala del collegio. It was only with the collegio that ambassadors officially
interacted.35 The palazzo’s physical spaces have been described elsewhere; suffice it to say they
were hard to access. Ambassadors did not have freedom of movement in the doge’s palace; for
an ambassador to enter he either had to be invited or to request audience.36 Pages and secretaries
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relayed messages between the Venetian government and the French embassy.37 Ambassadors
and their secretaries included originals or copies in dispatches. Ambassadors informed Louis
XIV that it irritated the collegio if they requested secretaries to come to the embassy, and, unlike
in France, there was no Venetian minister of foreign affairs with whom ambassadors
communicated on a more informal basis.38 Diplomats asked to address the collegio for a range of
issues: to present and negotiate complaints or propositions regarding commercial and foreign
policy; to announce royal births, deaths, and marriages; and to vaunt international events such as
military victories.
The collegio utilized restricted access to avoid thorny decisions and to alienate
ambassadors in heated diplomatic moments. Michel Amelot and César d’Estrées noted that the
Venetians refused or delayed sending secretaries to them or to receive theirs during turbulent
circumstances.39 Others, like Bonsy and la Haye recorded punctually their rather more frequent
audiences and alleged private discourse with doges during ceremonies. These details
demonstrated to Louis XIV individual capacities to maneuver within the Venetian political
system and ambassadors’ skills of persuasion and sociability.40 Moreover, ambassadors
contended with the long absences of the Venetian aristocracy from the city from 12 June to the
end of August. They exited the city again on the 4 October until early November. During these
periods patricians resided in their terraferma villas to escape the heat and humidity of the lagoon
37
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while overseeing the harvest on their estates.41 They returned just before the beginning of
carnival the 10 December.
The last formal interaction ambassadors had in Venice was the audience de congé –
taking leave. When an ambassador finished his tenure in the republic he took leave of the
Venetian government in the sala del collegio. In a ceremony similar to the entrée, ambassadors
read speeches of departure. At the end of the ceremony the ambassador received a golden chain
and a letter of congé from the collegio.42 He then departed. Normally a departing ambassador
awaited the arrival of his replacement who remained incognito until the next entrée. The
departing ambassador apprized his successor of the points of protocol - les formes ordinaires requisite in the city. Additionally, the outgoing ambassador informed the new envoy of relevant
information for negotiation providing - or bequeathing - the names of trusted informants.43
Domestic Arrangements: Ambassadors, Households, and Individual Experience in Venice
French ambassadors' households in Venice varied in size and the types of staff each
included. The rank of the diplomat did not necessarily affect the size and dynamic of his
household and staff. Of the five, three were ecclesiastics and two were drawn from the noblesse
de robe. Ambassadors-ecclesiastic were unmarried, whereas, Michel Amelot's wife accompanied
him to the republic, and Denis II de la Haye had wive(s) and children in the embassy with him.
The sources communicate that both of these ministers' French wives detested life in Venice away
from the court and Paris.44 Only Venetian spies' reports record that Amelot's consort was
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allegedly involved in espionage and that she played the organ.45 La Haye's second wife, Catarina
Groppo, an Italian, was the widow of the Signor Beatiano, a spy for the French; the links
between ambassadors and the world of espionage became closely enterwined.
Of the sources I surveyed, only the Bishop of Beziers provided a summary of the
members of his suite. Detractors in Venice and Paris accused the bishop of being parsimonious
in his service to the king, but he defended himself with a detailed list of his staff. The Liste des
Domestiques de Monseigneur l'Evesque de Beziers, Ambassadeur de S. M. à Venise, recorded
that forty-one individuals worked at the embassy:
A chamberlain……………1
2 Secretaries……………...2
An under secretary……….1
2 clerics………...………...2
An equerry……………….1
A Maistre d’hostel……….1
2 chamber valets…………2
1 Tailor….……………….1
1 Surgeon….……………..1
4 Pages…………………...4
2 Little Turks.……………2
8 footmen……..…….……8
2 Swiss guards……….…..2
2 Cooks…..………….…...2
A kitchen page……..…….1
2 Someliers………………2
Eight Gondoliers…………8
4146
Bonsy boasted that he paid for more domestics than any French ambassador to Venice “in the
last thirty years.”47 Other ambassadors did not leave such accounts. Michel Amelot, however,
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noted in 1683 that he employed six gondoliers.48 This being the case, I deduce that each
ambassador’s household varied in size and dynamic but included probably no fewer than fortyone people. Ambassadors also purchased and paid for the upkeep of at least two if not more
stately gondolas for transportation.49
It is clear that each diplomat maintained at least one secretary who wrote dispatches and
organized the details of the ambassadors’ households. Secretaries also facilitated the clandestine
acquisition of intelligence.50 Scholars of early modern diplomacy have commented on the
importance and problematic nature of ambassadors’ secretaries.51 Michel Amelot’s secretary,
Roger de Piles, became a target for the Venetian senate’s ire as there was ample proof that he
organized a contreband ring paying spies for the collection of Venetian state secrets.52 Besides
the French secretaries who accompanied and served them, ministers who did not speak Italian
employed Italian secretaries. Amelot in particular did not speak Italian, and he included an
Italian secretary, Signor Bartolomeo Franceschini, among his household.53 The other
ambassadors all either spoke Italian fluently or employed a translator without mentioning him.
A noteworthy minister working in Venice with whom ambassadors interacted was the
French consul. Consuls theoretically mitigated and facilitated French commercial interests in the
city and states belonging to Venice, but during the embassies of Bonsy and Estrades the consul
appeared more as a functionary and advisor with access to the knowledge of the formes
may have been employed for diplomatic prestige. Dennis Romano, Housecraft and Statecraft: Domestic Service in
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48
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ordinaires - as seventeenth-century diplomats called protocol - and as attaché in the interims
between ambassadors in residence.54 Throughout the 1660s and 1670s the French consul in
Venice was Paul Vedoa. Ambassadors in Venice considered themselves superior to the consul as
the example of Michel Amelot indicated; Amelot included Vedoa among the members of his
household as well as Monsieur Comel, the vice-consul.55
The relationship between Louis XIV’s ambassadors and the consul changed, however, in
the 1680s. Denis de la Haye-Vantelet and Consul Jean-Guillaume Le Blond collaborated almost
as equals. The nature of this collaboration reflected the elevation of consuls as consequential
ministers in the French ministry of the marine serving similar functions as the ambassador for the
secretary of the marine.56 From 1688 onward, ambassadors and consuls in Venice worked in
tandem updating ministers in Louis XIV’s conseil d’en haut of political and commercial affairs
from Venice and the Mediterranean. The shift in their relationship, as I argue farther along,
reflected the rise and entrenchment of louisquatorzien bureaucratic practice beyond the borders
of the kingdom.
From their correspondence the personal lives of these five men and the pressures the
office and the environment exerted upon them became clear. The difficult requirements of the
role of ambassador, namely to represent, mediate, and negotiate, emerge through their frequent
communications with Louis XIV and the ministers of foreign affairs. Beyond their official tasks,
however, emotional and physiological experiences in Venice stood out. These men benefitted
from the king’s call to serve, but it also battered them.
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Although not every ambassador mentioned personal struggles, some left strong
indications. The young Abbé Jean-François d’Estrades described homesickness. In January 1677
Estrades wrote to Cardinal d’Estrées, “I do not mind seeing the snowy streets here as they
remind me of those in Paris; I must admit that I would be overjoyed if I could but hope to return
there as soon as your Eminence will.”57 Estrades maintained a regular correspondence with his
father, the Marshal d’Estrades suggesting his close ties with his family. Homesickness was not
the only hardship. There is also evidence that Estrades’s nostalgia may have resulted from
lovesickness. The Marquise d’Uxelles wrote the young abbé that she heard of the magnificence
of his entrée into Venice adding the cryptic verse: “but lost is the time/ that one does not spend
loving.”58 Ambassadors may have faced loneliness as free conversation was restricted between
ambassadors and most Venetians, as Maximilien Misson remarked in 1688, “what hardness, that
a Government cannot be happy without destroying the connections and the communication of
Society, these are among the most tender things in life!”59 Furthermore, Estrades faced the death
of his brother in battle while la Haye experienced the death of a partner.60 Adding to the
emotional fatigue of their tasks, Venetian ambassadors in France occasionally harassed the
French ambassador’s family members. This was the case with Michel Amelot whose mother at
the French court was threatened with her son’s ultimate ruin if she did not pressure him to
change his attitude toward the Venetian government.61
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Aside from loss, nostalgia, and threats ambassadors dealt with illness. The humid climate
of the Republic of Venice was considered insalubrious, and ambassadors commented that it was
necessary to exit the city occasionally for their health.62 Adding to the pressure was the
knowledge that the Venetian government considered an ambassador’s departure for illness or
religious contemplation, even for short periods, as indications of nefarious activities.63 Both la
Haye and the Cardinal d’Estrées were septuagenarians, and their health concerns figured in their
dispatches. Not surprisingly gout and the infirmities of age were noted in these two ambassadors’
correspondence. La Haye begged the king to allow him to retire in 1700 after serving in various
posts for forty years.64 Estrées, in particular, mentioned that he could not walk and take stairs as
well he used to. Gout afflicted his right hand affecting his writing that the tortured script of his
letters confirmed.65
Other facets of ambassadors’ lived experience included moments of respite from their
tasks. Ambassadors mentioned the hunt, promenades, soirées, and religious retreats to the shrine
of the Madonna di Loretto.66 Ambassadors shopped. They purchased gifts for patrons, friends,
and family back in France.67 Despite royal legislation forbidding the purchase and entry of
Venetian glass into France after the 1665 establishment of the royal glass manufactury, Amelot
and la Haye remarked that they purchased quality Venetian mirrors and glassware for family
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members or patrons.68 The ambassadors likewise collected Venetian artwork, books, textiles, and
gondolas.69 Acquisitions and the upkeep of their households and health cost them. Ministers’
finances added constraints to their tasks and comfort.
The Cost of Serving Louis XIV in Venice
The everyday costs of functioning in a foreign environment as an ambassador were many.
The requisite outlay for pomp and the collection of information from informants added to
everyday expenses.70 Venetian patricians often refused their election as ambassadors precisely
because of the immense finances required. They were either fined or exiled ignominiously for
refusing the call of civic duty.71 The ambassadors of Louis XIV to Venice, however, did not turn
down the king’s nomination to the embassy with the hope of augmenting their prestige in the
aristocratic hierarchy and their personal fortunes through later rewards.72
French ambassadors used their own incomes and the stipends paid them from the Crown
to survive in their posts. A precise reconstruction of the income and outlay of ambassadors in
Venice is difficult. It is possible, however, to note that annual stipends from the Crown began at
eight thousand écus in 1662 and remained relatively unchanged at twenty-four thousand livres in
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1698.73 The government paid stipends erratically in the 1660s, but by the close of the century
they were paid biannually. Ambassadors sometimes received advances before their departure to
purchase necessary furnishings for the embassy.74 It is telling that the Bishop of Beziers and the
Abbé d’Estrades wrangled with Jean-Baptiste Colbert to receive the installments of the stipends
owing them and the pressures this placed upon their own personal finances.75 Repaying the
expenditures they accrued in Venice troubled them; although neither ambassador fully specified
what each of these costs entailed.
One expense was the rental of the embassy. According to Consul Vedoa, Bonsy paid
seven hundred livres annually for the building.76 The bishop defended himself to Colbert against
accusations that he was unwilling to use his personal fortune to pay for the expenses accrued in
the king’s service. He claimed “there has not been an ambassador of the king who lived with
more magnificence and expense in all things than myself: be it at table, furnishings, livery of
gondolas and the number of domestics.” He allegedly paid for all of this from his personal
income to the tune of seven thousand écus annually as he waited for the Crown stipend.77
Estrades allegedly ruined himself in debts to Venetian bankers as he fought for the conferral of
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the income of the abbacy of Moissac from the pope.78 That I am aware, later ambassadors, Amelot, la Haye, and Estrées - expressed less financial concerns than Bonsy and Estrades.79
Funds sent to the ambassadors and consuls in Venice were expedited as letters of credit
that they delivered to Venetian bankers in exchange for ducats.80 In Venice the ambassadors used
the bank of the signori GioGalli, Samelli, and Piatti. Piatti’s bank was continuously used until
the end of the century to provide credit.81 From the funds exchanged ambassadors certainly paid
the members of the embassy household and for necessary supplies. Ambassadors and consuls
also used these funds to secure spies and informants who provided political and military secrets
relayed to the court.82
Money was not the only currency ambassadors used to reimburse their households.
Michel Amelot recorded that he paid staff members with the wine and flour that he accessed
through the privileges of the franchises.83 The wine and bread of Venice were apparently so
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“disgusting” to foreign ambassadors that they were spared the horror. Misson noted that
Venetian wines were “terribly disagreeable” and of the bread that the “paste was so hard...that
you had to break it like biscuits, thumping it like a hammer.”84 The franchises allowing
ambassadors to import better wine and flour for their tables benefited their domestics too.
Amelot allocated ten barrels of wine and thirty sacks of flour each to the consul, Le
Blond, and vice-consul, Comel. Additionally, he gave his six gondolieri each twenty-four sacks
of flour and one hogshead of wine. Sometimes servants in turn sold these goods illegally to
augment their income.85 The acquisition and distribution of the commodities allowed as
franchises became a source of tension for Amelot and other foreign ambassadors as the Venetian
government frequently alleged that they abused these privileges for lucre. In Amelot’s case, the
abuse was real. The fallout regarding the ambassador’s misuse of diplomatic privilege and the
violence of his gondolieri formed a considerable portion of his official correspondence.86
The Culture of Diplomatic Correspondence and Types of Intelligence
Lucien Bély remarked when one approaches diplomatic correspondence to beware “that
it can drag on.”87 It is only by closely following ambassadors’ long and often personal
correspondence, however, that one can become acquainted with them as distinct individuals and,

84

Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 235. Misson opined that he was luckily treated and ate well in
Venice’s “Auberges Françaises.” Ibid.
85
Saint-Didier remarked that French domestics had often been the most heinous offenders in this “sordid” trade.
Saint-Didier, La Ville et la république de Venise au XVIIè siècle, 251.
86
Although the embassy of the Seigneur de Charmont is not analyzed in this work, it is relevant to note that
Charmont returned from Venice in shame in 1704 after being caught illegally using the privileges of the franchises
to bolster his own fortune. See Colbert de Torcy, Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Sieur Abbé de Pomponne, in
Du Parc, passim 140-145; Picavet, "La 'Carrière' Diplomatique," 407.
87
Lucien Bély, interview by author, Paris, France, Paris IV: La Sorbonne, 4 Oct. 2012. His caveat soon made sense
to me. There are fifty-six volumes of dispatches and supplemental correspondence from Venice alone between the
years 1662 to 1702 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ correspondance politique. I read thoroughly twenty-three
volumes of communication from the five ministers examined here. Each of these volumes ranged normally from two
hundred to six hundred recto-verso folios. Excluded from these are the various volumes of administrative papers and
documentary mémoires contained in the same archive’s Mémoires et documents. Beyond the official volumes in the
foreign affairs archives, I read personal correspondence at the Bibliothèque nationales. Additionally, the Archives
nationales contain the communications of ambassadors and consuls with the secretaries of the marine.

56

as Gordon Craig opined, “only someone who is insensitive to the role of the individual in history
could be bored by this kind of literature.”88 The matters discussed in correspondence revealed
that ambassadors relayed a wide range of information to the court.89 Four areas of
communication stood out: Internal Information, External Information, Practical Information,
and Information of Potential Interest. First, what I refer to as Internal Information related to
knowledge ambassadors relayed concerning the Republic of Venice itself. Information regarding
the republic internally and its foreign policies was the ambassador's primary concern.90 This
information regarded the internal socio-political, military-naval, and economic-industrial
institutions of the republic. Internal Information included important points vis-a-vis the Venetian
government's foreign relations and policies towards European powers such as the Holy Roman
Emperor, the popes, Italian and German princes, the Ottomans, the Knights of Malta, the
Republic of Ragusa, and Louis XIV. Ambassadors reported their alleged interactions with the
Venetian doge and senate sending along copies of responses or complaints from the senate to
their inquiries and concerns.91 Additionally, the senate’s commentaries upon the deaths of royal
family members, military victories, and royal births figure in this category. If the Venetian senate
published laws that might be of particular interest copies were sent to France.92
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The second category, External Information, comprised relevant news and points of
interest ambassadors acquired regarding the states surrounding Venice. The Ottoman Empire was
one example. Ambassadors regularly communicated with their counterparts in Constantinople
waiting for and then sending along packets of dispatches and letters from the ministers there
along with their own.93 In Venice, ambassadors learned much about the geopolitical aims of the
Viennese and Roman courts, the Duke of Mantua, the Knights of Malta, Polish kings, and
various German princes visiting the republic. This list is in no way exhaustive, but it illustrates
the wealth of international intelligence ambassadors relayed. Both Internal and External
Information were linked, but they were distinct types of classified intelligence as close reading of
the sources confirms.
Third, unlike the categories above, Practical Information was not necessarily classified.
Ambassadors sent along reports, memos, and mémoires that they or others wrote concerning
information not directly linked to politics. Some detailed the ministers' impressions of the
Venetian people while others outlined items such as international weights and measures, current
international exchange rates, and prices for commodities in Italy like grain and hay.94 Finally,
Information of Potential Interest, delineated intelligence that provided the Ludovician
bureaucracy insight into foreign socio-political and cultural perspectives and attitudes.
Ambassadors collected and sent letters that Venetian subjects favorable to Louis XIV wanted
Forestiero, come Fabbricato in questa Città, fuori delle pistoie ordinarie, sent in dispatch from Estrades to
Pomponne, 12 Feb. 1676, Fs. 63r-64r.
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delivered to the king. Some asked to be made knights of Saint Michel while others asked if they
could name their son after the king. Newly printed or as-yet-unpublished political pamphlets,
histories, or tracts that demonstrated the prevailing geopolitical mood in Venice or Italy were
sent along95 At times Venetian subjects wrote histories of France dedicating them to Louis XIV
or the Dauphin. They expedited complimentary copies and letters of introduction by way of
ambassadors to the court. These writers received a letter of thanks from the dedicatee, a small
sum of money, and the occasional diamond for their trouble.96 Included in all of these categories,
however, were pieces of information acquired through the extensive intelligence networks
ambassadors spearheaded.
Ambassadors as Intelligence “Case Officers”
The chapters that follow illustrate the importance of espionage to ambassadors.97 Not
every ambassador proved adept at managing webs of intrigue. Becoming a master "case officer"
was challenging.98 Of the ambassadors examined, those with prior experience, Bonsy, la Haye,
and Estrées demonstrated patience and discretion in this role. Dealing with sensitive information
and “intelligence agents” providing information demanded exposure to the process of espionage
and its contingencies. F. M. Begoum, a former trainer of CIA agents, observed “a human being
in a stress situation is a complicated personality, and the interviewing officer must penetrate
95
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below the surface, sensing the man’s emotions and mental processes.”99 Seventeenth-century
ambassadors were undoubtedly no different. Their roles demanded a proficiency in penetrating
below the surface of the intentions of their many informants.
It could be argued that the inexperienced Abbé d'Estrades demonstrated subtlety as a
"case officer." He managed and protected spies and information with relative ease and genuine
concern. His financial struggles, however, as discussed in Chapter Six, led him to make a
number of precipitous personal errors of judgment regarding patrons he believed instrumental to
his personal advancement. Fear of ruin contributed to the missteps he took by withholding
sensitive intelligence from the king. Begoum noted, “only timely and full reporting to your
headquarters will permit it [information] to help you effectively.”100 Estrades learned this before
it was too late. Ultimately, the secret negotiations he was forced to divulge to the king secured
him further diplomatic appointments. His skills, despite the personal blunders, paved the way for
the French purchase of the important enclave of Casale in 1681.
Michel Amelot was inexperienced in espionage and the sang froid required to manage
stressful situations out of which intelligence gathering arose. Amelot’s service in Venice was the
most personally brutal of the five diplomats examined here. His case revealed how diplomacy,
like most human endeavors, required exposure to circumstance, calm under pressure, and a
personality adapted to the demands of the particular profession. Amelot was unable to hide from
the Venetian inquisitors of state the close interpersonal ties he formed with informants and their
families as well as the illegal means that he and his secretary facilitated to pay them. When this
shortcoming became problematic vis-a-vis his official role as royal representative, his credit in
Venice crumbled.
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Amelot tried to mask his insecurities and inexperience by demonstrating an offensive
haughtiness towards the Venetians. His correspondence suggested an upwardly mobile aristocrat
self-satisfied in his nomination to the Venetian embassy. It seemed he went to Venice assured of
his own primacy as Louis XIV’s man.101 When the stressful realities of diplomatic service and
espionage surfaced he was shocked that the king and Colbert de Croissy left him to suffer the
fallout of his own mistakes.102 Estrades and Amelot learned that diplomacy required patience and
circumspection under strain. They became aware that they were relevant to Louis XIV only in so
far as they facilitated Bourbon dynastic aims through their reportage. Independence of action was
lauded so long as it succeeded.
Conclusions
The examples of Estrades and Amelot prove that Venice could harden novice
ambassadors. Despite the controversies they faced in Venice, these ambassadors went on to serve
in other diplomatic posts. The services of the experienced Bonsy, la Haye, and Estrées, however,
demonstrated that the Republic of Venice continuously merited the presence of highly skilled
diplomats from the French court. The embassies of Bonsy and Estrées in particular contradicted
the idea, pace Picavet, that the louisquatorzien foreign ministry only sent robe nobility to
Venice.103 The tenures of the bishop and the cardinal in the republic, almost like bookends for
this study, revealed that Venice commanded ambassadors of superior status, high clergy in this
case, until the dawn of the eighteenth century. As I argue, the Venetian government remained an
important factor in French-qua-European geopolitics. The formation and ministrations of
ambassadors in Venice was another crucial facet of this reality. Time spent in the Serenissima
tested the personal resilience of French ambassadors - experienced or not.
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I cannot say with certainty whether or not Louis XIV and his secretaries of foreign affairs
sent some ambassadors to Venice for an “education” in diplomacy and espionage. Amelot de la
Houssaie had concluded in his history:
An Embassy in Venice is not ordinarily of great importance for negotiation, as the Senate
applies all its force to maintain Peace; however, it is the most difficult, as well as the
most idle, of all [posts], and that which demands the most intelligence, because there one
treats with Mutes, and one only learns through enigmas. Because of this one calls Venice
the school and the touch stone of Ambassadors, for it is there that Princes put their
subjects to the test, to know the just cost [of service].104
Such sources suggest that the king and the foreign ministry understood the Most Serene Republic
to be a difficult environment capable of sharpening and “professionalizing” ambassadors-cum“case officers.” The ministers’ social networks in France and their abilities recommended them;
Venice’s rough geopolitical climate sharpened them or demanded that they mature. Keeping
these ideas in mind, the following chapters endeavor to tell the stories of one Italian and four
French ambassadors representing Louis XIV.
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PART I:
Structuring Franco-Venetian Diplomacy, 1662-1679
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Chapter Two

Fig. 6
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Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1662-1665):
The Fabrication of French Dynastic Prestige from One Mediterranean State

Fig. 7

Venice’s senate presented Louis XIV with a gift. The French ambassador, Pierre II de
Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1631-1703), informed Jean-Baptiste Colbert and Hugues de Lionne
that the senate offered Paolo Veronese’s Feast in the House of Simon to the king.1 This news
came at the end of thirteen months of clandestine negotiations on the part of the bishop to
purchase the master’s painting from the Venetian Servite friars who owned it.2 Other princes
vied for the canvas, but they could not afford the price tag the indebted friars demanded for it.
That the republic’s senate requisitioned the piece from the Servites, however, came as a surprise
to Bonsy and the king.3
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Scholars have discussed some aspects of Venice’s gift to Louis XIV, but none sketched
fully the political contexts framing the Serenissima’s calculated gesture.4 The giving of gifts was
a critical part of early modern diplomatic praxis, but it is necessary to understand why the senate
commanded the friars to sacrifice the costly painting rather than allow its purchase to pay their
debts to the state.5 The circumstances that brought illegal secret negotiations for a painting into
the realm of high politics illuminates Franco-Venetian relations at the outset of Louis XIV’s
personal rule. The episode underscored the relevance of cultural politics in louisquatorzien
foreign policy just after the death of Cardinal Mazarin to be sure, but it highlighted much more
than simply the importance of art to Louis XIV’s prestige.
In particular the senate’s gesture corresponded with its early interactions with Louis XIV
as he undertook to rule France alone.6 As such, an analysis of Franco-Venetian politics during
Bonsy’s embassy from 1662 to 1665 adumbrates the relationship between French dynastic
expansionism that historians have recently explored.7 The growth of louisquatorzien
centralization depended upon extant domestic and international contexts. The rapport between
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France and the Republic of Venice illuminates the French government’s drive to hegemonize the
Mediterranean world. Louisquatorzien dynastic politics did not rest solely upon adaptations
between the crown and domestic elites. It contended with a plurality of sovereign states beyond
France’s borders whose international engagements acted upon Louis XIV’s foreign policies.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in relations between France and Venice. These two
states, moreover, competed in the Mediterranean in regards to their historical attachments to the
Ottoman Empire. France maintained a privileged commercial relationship with the Turks since
1536. Over time Franco-Ottoman relations became more complex through commercial and
diplomatic accommodations.8 But Venice’s rapport with the Turk preceded those of France.9 The
republic built its wealth upon Mediterranean commerce in conjunction with the Sublime Porte.
By the time that Louis XIV began to rule, Veneto-Ottoman relations soured. The republic warred
with Mehmet IV over the island of Crete and, ultimately, for the survival of its stato da mar.
Louis XIV’s expansion into the Mediterranean and in Italy materialized in the context of the last
stages of the protracted Candian War (1645-1669).
The republic’s reputation among European states as a Mediterranean power rested upon
the struggle for Crete. At the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule Venice believed the young
monarch might furnish the resources necessary to repulse the Turk in the Mediterranean.
Venice’s senate lobbied for French support to maintain the island, and in exchange, Louis XIV
and his ministers gambled on Venetian cooperation in French Italian and Mediterranean
policies.10 In Italy the king particularly lobbied for Venetian support against the papacy. As
Bonsy arrived in Venice in 1662 a diplomatic furor raged between the king and Pope Alexander
8
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VII. Louis and his ministers hoped that Venetian pressure could persuade the pope to bend to
French demands.
Louis XIV worked under a dynastic imperative inherited from the late Cardinal Mazarin
to extend Bourbon authority in opposition to the Habsburgs.11 The lure of dynastic expansion
and the commerce that could facilitate it motivated the king as the 1660s opened. The
fragmented Italian peninsula offered one theater where the king tested his strength against
Habsburg authority.12 French might bore down upon the states of Italy in the fallout of the
Corsican Guard Affair in Rome wedging Northern Italian princes between Louis XIV and the
pope. French military advancement into the peninsula menaced Venice’s terraferma possessions
and incited anxiety that its crisis with the Ottomans might tempt Louis XIV to expand French
authority in Italy.
Venice feared French expansion into Italy. To a large degree the Candian War drew the
attention and resources of Venice’s government away from the peninsula and prompted a
willingness to mitigate the king’s expansionism rather than provoke his ire in refusing.13 The
Bishop of Beziers was the vehicle in the republic through which Louis XIV sought
accommodation for dynastic politics. He was the first ambassador Louis’s government deployed
to Venice, and his dealings there set the tone for all subsequent interactions between the king and
Venice’s senate. Bonsy dangled possible French military and financial aid against the Ottomans
before the senate, and he negotiated Venetian acquiescence in French policies in Italy.14
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Furthermore, Louis’s emergent international authority depended upon commercial and
industrial expansionism. The French economy stagnated and fought for survival when the king
took up the reins of power in 1661. The image of a prosperous and thriving absolutist state
characterizing France in later decades was yet to materialize as Bonsy arrived in Venice, but his
role was tied distinctly to the monarchy’s plans for commercial growth. In France, Louis’s
minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, undertook the revitalization of almost every aspect of the French
economy. Critical to Colbert’s program was the overhaul of French commercial and maritime
interests in the Mediterranean. Colbert’s investigations indicated that French interests in the sea
were severely compromised through the neglect and malfeasance of French consuls and the
instability of French commercial links with the Ottomans provoked through the ongoing Cretan
war. The paltry fifty-six French vessels on the seas as Louis’s personal rule began placed the
kingdom far behind states in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean like the United Provinces,
England, and Venice. French commercial vessels had little protection then from the Crown, and
the French navy would have to wait more than a decade before it was adequate enough to
achieve maritime victories.15 French ministers and consuls around the Mediterranean were
increasingly to participate in the Crown’s bid to increase commercial enterprises and revenue
that the sea could afford.
Louis XIV and the foreign ministry manipulated and avoided responding to the Venetian
senate’s repeated calls for French aid in the Mediterranean to enhance France’s own relations
with Mehmet IV. Louis’s administration sought to demonstrate to the Turk that he was unwilling
to attack France’s time-honored commercial partner in an effort to renew the privileged status of
the French monarchy and its merchants. Additionally, Colbert set Bonsy the task of industrial
espionage. The bishop already proved adept at this in his prior service to France in 1661 while in
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in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Colbert’s program in the early 1660s included the development
of domestic French luxury industries, and he charged Bonsy with tasks in Venice related to the
expansion particularly of the French glass and lace industries.
The bishop facilitated the defection of Venetian artisans and their expertise that helped
diminish Venice’s “industrial supremacy.”16 Richard Rapp argued that the enervation of
Venice’s leadership in industries like lace and glass manufacturing contributed more to its
“decline” than the traditional narrative of Mediterranean-wide commercial decay.17 In fact,
Colbert’s interest in redefining a strong French presence in the sea against that of states like
Venice, England, and the United Provinces with stronger trade networks in the sea revealed the
extent to which Mediterranean commerce remained paramount as French commercial endeavors
in the Atlantic and the New World foundered. Bonsy’s embassy underscored the role of the
ambassador as a critical link through which one Western European state’s industrial capacities
benefitted from and then superceeded those of the republic.18 Louis’s government filched
Venice’s industrial secrets while simultaneously striving to expand its own commerce in the sea.
This chapter aims to highlight the extremities in which both France and Venice found
themselves in the 1660s. Louis XIV’s government faced the difficult reorganization of the
kingdom’s domestic economic and cultural institutions alongside its post-mazarine political
stature on the international stage. The Republic of Venice faced the unknown outcome of an
ongoing war that could redefine its traditional maritime role. The embassy of the Bishop of
Beziers demonstrated that the king wanted to draw Venice’s government close as an ally in
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attempts at an hegemony over Italian politics while waiting to see the outcome of Venice’s
Mediterranean conflict to gauge better how to proceed with mercantilist expansion and Ottoman
relations.
Ultimately, Bonsy’s reportage and mediation facilitated royal maneuvers during the
Franco-papal feud; the transfer of French troops across Venetian territory as the feud came to an
end; and the successful establishment of two nascent French industries to the benefit of
colbertisme and royal prestige. Such varied tasks amplify our view of what the role of French
ambassadors comprised as Louis’s personal rule began. Moreover, Colbert instructed the bishop
to acquire Venetian art to expand the royal collection and to contribute to a growing
louisquatorzien cultural machine. Thus, along the way Bonsy manipulated Venice’s warweariness to procure an artistic masterpiece. The gift of the Veronese painting symbolized much
as Louis XIV received it at the Louvre later in 1664.19 The canvas signalled the Republic of Saint
Mark’s willingness to accommodate Louis XIV to a point. The gift served though as a reminder
that Venice was a sovereign state controlling its domestic affairs and honor despite one French
ambassador’s infiltrations. The republic, too, could still choose upon whom it bestowed its
favors.20
The Bishop of Beziers and the Venetian Political Context
Cardinal Mazarin bequeathed a dynastic vision to Louis XIV. On the surface, Mazarin’s
final achievement, the Peace of the Pyrenees, brought France and Spain closer while laying
foundations for French ascendance among European states.21 Louis XIV used the momentary
peace in Europe in the early 1660s to assert authority within France. Furthermore, the monarch
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demonstrated his resolve to command international affairs. The king quickly enacted his personal
approach to foreign policy through the affair of the Spanish ambassador in London (1661), the
Treaty of Montmartre with the House of Lorraine (1662), and the affair of the Corsican guards in
Rome (1662).22
He then moved to expand Bourbon authority against Habsburg preponderance in Italy.
The Spanish Habsburgs long controlled much of the peninsula dominating, for instance, papal
politics in mid-seventeenth century Rome.23 To test his neighbors the king struck at the papacy in
the fallout of the Corsican Guard affair (20 August 1662) in a moment when neither Felipe IV
nor Emperor Leopold I could afford to challenge him. French measures against Pope Alexander
VII could not ignore other Italian sovereigns. Of Italian states Venice was unique in its reputed
neutrality in the affairs of its European neighbors. The republic lay sandwiched between the
states of the Habsburg reichsitalien.24 Although “neutral” it was often amicably inclined toward
France in the early decades of the century as a countermeasure against the Habsburgs
surrounding its terraferma frontiers.25
Matching Habsburg and papal authority required robust diplomacy with the Serenissima.
To prevent the republic from allying itself outright with either the papacy or Habsburg princes
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Louis XIV dispatched Bonsy as his first ambassador to Venice since Mazarin’s death. The
bishop entered the republic officially on 21 December 1662. His instructions were to assure the
republic of royal support as Venice languished in the Candian War.26 Upon closer examination
the intent of the ambassador’s embassy clearly indicated that the king wanted a compliant
republic willing to cooperate with him.27 Venice’s context required a minister skilled in the web
of Italian politics. Of Florentine descent, Bonsy was reared under his uncle, the late Bishop of
Beziers. Saint-Simon averred decades later that Bonsy “pleased Cardinal Mazarin at an
opportune time.”28 Through his clientage to Mazarin, Bonsy succeeded in his uncle’s bishopric.
He was soon engaged in the 1661 negotiation of Marguerite-Louise d’Orléans’s marriage to
Ferdinando II de’ Medici’s heir, Cosimo.29 In Mazarin’s circle Bonsy became attached to
Hugues de Lionne and Jean-Baptiste Colbert ensuring the prelate’s entrée further into French
politics.30 Both ministers depended upon Bonsy.
On one hand, the Italophile Lionne appreciated his diplomatic skill and loyalty; the two
ministers worked especially well together. Their dispatches evinced a deep knowledge of and
affinity for Italian politics.31 The ministers’ correspondence revealed that they shared a ribald
humor aimed often at Alexander VII.32 On the other hand, Bonsy’s letters to Colbert
demonstrated formal but no less loyal attachments. Colbert required information related to
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cultural and industrial programs, and he knew the bishop would punctiliously oblige.33 Venetian
artistic treasures, notably the Feast in the House of Simon, arrived in France because of Colbert’s
collaboration with Bonsy. The ambassador received instructions and requests from Lionne and
Colbert with equal attention and as correlatives to their triangular dedication to the king’s glory.
The collaboration of these ministers revealed shared horizontal negotiations and the collection of
information characterizing French ministries at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule. This
system would change across the decades as ministries increasingly centralized under their
respective secretaries who in turned answered to the king in the crucible of the conseil d’en haut.
France, Venice, and the War of Candia
Bonsy entered a republic on the defensive. Analyzed in conjunction with the Francopapal crisis unfolding in Rome, the Candian War proved critical in leveraging Venetian
accommodations to Louis XIV’s foreign policies. I will consider these concomitant crises
separately. Since 1645 Venice warred with the Ottoman Empire for the island of Crete. In spite
of its size, the republic maintained an aggressive front against Ottoman attacks and earned the
admiration of Europe. Conflict was mostly on the seas in a number of spectacular maneuvers that
left the governments of Mehmet IV and Venice in a momentary stalemate and the city of Candia
under siege.34 The reign of Venice’s doge, Domenico II Contarini (1658-1675), had only recently
begun. The duke presided over a republic whose factionalism the war exacerbated.35 The crisis
provided a moment of historical redefinition for Venice, and, though protracted and costly, it
allowed the republic to cast itself as protector of Christian values against Ottoman invasion. The
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immediate question for Venice in 1663 was how to sustain the war and whether retaining Crete
was worth further expenditure.36
Venice’s patriciate warred within itself as much as it did against the Ottomans.
Increasingly the nobility quarreled over the authority of government institutions. Would Venice
remain a republic over which its aristocracy ruled in toto through the councils or devolve into a
limited oligarchy tyrannized through privileged, powerful entities like the Council of Ten and the
state inquisitors? The crisis of identity rocking the Serenissima gained momentum as the war
progressed. The state required nobles and cities of the terraferma to pay heavy taxes, and many
cities and villages there were forced to sell regional properties to lagunal patricians to fund the
war.37 The nobility’s ranks swelled with new land, and new families bought titles to offset
Venice’s wartime financial crisis. Many patricians found themselves enriched through state
purchases of war material, its transport, and profiteering.38 The alleged loss of traditional
liberties and the degeneration of government further into the hands of the giovani offended many
traditionalist patricians. European states spoke not of a doomed republic as the war progressed,
but they watched with interest to see how far the war would alter the republic’s famed conciliar
stability.
The debate among the old patrician families raged over Crete and impacted diplomatic
relations with France. In the senate neutralisti patricians believed that Venice should cede the
island to the Ottomans or even to France in order to consolidate its resources and focus on
governing the terraferma and territories like Dalmatia in the Adriatic.39 They maintained that the
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republic might partially conserve the stato da mar and prosperous Mediterranean commerce this
way. Detractors of this view –the attivisti — believed that losing the status the kingdom of Crete
conferred upon it in the Mediterranean would irreparably damage Venice’s international
reputation.40 It should also be noted that many attivisti were in clans either newly ennobled
because of the war or belonged to those older families profiting from it.
Terraferma nobles of ancient lineage often refused to acknowledge the hegemony of the
lagoon, and many of them baulked at the further diminution of liberty the war caused.41 Some of
these approached the French ambassador offering friendship to Louis XIV. Bonsy alerted the
king to a significant number of terraferma nobles with Francophile loyalties. Dispatches from
Bonsy demonstrated that Louis XIV, who recently reinstated the Order of Saint Michel,
bestowed the order on interested Venetian nobles. Bonsy reported that the French government
profited in the past from such honors and the king should continue to do so.42 As in Rome
cardinals of the French faction could sway the Sacred College to French interests, so too a
divided patriciate might ease Venetian policy towards France.
The war stretched the republic’s financial limits.43 It underwent a noticeable economic
crisis as the war continuously sucked immediate finances and military resources, yet, according
to economic historians like Richard Rapp Venice’s domestic economic prosperity did not suffer
irremediable decline as a result.44 Historians like Sanchez and Rapp reveal that Venetians feared
a potential loss of status among European states if Crete fell to the Turk more than the loss of
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commerce in the 1660s.45 Mehmet IV menaced the stato da mar with every indication that he
intended to prosecute the war and, more ominously, to extend hostilities into the Adriatic against
the Dalmatian coast.46 The senate scrambled to secure financial and military assistance to avoid
losing its territory by recalling domestic debts and importuning European neighbors.47
In Rome the Venetian ambassador, Basadona, lobbied for a league of Catholic princes to
counter the Ottomans that was to include the empire, the papacy, France, and Spain.48 In Paris
Venetian ambassadors pressed Louis XIV and his ministers to support either the league or the
republic outright.49 Shortly before his death Mazarin had sent four thousand French troops and a
number of galleys to assist the Venetians in Crete. French efforts affected little, and the
Ottomans routed and enslaved a number of them.50 This turn of events damaged the potential for
further French participation in the war, and in counsel the king stipulated that he would aid
Venice only when it could afford offensive measures.51
The late Cardinal Mazarin gave Venice two hundred thousand livres meant to assist in the
war and bequeathed six hundred thousand more in his will.52 He stipulated that the pope was to
decide if the bequest should be given to Venice or to Leopold I whose Hungarian borders
Mehmet IV’s troops ravaged.53 Louis XIV determined that Alexander VII should accord Venice

45

Manuel Herrero Sanchez, “Republican diplomacy and the power balance in Europe,” in War, Trade and
Neutrality: Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Antonella Alimento
(Milan: FrancoAngeli Storia, 2011), 33; Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, 4, 5-6; Pezzolo, “The Venetian
Economy,” 281.
46
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 82, anonymous to Bonsy, 16 Feb. 1663, F 312r.
47
Setton, 205.
48
Louis XIV to Cardinal Antonio Barberini, 1 Oct. 1661, in Mémoriaux du Conseil de 1661, tome III (Paris:
Boislisle, 1905), 127. Louis XIV remarked that Venice wanted this league only for its own defense. It could provide
nothing advantageous to the other members because of its war with Mehmet IV.
49
AMAE, CP, Venise, vol. 82, Bonsy to Louis XIV, January 1663, F. 270r.
50
Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turk, 189, 190-191.
51
Colbert in council, minutes, 26 March 1661, in Boislisle, 217-218.
52
Ibid., 218; Treasure, Mazarin, 264.
53
Colbert in council, minutes, 26 March 1661, in Boislisle, 218; Treasure, Mazarin, 264.

77

the full amount so that Leopold would struggle against the Ottomans.54 The king wrote Cardinal
Antonio Barberini that he would publicly consider a league against the Turk, but he secretly had
no intention of committing to it.55 He wanted to weaken the emperor, and he wanted to maintain
cordial relations with Mehmet IV. Mazarin’s money would be more strategically spent assisting
Venice — the republic could save enslaved French troops besides.
Mazarin’s bequest set in motion a conflict of interests threatening Franco-Venetian
relations throughout 1663. After his death his fortune and the fulfilment of his testament were
left to the crown.56 As relations between Louis XIV and Alexander VII deteriorated, the
disbursal of funds from France trickled; the crown still owed fifty thousand écus of the cardinal’s
subsidy. Departing Paris in early 1663, the Venetian ambassador Alvise Grimani noted in his
dispatches to the senate that he petitioned the king and his ministers for the remaining money.
Grimani reported that Colbert confirmed that the money would be paid.57 Grimani remarked
upon the king’s desire that Venice secure the release of enslaved Frenchmen.58 The crown
demonstrated that assistance for the republic required reciprocity.
Grimani soon sped south to Lyon to arbitrate in the mounting crisis between Louis XIV
and Alexander VII.59 The “formal and dry” Nicolo Sagredo replaced him in Paris.60 Ultimately,
Sagredo’s embassy procured little more than equivocations from the king in regards to the war.61
The king and Lionne learned from Bonsy that funds already sent to Rome were secretly
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disbursed to the Venetians with the understanding that they in turn subsidize Leopold I’s possible
military intervention against the king in his struggle with Alexander VII.62 The king’s rapport
with the republic tensed as the initial roots of an affinity for Leopold I appeared.
The king alluded to the betrayal in an audience with Sagredo adding that all French funds
were expressly for its war.63 According to Lionne, the ambassador assured the king that it was
so, but Louis XIV rejoined, “No, Monsieur Ambassador, you do not seem well to understand
me.”64 Sagredo misapprehended that the king now held the pope and Venice responsible for the
misuse of monies given to Leopold I.65 If Venice wanted more money the king resolved that it
would have to solicit it from Rome.66 Sagredo continued to lobby for the remaining fifty
thousand écus, and Bonsy relayed that honoring Mazarin’s will would elevate Venetian public
opinion toward the king benefitting maneuvers against the pope.67 Lionne wrote Bonsy noting
that the king sanctioned the payment honoring his debt, but Venetian and papal collusion would
have to change “if wisdom guides the stars.”68 Louis XIV paid the remaining fifty thousand écus,
but it was more politic to make Venice beg for it as the fight with Alexander VII reached fever
pitch.
Venice’s cooperation with Alexander VII provided an excuse to delay provisions for the
republic and another accusation the king could level at the pope. The monarch remarked to
Bonsy: “sooner or later I will find a way of shoving this down the Chigis’ throats.”69 News of
the Veneto-papal misappropriation of French money in a bid for imperial reinforcements against
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the French contributed to the king’s subsequent invasion of the papal enclaves of Avignon and
the Comtat Venaissin in July.70 The French annexation of papal lands appalled the republic, but
it hoped the pope would be persuaded finally to negotiate a peace.71 Bonsy noted that Venice
could be excused slightly due to its dire circumstances in the war.72
Louis XIV played a double game with Venice. While initially eschewing Venetian
diplomatic intervention in the Roman affair the king manipulated Venetian ambassadors and the
republic’s fear.73 He instructed Bonsy to remind the Venetians that their only concern should be
events in the Mediterranean.74 Sending further aid to Leopold I or taking directives from
Alexander VII would ruin the possibility for further French intervention. This proposition
seemed unlikely anyway as the king believed “it would be easier to send fifty thousand men to
any other place than to send even one thousand to Candia.”75
The king jeered at the inability of the Venetians’ “long Pregadi” to resist getting involved
in what he believed was his business with Rome.76 The republic should save its energies for their
war. It appeared too that Venice intentionally prolonged the fight for Crete; Bonsy accused
patricians of sustaining the war solely to increase private fortunes.77 He believed that any further
assistance France might send to the republic would procure only mediocre recompense.78 Venice
could not be trusted to use French funds, and it seemed the Venetians stubbornly prosecuted a
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lost war for gain rather than necessity. Bonsy’s reportage indicated that Louis XIV would be
foolish to send either men or money in the foreseeable future.79
Increasing Venetian acquiescence was the imminent descent of a French army into
Northern Italy as Louis XIV menaced an invasion of the Papal States. Although the king
reassured the republic through Bonsy that French troops would not come into contact with
Venetian territories, the senate remained alarmed.80 The republic was in no position to defend its
western borders in the event that the monarch opted to do more in the peninsula than humble the
Chigi. Throughout 1663 Bonsy suggested to the Venetians that French assistance would be
forthcoming as soon as the pope honored the king’s demands, and Venetian ambassadors in
Paris, Lyon, and Rome labored to convince Alexander VII.81 Although afraid of the French
military presence crossing the Alps, the republic appeased the king beginning negotiations with
Bonsy for supplies of grain and hay from the terraferma as had the Republic of Genoa.82
Louis XIV stated: “Venice depended upon me more than any other prince.”83 His boast
reflected the republic’s diplomacy vis-a-vis France toward the end of 1663. The Candian War
was at a standstill throughout the year, but intelligence reports arriving from the Mediterranean
warned that, not only were the Turks continuing the siege of Candia, but they were also set to
attack the coast of Dalmatia. 84 Because many patricians believed Louis XIV to be the only
Christian prince strong enough to assist them, ultimately, they made little effort to block French
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policy aimed against Alexander VII. In later decades Venice would not forget the king’s
obstinacy when it held the upper hand.
Louis XIV, Venice, and the Affair of the Corsican Guards
The attack on the French embassy in Rome on 20 August 1662 plunged France and the
papacy into eighteen months of open hostility. The violence that occurred in Rome between
Louis XIV’s ambassador, the Duke de Crequi, and the pope’s Corsican Guard are described in a
detailed literature elsewhere.85 Mazarin undoubtedly passed onto Louis XIV a personal antipathy
for Alexander VII and his papacy.86 Mutual Franco-papal obstinacy fueled a series of events that
ultimately led to the passage of French troops in Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, the Milanese,
Modena, Parma, and Monferrato.87 Throughout the crisis of 1663 the king used Venetian
ambassadors and the Veneto-Ottoman gridlock to further demands in regards to the pope.
On the surface the attack on the French embassy violated the ius gentium, but the king
saw it as an opportunity to increase French authority in Northern Italy and in Rome against that
of the Habsburgs and a Hispanophile pope.88 Abbé Regnier-Desmarais, secretary to Crequi, later
remarked that Felipe IV knew and feared Louis XIV’s actions would diminish Spanish authority
in the peninsula, but there was little the aged king could do as his resources were engaged in a
war with Portugal.89 Bonsy reported that no one in Venice believed that the peace of the
Pyrenees would hold; the French king would seek to supplant Spanish authority with the
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potential to expand French influence among Italian princes or acquire territory there as his
ancestors had done.90 The monarch sought diplomatic preferment over the Habsburgs in London
and in Venice and received satisfaction in both instances. Royal actions undertaken against the
pope and in favor of the Francophile dukes of Parma and Modena attested to the king’s resolve
to countermand Spain’s interests in Italy first through an attack on the papacy.
Louis XIV stressed that he was not attacking Alexander VII as head of the universal
church. Instead, the king claimed he sought the satisfaction of dynastic honor from the House of
Chigi. Be that as it may, the Chigi were attached to the Spanish crown.91 They, like the Medici
cardinals, vetted Spanish policies at the papal and other Italian courts.92 With the accession of
Alexander VII in 1655, Felipe IV rejoiced that Spain’s dominance in the peninsula would be
reinforced through the pro-Spanish pontiff.93 Louis XIV needed only a reason to force his hand
across the Alps to vindicate French obligations to the Este and the Farnese. Mazarin’s desire to
strengthen a French presence in Italy spurred the king and Hugues de Lionne. Louis and Lionne
shared in the late cardinal’s belief that Italy was a springboard for further expansion. The
personal hatred for Alexander VII of Mazarin and Lionne continued to underscore official
policy.94
Governments often precipitate crises to achieve desired political outcomes. Crequi, the
French ambassador in Rome, was reputedly arrogant and obstinate.95 The king knew this, and
yet he sent Crequi to the most difficult diplomatic post in Europe to deal with a pope who was
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equally intractable and Francophobe. Crequi’s insolence toward the pope and his Chigi relatives
and the unruliness of the papal bodyguards provoked a firestorm. The ensuing attack of the
Corsican Guards on Crequi’s household at the Palazzo Farnese, the new French embassy in
Rome, proffered a pretext for French intervention in Italian politics.
Louis XIV immediately demanded reparations. Initially the king aimed his demands
mostly at members of the Chigi clan and the pope’s Corsicans. Louis ultimately stipulated that
the pope disincamerate – disgorge – states annexed into the Roman Camera to their original lords
– the territories of Castro and Ronciglione to the Duke of Parma and Comachio to the Duke of
Modena.96 Mazarin earlier tried in vain through short embassies undertaken by Lionne and the
Président Colbert (future Colbert de Croissy) to affect the return of these lands to Parma and
Modena, and the Peace of the Pyrenees obligated Felipe IV to defend the dukes’ rights to the
lands.97 Louis XIV believed his reputation hinged on honoring Mazarin’s stipulations.98 If the
king successfully bullied the pope, the Este and Farnese would be obliged to sustain French
policies. These conditions had nothing directly to do with the attack on the embassy in Rome, but
they represented elements of the king’s Italian policies for which the incident afforded
advantage.
Accords with Parma, Modena, Mantua, and Savoy provided a strong counterbalance in
Northern Italy against Spanish predominance there in the Milanese, Genoa, Rome, and Tuscany.
Unrest in the Kingdom of Naples already saw the arrival in France of pleas to assist in an
overthrow of Spanish power there.99 In 1663 only the Republic of Venice refused officially to
commit to either Alexander VII or the king. The republic vacillated claiming publicly that it
96
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desired peace and would act as a neutral arbiter.100 In private Venice entertained Alexander VII’s
approaches to Leopold I in exchange for papal aid against the Ottomans and in fear of French
entry into Italy. This plan infuriated Louis XIV who wanted Leopold I occupied with the
Ottomans to benefit domestically from a protracted era of peace in Europe.101 The king wanted to
give Colbert time to reinforce French commerce, and he would not compromise the FrancoOttoman rapport that could guarantee commercial advantages in the Mediterranean.102
Bonsy negotiated the republic’s role in the king’s policies with the papal court. Louis
XIV expected Venetian relations with Alexander VII in no way to hinder the disincameration of
Castro, Ronciglione, and Comachio.103 Initially Louis XIV rejected Venetian and Spanish offers
to arbitrate over the conflict with Mehmet IV.104 In Rome, however, the Venetian ambassador,
Basadona, obtained a private promise from Alexander VII to reconsider the disincamerations if
French troops did not march into Italy. Basadona sent this information to Grimani in Paris, and
the ambassador, thinking he held the upper hand, offered once again to arbitrate along with the
Spanish ambassador Iturietta.105 The Venetians did not know that a Maltese agent in Rome had
already passed the news of the pope’s promise along to French intelligence, and Louis XIV
prepared a trap.106 Grimani and Iturietta signed a letter of intent to arbitrate based upon the papal
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promise to disincamerate.107 The honor of Spain and the papacy, as well as Venice’s reputed
neutrality, were now implicated should the pope’s word prove false.108
Royal troops marched on Northern Italy as the pope stalled to fulfill his private promise
to disincamerate.109 All of Italy feared the potential for French conquest; echoes of previous
French invasions of Italy abounded. Rumors circulated in Venice that the king intended to
occupy the Mantuan enclave of Casale or the Spanish Milanese.110 Venetians’ anxiety intensified
because they had no resources to counter the French. As the months of 1663 passed so did
conferences between the respective emissaries.111 The pope tergiversated, but, finally, pressure
placed upon Alexander VII from Venice and Spain in conjunction with the presence of the
French army in Italy weakened papal pride. A conference of the involved parties ensued in Pisa
in February 1664.112 The resolutions were humiliating for Alexander VII who finally conceded to
all of Louis XIV’s demands in the Treaty of Pisa signed on 12 February.113 The pope
disincamerated Castro, Ronciglione, and Comachio to the dukes of Parma and Modena, and the
personal apologies of the papal nephew and legate, Cardinal Flavio Chigi, given to Louis XIV at
Fontainebleau on 29 July 1664, concluded the crisis.114
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Many in Venice’s senate believed that the end of the tensions between the pope and the
French king would benefit Venice militarily and financially in the Mediterranean. Neither Louis
XIV nor Alexander VII, however, committed to the republic regarding the conflict over Crete.
The pope denied the republic more money complaining of the prohibitive expense of Cardinal
Chigi’s extraordinary embassy to France, and Louis XIV believed it more politic to show slim
solidarity with Leopold I as the Ottomans menaced Hungary.115 As 1664 opened, Venice had no
assurances from the king, and the republic soon experienced French troops crossing its
terraferma to fight with Leopold I’s armies against Mehmet IV.
Bonsy, Venice, and the Habsburg-Ottoman Crisis
Europe’s attention in 1664 turned to Western Hungary where the Ottoman forces
invaded.116 Louis XIV had been careful not to ally openly with Venice against Mehmet IV, but
as the crisis with the papacy ended in February he decided to send a small contingent of men to
assist Leopold. On one hand, he wanted to reaffirm that the recent papal feud had been with the
House of Chigi and not against the pope. On the other hand, the king saw a vacuum of power
among the Transylvanian princes of Hungary as an opportunity to position a member of his
family as an alternative ruler there. From Venice, Bonsy, echoed that if the king had any interest
in ruling Hungary the unrest there was timely.117
In the spring of 1664 the ambassador achieved Venetian approval to move royal troops,
facilitating their organization under the suspicious eyes of the senate. The republic feared the
entry of a French army into its lands. Some suspected Louis XIV of using Italy as a stepping
stone toward universal monarchy.118 Senators suggested that a possible partition of the Milanese
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between France and Venice could profit the latter if the king decided to move openly against
Spanish authority in the peninsula.119 The king’s troops were in Italy because of the Affair of the
Corsican Guards, but, as the ink on the Treaty of Pisa dried, it was time to remove them.120
Twenty-six companies were to march north to Hungary.121 Leopold I wrote to the senate
and to the Duke of Mantua for permission for free passage of French auxiliaries across their
boundaries. Bonsy petitioned the senate’s approval in April for the passage.122 The senate
approved, but it required details of the number of troops, their route, and provisions. The bishop
acquired these details, and negotiated for Venetian observers to accompany the army. The
companies passed through the Friulian lands. The army then joined imperial forces at Marsburg
in Styria proceeding into Hungary where it fought with Raimondo Montecucculi at the River
Raab.123
Franco-Imperial forces defeated the Ottomans in the Battle of Saint Gotthard on 1
August.124 Like other European rulers, the settlement Leopold I accepted with Mehmet IV at
Vasvar shocked Louis XIV.125 French efforts to acquire the Hungarian crown in the interval
proved futile, but the king could claim his willingness to help — although only minimally — his
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fellow Christian prince against the infidel. Bonsy ably mitigated Venetian concerns in favor of
Louis XIV. The republic reluctantly opened its frontiers to French troops headed to fight the
Ottomans as a maneuver in the Cretan conflict. Bonsy noted that the republic still hoped to have
Louis XIV’s assistance now that the Franco-papal feud was over and as the king appeared
willing to counter Mehmet IV in Hungary.126 The senate’s generosity was to solicit the king’s
good will and influence with the Ottomans. Bonsy capitalized on this, even while counseling the
king that it was more politic to let the republic lose Crete to the Turk.127
Bonsy, Colbert, and the Subversion of the Venetian Lace and Glass Industries
Bonsy’s interventions in industrial politics illuminates yet another facet of the
ambassador’s role in the mid-seventeenth century. The bishop proved himself a valuable
impresario in industrial espionage in 1664. He was instrumental in the expansion of French lace
and glass production as Colbert marketed French luxury goods abroad. The ambassador’s actions
demonstrate how exportation of industrial knowledge and production, more than the shift in trade
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, doomed the republic’s monopoly over these products.128
In short, Bonsy stole Venetian industrial secrets for Colbert.
It is well known that Colbert intended to improve French luxury textile manufacturing.
Prior to the 1660s France relied on imports of brocade, damask, silk, and fine point lace. French
elites — including the royal family — purchased brocades and other cloths from Venice. Royal
orders became matters of state as Venetian artisans demonstrated their skill and quality
abroad.129 Bonsy brokered royal purchase of five hundred “brasses” of Venetian brocades to
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cover the canopied beds of queens Marie-Thérèse and Anne of Austria.130 Colbert made royal
wishes for cloth known to Bonsy who commissioned and oversaw production of the fabrics.131
Bonsy and the French consul arranged the delivery of these textiles to France; two cases
were sent along later with Paolo Veronese’s painting as it crossed the Alps by wagon. Other
royal parcels did not leave the republic until after Bonsy’s departure from Venice.132 His
discussion of expense and Colbert’s hesitancy to pay gave an idea of the amount of capital that
the monarch himself provided to Venetian weavers. Paul Vedoa informed Colbert that one parcel
of fabric cost fifteen hundred écus de France.133 Cole asserted that, “900,000 livres to 1,200,000
livres was spent each year in Venice.”134
The example of royal expenditure alone for luxury cloth no doubt contributed to
Colbert’s promotion of domestic textile production. His initiative to regulate and increase French
cloth production intersected with Bonsy’s involvement in appropriating Venetian artisans and
their products.135 He confirmed to Colbert in December that he would export Venetian artisans to
France. Venice’s expert female workers were in high demand abroad.136 Bonsy and his
household came into contact with female cloth and lace makers.137 “What I can do,” the
ambassador wrote, “is send the girls of some of the best workers who can instruct those in France
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not neglecting at the same time my efforts to find some glassmakers.”138 In August 1665 Colbert
declared the creation of the Manufacture royale des points and in 1666 prohibited importation
and even the donning of foreign lace.139 Glass soon followed lace.
While a loss for the republic, lace drew far less outcry than did the ongoing dissolution of
its “state-of-the-art” glass industry.140 The republic’s specchieri – mirror makers – were the
acknowledged European experts in the creation, refinement, and exportation of quality cut
crystal and large-scale plate glass and mirrors.141 Victor Tapié alleged that “the interior of any
house above the borderline of poverty included a Venetian mirror, whether large or small,” while
Frémy observed that the French imported two hundred caisses of glass, mirrors, and wrought
crystal annually from Venice.142 The few French glass workers profiting from the initial forays
into the industry of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert paled in comparison to the Venetians.143 As
early as 1662, Colbert planned to entice Venetian specchieri to France to teach French
apprentices. Paul Vedoa informed Hugues de Lionne as early as 1661 that France contained
suitable sand for the Venetian process.144 In 1664 Colbert asked Bonsy to learn exact information
about the industry with the aim of establishing state manufacturies.145
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Venice imposed strict legislation against the alienation of industrial knowledge, and the
republic’s economy could not withstand more economic loss as the Candian war progressed.146
In his initial response to Colbert, Bonsy asserted that he had thought “for some time now to
propose to you the manufacture of mirrors for the good of the kingdom’s economy (commerce)
having noted that a few workers already in France have achieved success.”147 He indicated that
Venetian glass production impressed him. Bonsy researched glass manufacturing and the artisans
who knew it best through his access to the republic’s Muranese glassworks, Bonsy researched
glass manufacturing and the artisans who knew it best.148 His remarks revealed a prescient
understanding of Colbert’s commercial objectives and his participation in state-sanctioned
industrial piracy.
Colbert sought specchieri willing to place themselves and their families in danger for
leaving the republic. The ambassador described the menaces specchieri faced if they left Venice.
He assured the minister “given the necessary expertise needed to avoid angering the republic…I
will not falter in doubling my efforts to overcome all of the obvious obstacles for the success of
this very glorious enterprise that you inspire for His Majesty and for the good of the
kingdom.”149 In 1664, Bonsy contacted four glassworkers willing to go to France.150 He enticed
them with promises of wealth and privileges — including exemption from the droit d’aubaine.151
The Muranesi specchieri Della Rivetta, Barbini, Civrano, and Marasse absconded to Paris where
they established ovens in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine.152 It became increasingly common
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throughout the century for glassworkers to be drawn to the higher income that foreign states
offered.153
Colbert’s interactions with the Venetians were tedious due to the specchieris’ demands
for money and privileges, but the glassworkers finally agreed to teach French apprentices.154
Their Venetian gastaldo, the warden of the glassmakers’ guild, feared this the most. The
renegades taught successfully. Letters patent of 8 October 1665 established the manufacture
royale des glaces.155 The monarch’s tour of the manufactory legitimized the trade.156 The
cooperativo degli specchieri was horrified that its countrymen betrayed artisanal secrets; they
lodged formal complaint to the inquisitori di stato on 3 July 1665.157 By the time Venetian
Ambassador Marc-Antonio Giustinian succeeded in luring them back to the lagoon in 1667 they
had made France a competitor in the glass industry.158
Muranesi specchieri identified themselves with their specialized knowledge. But the
specchieris’ gastaldo identified the trade with Venice lamenting to the inquisitors: “One of the
most precious gems that crown the diadem of the Republic is the glassmakers’ peculiar art
belonging solely to this city, of which the ovens of Murano are recognized as one of its major
foundations.”159 He added that the renegade workers’ actions destroyed “our art and took away
one of the major privileges that our Lord God entrusted to this Holy City.”160 The loss threatened
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the republic’s economy and reputation, and the effects of their expatriate colleagues contributed
to the long-term relative decline in the Venetian markets that Richard Rapp described.161
These long-term effects were not yet clear to contemporaries, and the republic could only
lodge strong complaints. Arguably the greatest symbol of Venice’s industrial loss was the laterconstructed Hall of Mirrors at Versailles that reflected French dominance in European glass
production and Venice’s defeat.162 Despite its irritation Venice’s government could not risk
overtly offending Louis XIV. For his part, the French king agreed in 1669 to send troops and
ships led by the Duke de Navailles to assist in the war for Candia, but the King’s procrastination
proved too little too late for the Serenissima.163 Bonsy the industrial pirate had assisted in
engineering Venice’s misfortune. He facilitated the concerted alienation of industrial secrets
from Venice. By the time the specchieri returned to Murano the bishop was in Poland. In 1670,
his successor, ambassador Saint-André, would continue receiving the senate’s complaints about
the theft of industrial secrets.164
Bonsy, Colbert, and Venetian Art: The Politics of Culture
While Bonsy secretly enveigled Venetian artisans to contribute to French commerce, he
also engaged in secret cultural politics. Although a small state, the republic’s cultural prestige,
like its maritime and commercial prestige in the Mediterranean, loomed above that of the young
Louis XIV. The king and Colbert took keen interest in Venice’s artistic and industrial resources
both from the perspective of economic supremacy as well as the push for cultural dominance
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over the Italian aesthetic.165 These facets of the ambassador’s role emerged clearly through
Bonsy’s correspondence with Colbert, who soon after became Superintendant of Buildings and
Manufacturies (1664) and then Comptrolleur General of Finance (1665), had spurred the
ambassador to collect Venetian art.
Letters between the two ministers invoke the breadth of a French ambassador’s
obligations as a cultural and commercial attaché that was critical to foreign relations in the midseventeenth century.166 Some scholars downplay the cultural interventions of ambassadors as
ancillaries to the “real work” of high politics.167 Bonsy’s involvement in the cultural aspects of
the arcana imperii, however, expands our understanding of what Louis XIV and his ministers
considered pertinent foreign policy as the personal rule began. Ambassadors’ involvement in the
relay of artistic and musical culture from Italy was critical to the extension of the state’s prestige,
and these interactions reinforce recent scholarship regarding the relevance of cultural politics to
the expression of louisquatorzien glory.168
Bonsy, as Colbert’s protégé, proved himself as adept at cultural espionage as in
commercial intelligence when he served as extraordinary ambassador to Florence in 1661. He
accompanied the difficult Princess Marguerite-Louise d’Orléans to her groom in that year.169
Aside from his duties during the nuptials, Bonsy secretly investigated the grand ducal court.170
He provided construction details, costs, and manpower required to operate Tuscan galleys, and
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he recruited trainers of “ferocious beasts” for the Duke de Mazarin at Colbert’s behest.171 The
bishop returned to France in great favor, and he was soon dispatched to Venice because of
“his…great experience…acquired…through the management of…various important tasks that
have been confided to him both within and out of the kingdom.”172 En route to Venice Bonsy
continued to supervise Colbert’s commissions from the grand ducal fabbriche delle pietre dure –
workshops of precious stones – through Florentine connections.173 Passing through Montpellier
Beziers ordered two tables “of the most beautiful stones and ornaments to have sent to France to
have them modeled for the service of the King.”174 Institutions like the Gobelins manufactory
benefitted from the interventions of ambassadors in cultural politics.
Bonsy was one of a number of agents researching Italian art and expertise.175 The bishop
located Venetian paintings that could be bought for the king.176 Colbert’s art expert, Potestà,
journeyed to Venice, and along with Bonsy’s associates, scoured the republic and its environs for
suitable chef d’œuvres.177 The ambassador told Colbert on 21 April 1663 that he would serve as
“director and guide for the market paying the most attention possible to secure the best price one
can [for several paintings]….”178 By May Bonsy described three of the most coveted canvases of
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Veronese and Titian.179 One of these, Veronese’s famed Feast in the House of Simon, caught
Colbert’s attention.180 Ambassador Sagredo quipped that Colbert’s counsel to the king in such
matters went unchallenged, observing “that when Colbert has driven the nail, there is no
imaginable motive or persuasion that can withdraw it.”181
Venice’s Servi di Maria commissioned the Feast in the House of Simon from Veronese in
1573, and it hung in their refectory at Cannaregio not far from the French embassy.182 The friars
were indebted to the state, and the republic recalled debts in 1663 as it struggled to cope with a
new levee of ten thousand troops to succor Candia, to reinforce Dalmatia, and strike against
convoys to Constantinople from Alexandria.183 In November, Venice’s provveditori sopra li
monasteri – superintendents of monasteries – reinforced legislation from 1657 prohibiting
religious houses from making profit without declaring it to the state; they surely took notice too
of unreported foreign appeals to the Servites for the Veronese.184
Louis XIV was not alone in his interest in the painting. Other Italian princes and
ambassadors were unable to muster the resources to pay what the Servi asked.185 They refused
the Spanish Ambassador de la Fuentes’s offer, the Duke of Modena’s proffered ten thousand
ducats, and the large sum of twenty thousand ducats that the Duke of Mantua offered to pay.186
Cosimo III de’ Medici too made overtures for the canvas revoking his offer when he learned of
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Louis XIV’s interest.187 The purchase would not be easy, as the senate would also have its honor
to consider.188 Communications from Bonsy to Colbert regarding the canvas ceased for some
months as affairs in Rome dominated. After the signing of the Treaty of Pisa in February, the
feud with Rome came to an end.
The conclusion of Bonsy’s successful negotiations for the movement of French troops
across Venetian territory in the spring of 1664 revealed that the king’s desire for the Veronese
was not forgotten. Venetian concessions to Louis XIV characterized Franco-Venetian relations in
1664. The feud with Rome over, Louis XIV’s troops marched across the terraferma, and the
ambassador devoted time again to Colbert’s commercial and cultural interests. The king
reminded the ambassador of his desire for Veronese’s painting.189 A major work of Venice’s
cultural patrimony, however, was not something it would willingly surrender as it had come to
appreciate its cultural prestige among Europeans.190 Venetian law forbade the Servite friars to
negotiate without its permission with foreigners. In fact, the republic was right to be suspicious
of commerce between religious houses and foreign emissaries as the Servites were later
implicated in the exchange of secret information with the French — Bonsy’s negotiations with
the brothers in 1663-1664 procured more than just the painting.191
Meanwhile, Bonsy would not risk Venetian ire through negotiations that could be
considered acts of espionage. Three issues compelled Venice’s senate to cede the canvas. First,
and most urgent, was the Venetians’ war with the Ottomans. Louis XIV was still considered the
key donor for troops and money. The king’s flagrant concessions to Leopold I rather than to the
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republic in 1664 against the Turk pressed the senate further to oblige him. The loss of a major
masterwork, while unsavory, was far more palatable in this moment than was the risk of further
irritating Louis who could provide them resources and men in the Mediterranean.192 The
consignment of the painting represented a means to ensure the king’s continued goodwill. The
gift could remind the king of the republic’s war against Mehmet IV. The masterpiece could serve
too as thanks and reward to Louis XIV as the senate permitted a disciplined French army to pass
through its territories without incident during the early summer.
Venice’s second motive was the republic’s honor. Art historians comment on the sale of
valuable works of art in the early modern period and the connection between gift giving and the
honor of the donor in diplomatic rapports.193 The king of France was no ordinary collector, and
the Republic of Venice, especially in its wartime circumstances, could not afford to appear in
such distress as to be dependent upon the price of a painting. The gift then became attached to
the republic’s honor as a sovereign power willing to gratify the desire of an equal as a matter of
friendship and good faith rather than duress in a moment of distress.194 While state secrecy and
policy would be compromised if the purchase were left in the hands of the foreign emissary,
Bonsy, the Republic of Venice’s show of generosity to the French monarch would communicate
confidence and stature.
A tertiary incident in Paris recommended the gift. Ambassador Sagredo alleged that royal
horsemen menaced and humiliated him and members of his household in the street on 16 April.
He made an internationally publicized ultimatum to Louis XIV calling for their execution.195 A
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royal inquest found the men innocent of the charges leaving Sagredo and Venice’s government
embarrassed before a young king who proved exacting when his reputation was threatened.
According to Allain-Launay, the “affair of the domestics” was the impetus for Venice’s decision
to offer Louis XIV the painting. The affair, however, while annoying to the king, was not
substantial enough alone to explain such a high profile gift.
Sagredo’s allegations certainly played a role, however, as it presented an opportunity for
Bonsy to petition the senate for the sale of the painting. The bishop sought to persuade the
government to negotiate the sale as he would negotiate other foreign policy. Cultural politics
were high politics in the mid-seventeenth century. The ambassador renewed the king’s
assurances of friendship for the republic after the Sagredo debacle in an audience before the
collegio. In a well-placed concluding remark at the end of his speech Bonsy added that the king
had taken notice of the Servites’ Veronese. He requested that the senate allow negotiations with
the friars for its purchase.196 Seeing a more advantageous opportunity the senate soon after voted
with a majority to satisfy royal desire.197 Bonsy penned a letter to Colbert on 5 July: “the
Republic is delighted to make a gift of [the painting] to His Majesty.”198 Bonsy’s own rhetorical
maneuver again produced results for his master.
The senate and the Council of Ten supervised negotiations with the Servites after the
vote.199 The senate penned the legislation to take the painting from the friars. The bishop
informed Colbert of the task of dismantling the fragile three-piece canvas. It was delivered to the
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embassy on 23 September, and he detailed news of its subsequent transport across the Alps by
wagon from Venice to France.200 Bonsy kept abreast of the painting’s journey seeming genuinely
relieved when it finally arrived in Paris in November.201 News of Bonsy’s success pleased Louis
XIV.202 Other Venetian masterpieces followed, but none received the same attention as the Feast
in the House of Simon. The king received it at the Louvre in December — twenty-one months
after Bonsy first informed Colbert that it was for sale. Although critical of the painting, Louis
XIV sent a letter of thanks to the republic that Paul Vedoa delivered to the collegio in January
1665.203
Cultural politics were important facets of diplomatic negotiations. That the republic
forbade the sale provided an opportunity for Colbert and the ambassador to demonstrate the
king’s clout in international circles. Venice’s troubles left it willing to gratify royal wishes in
cultural affairs where others had gone away empty handed.204 For its part, Venice took control of
the negotiation to curb further uncontrolled interactions between the French embassy and
Venetian subjects. Such unsanctioned communications between foreign ambassadors proved to
compromise state knowledge and security. The French undercut Venetian industries, but the
republic retained the right to control its artistic heritage.
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Conclusion
Bonsy left Venice for Poland in January 1665. The republic’s regard for Louis XIV,
while officially amicable, would never again prove as accommodating as during the final phase
of the Candian War. The French embassy remained vacant until 1668. Subsequent French
ambassadors reckoned with the mistrust that Bonsy engendered while benefitting from
communication networks such as those within the convent of the Servite friars. On the surface it
appeared that the Republic of Venice accommodated Louis XIV’s every need throughout
Bonsy’s embassy. This analysis suggests that policies and circumstances of other states affected
louisquatorzien pretensions international and economic hegemony that began to appear in the
early years of the personal rule. Venice toiled in a long and costly struggle with Mehmet IV. The
Candian War threatened its economic and naval vigor, sovereignty, and prosperity. Venice was
under duress, but it was not irrelevant. As Bonsy relayed at his departure that Venice would
“take all possible precautions to reassure itself of Your Majesty’s intentions…and give with care
and ‘esclat’ visible examples of its fidelity.”205 In its turmoil Venice reluctantly accommodated
the king’s emergent policies.
Louis XIV could not disregard the republic. His foreign policy toward Pope Alexander
VII and the growth of a French hegemonic authority in Northern Italy required that French
ambassadors maneuver with a regard to Venetian interests. The king boasted that Venice
depended upon him more than any other prince in Europe, but his policies in Italy rested upon
the republic’s uncertain context. The senate could very well have allied with the pope and the
Habsburgs to thwart French pretensions. Alexander VII invited Venice to do so, but the senate
refused further collusion against Louis XIV.206 The king did not run roughshod over either
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Venetian sovereignty or territory. French policy in Italy throughout 1663 and 1664 adapted to a
series of international contexts. Once in Paris, it seems Veronese’s Feast in the House of Simon
languished at the Gobelins throughout the king’s reign.207 The gift was far from the king’s gaze,
but the evolution of what many states feared were louisquatorzien designs to construct a
universal monarchy that would include Italian territories would have to contend with the
embittered republic that sacrificed a part of its cultural heritage.
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Conducting Louisquatorzien Hegemony from Venice: The Abbé d’Estrades, Alessandro
Stradella, and the Outing of Negotiations for Casale, 1675-1678

Assassins pummeled composer Alessandro Stradella on 10 October 1677, leaving him for
dead in the streets of Turin. Alvise Contarini, the musician’s Venetian employer, had ordered the
assault in retribution for Stradella’s elopement with his mistress, Agnese van Uffelle. Leaving
Venice to pursue the composer, the assassins carried a letter of protection from the Abbé
d’Estrades, the French ambassador in the republic.1 In the missive Estrades enjoined the Marquis
de Villars, Louis XIV’s ambassador to the Duke of Savoy, to lodge the Venetians. Private
revenge became scandal when it was learned that Contarini’s henchmen sought asylum at the
French embassy after their attack on Stradella. The Duke of Savoy in turn demanded
explanations from Louis XIV for the attempted murder of the composer in his state. The attack
contravened the duke’s sovereignty, and the unusual involvement of French ambassadors in a
personal affair without his foreknowledge outraged and embarrassed Louis XIV.2
After the king rebuked the Abbé d’Estrades for overextending his authority without royal
consent, the ambassador feverishly defended his actions in letters to his master and to
colleagues.3 In his explanation to Louis XIV, the abbé revealed another secret negotiation that he
was spearheading with the Duke of Mantua for a French purchase of the stronghold and territory
of Casale in Northern Italy.4 Explanation for the Stradella affair read in conjunction with the
Casale negotiations highlight the complex networks the ambassador cultivated from Venice to
serve Louis XIV and his own burgeoning career. Estrades sought to demonstrate to the king that
1
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the untoward interventions in the life of a mere musician should not vitiate his character as royal
representative. To deflect attention from the Stradella affair, Estrades offered a diplomatic
morsel to Louis XIV that soon led to the French acquisition of another Italian enclave. The
ambassador aimed to vindicate his role in the republic. His independent actions in Louis XIV’s
name required response and resolution from the Crown. That the monarch should have to react to
rather than generate policy speaks to the difficulties of the absolutist bureaucracy in managing
ministers at great distances from the centers of royal command.
Estrades’s story contributes to our understanding of the international context of
louisquatorzien centralization and expansionism. Historians have considered absolute monarchy
as a politics of collaboration and accommodation between the monarch and the various entities
and individuals within the kingdom vying for authority. I stress that foreign relations represented
another context in which accommodation materialized externally; louisquatorzien centralization
was forced to adapt to contingencies occurring far from the center of royal authority. Using
Estrades as a lens, the reversal of center and periphery in relation to traditional views of
absolutism comes clearly into focus. Embassies like that of Estrades in Venice revealed the level
of adaptation that foreign affairs and ministers to foreign courts demanded from the Crown.
Rather than a solely domestic project whereby the monarch imposed royal will upon the
periphery, Estrades’s story highlights how events outside of the kingdom necessitated response
from the seat of the absolute monarch-qua-periphery. Foreign affairs acted upon Louis XIV’s
aspirations to centralized authority while providing unforeseen opportunities to hegemonize
beyond France.
The ambassador’s involvement in scandal was not an example of personal malfeasance.
The affair demonstrated, rather, Estrades’s able – if overzealous – cultivation of constituents
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sympathetic to France. Using the scandal as a point of departure we discover that Estrades was a
crucial and strategic conduit in an information system linking Venice and Rome to
plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Nijmegen (1675-1679) and Louis XIV’s foreign ministry.
Estrades aligned himself with members of the Venetian nobility and the Roman curia in service
to Louis XIV. The scandal represented the level of involvement French ambassadors to Venice
could attain among Venetian government officials and others like gazeteers. Similarly, it
underscored the continued role of Venice as a diplomatic outpost and Venetian politics and its
patricians in determining those of France. Estrades’ complex communication networks and his
relationship with French allies among the Roman and Venetian nobility, like the Contarini,
created the strands linking him to the attempted murder of Alessandro Stradella.
The Abbé d’Estrades’s service in the republic amplified the process of cooperation the
monarchy employed among nobles filling state offices while Louis’s international dominance
grew during the Dutch War (1672-1679). Ambassadors in Louis’s government utilized their
appointments to further personal careers as clients of ministers close to the crown. Sara Chapman
noted that horizontal associations between “allies” of “political and social equals” existed within
the hierarchy of the centralizing state. Embassies like Estrades’s in Venice revealed that such
connections among nobles seeking preferment crossed states’ borders through international
networks.5 The Stradella affair resulted from the creation of such horizontal alliances as a royal
minister, and an examination of the events surrounding Estrades’s involvement in the attempted
murder of Stradella illustrates how a well-connected French ambassador melded personal interest
with that of the Crown.
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International Aims of France on the Eve of the Congress of Nijmegen (1678-1679):
Framing the Stradella Affair
The Bishop of Beziers was instrumental in distinguishing the French monarch’s
reputation and dynastic objectives in the Serenissima, and in the early 1660s Venice had
represented an embassy through which to augment French authority in Italian affairs. The
Franco-Venetian rapport provided a counterpoise against the papacy and in so doing also a tool
to weaken Spanish preeminence in the peninsula. Moreover, the bishop promoted economic and
cultural growth through negotiation and subterfuge. Upon Beziers’ departure in 1665 a chargé
d’affaires, Pailleroles, and Paul Vedoa, the French consul, kept the foreign ministry abreast of
events in Venice. New resident emissaries returned again in 1668 when the President de SaintAndre (1668-1671) and then the Comte d’Avaux (1671-1675) served as resident ambassadors.
During these years Louis XIV’s dynastic pretensions generated the War of the
Devolution (1667-1668) and the so-called Dutch War (1672-1678) as the king sought to
incorporate lands in the Spanish Netherlands into France’s borders. Carlos II had formed an
alliance with the United Provinces in 1673, and belligerents were obliged not only to fight on
land but also in a number of sea battles. The Spanish king ruled the southern Italian peninsula
and Sicily, and cities such as Naples and Messina were key to Spanish commerce and strategy as
well as to their Dutch allies.6 French naval victories from 1674 to 1676 further established the
bid for French hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea, and they promised the continued possibility
of French ascendance over Spain in Italian affairs and the progress of French commerce in the
sea amid the Venetians, Dutch, and English.7 The wood to be found in forests in the Sicilian
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interior drew French interest also as it was necessary for the construction of galleys.8
Additionally, the naval successes of Admirals Vivonne and Duquesne against Spanish and Dutch
fleets, led by the formidable Admiral de Ruyter, pushed the Messinese and Neopolitans to
encourage Louis XIV to release them from Spanish rule.9 The Italians’ importunements to the
king and the hatred of the Messinesi for Spain enticed Louis XIV to strengthen his forces in the
waters around Southern Italy.10
By 1675 European states already pressed to end the war. Plenipotentiaries set off for the
city of Nijmegen to negotiate a peace. The outcome of the congress meeting at Nijmegen and of
the king’s policies in the Mediterranean depended to some extent upon French advances in
Southern Italy.11 The French presence there and along the Barbary Coast foreshadowed the
commercial and diplomatic enterprises that developed in later decades. Bourbon foreign and
commercial policies across the sea and Europe required a constant diplomatic and consular
presence in the port cities encircling the sea and to the systems of knowledge they afforded as the
Congress of Nijmegen began. French emissaries and commerce would later stretch from Tangier
to Jerusalem and beyond to trade routes onto which the Mediterranean gave access as far afield
as Persia and Siam before the close of the century. French ministers in port cities such as the
Republic of Venice helped to lay the groundwork for these contacts providing a buffer of
political representation as Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s commercial legislation encouraged the vast
maritime networks that would develop in the late 1680s and 1690s. This was not yet fully
realized in the late 1670s.
384; Charles-Édouard Levillain, Vaincre Louis XIV, 18, 273; Cornette, Chronique du Règne de Louis XIV, 207,
223;Vierhaus, Germany in the Age of Absolutism, 120.
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For the French the republic remained an outpost from which to press Mediterranean
economic and political interests. Venetians saw France as another competitor in Mediterranean
commerce during Estrades’s embassy. The republic already vied with Dutch merchants in the sea
who outnumbered those of France and Venice in the early 1670s. Dutch diplomats, trading
companies, and merchants established relations with the Ottoman Sultan first in 1612.
Capitulations with the northern republic were renewed in 1634. The confirmation of French
trading privileges with the sultan in 1673 and then of the English in 1675 saw Venice further
discomfited from its role as the chief European state with links to the sea.12 As Louis XIV’s
navies threatened to establish permanent French authority in Southern Italy through the war,
Venetians warily witnessed its northern neighbor pressing further into its former spheres of
authority.
The Troubles of a Novice Ambassador: Estrades Balances the Friction of Family-quaPersonal Interests with Louisquatorzien Politics
Constant communication then from Venice with French envoys at Nijmegen attested to
the utility of the Mediterranean and Italian theaters to Bourbon policies as Jean-François
d’Estrades, Abbé de Conches and Moissac and the “Persona” of Heerlen (1647-1705) traveled to
the republic13 The abbé’s father, Godefroy, Marshal d’Estrades (1607-1686), Louis XIV’s chief
plenipotentiary at Nijmegen, averred to his son, “the word you send to us of the advantages we
have in Sicily is very considerable, and I hope that the conquest of that kingdom will be assured
for the king.”14 Moreover, Estrades’s instructions from the foreign ministry were to cultivate the
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“good disposition” of the Marcian Republic toward the king; a disposition that had been
continued overtly since the loss of Candia through gifts such as gondolas and gondoliers for the
canal of Versailles given earlier in 1673.15 No doubt such gifts were to dispose the king
favorably to the republic as his armies swallowed up territory and as his navies grew under
Colbert’s reforms threatening to move further eastward into Venetian maritime spheres
throughout the war. The recent rehabilitation of French commercial links with the Ottomans
through the 1673 capitulations contributed to the Venetian senate’s apprehensions toward the
king. Louis promoted aggressive representation in Venice to utilize its renown as a reputedly
neutral state, its location, and Venetian politicians to advantage while re-assuring the republic
that he had no greater designs in Italian affairs; a point far from true that still required royal
abnegation.16
Estrades arrived in Venetian territory on 24 December 1675 remaining incognito and
learning of protocol from Pailleroles and Vedoa who acquainted him with spies and Francophile
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Venetians that his predecessors used to gather information.17 Estrades’s initial months incognito
allowed him time to find the “habits and channels” that would provide critical intelligence to
send to the court. He connected with diplomatic colleagues throughout Italy writing to
Pomponne “to make him aware of the things of which he needed to be informed.”18 He began
accessing sources of information immediately passing much of 1676 forming relationships and
relaying the knowledge that he gleaned through them.
Estrades made his ceremonial entrée on 14 April 1676, and according to Armand
Baschet, “the more the reign of Louis XIV advanced, the more pomp and outlay in all that could
strike the viewer and denote grandeur was applied to the expense of these solemnities.”19
Following the example of previous ambassadors, Estrades’s entry into the city was no less
ostentatious. “I can assure you, Monsieur,” the abbé remarked to the secretary of state, “that by
the richness and number of the gondolas and those of my household and the other things that
happened everywhere, I maintained the honor that the King bestowed upon me and that you
procured for me by sending me here.”20 All of this expense, however, soon took its toll on
Estrades’s finances and consequently decisions he made in his work.
News of Estrades’s first audience in the collegio reached Paris and his father at
Nijmegen.21 His friend in Paris, the Abbé de Marcillac, remarked, “the gazettes recounted for us
the magnificence of your entrée, but there has been no word from you. I have always noticed that
you are truly a subject of virtue and that you are above such small things.”22 On 15 April, the day
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following his entrée, as was customary, the ambassador was brought before the collegio to
present lettres de créances and to pronounce the first speech.23 The language of the harangue
complimented Venice. Estrades remarked that the king could leave the repose of Europe “in no
more sure hands” than those of the republic.24 He made it plain that Louis XIV agreed with the
choice of a Venetian envoy as mediator at Nijmegen: “in this way,” he said, “all of Europe will
well enjoy a profound rest through your happy participation if the holy intentions of the King,
my master, go unopposed.”25
Estrades became a strategic conduit for intelligence. He was only twenty-eight years old
upon becoming ambassador to Venice, but the abbé’s diplomatic pedigree and ability to acquire
intelligence for the king, Pomponne, and his father soon proved accomplished.26 Estrades’s
embassy differed from that of the Bishop of Beziers remarkably as the abbé represented Louis
XIV when the king’s international political and military authority advanced briskly.27 Certainly
among contemporary observers the king’s reputation throughout the 1670s became ominous to
international observers. Commentators such as the Venetian ordinary ambassador to France from
1676 to 1679, Domenico Contarini, distant kinsman of Alessandro Stradella’s Venetian patron,
later remarked of the king that, “Fortune, favoring Louis XIV, who reigns gloriously, opened the
way for him to progress towards European domination, making him arbiter no less in peace than
in war.”28
The success of Bourbon dynastic politics in Europe emerging as the congress opened can
be credited, in part, then to Estrades’s talent for utilizing intelligence networks. The broader
23
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international connections of the Estrades clan, diverse and rich through his father’s long service
to the crown, benefitted the young abbé.29 His father had a colorful diplomatic and military
career that began under Cardinal Richelieu. Godefroy d’Estrades and his family continued as
clients of high-ranking members of the court including Louis XIV’s brother, Philippe, Duke
d’Orléans, who personally recommended the Abbé d’Estrades to the Venetian senate.30 The
Estrades clan was closely connected to secretary of state Simon Arnould de Pomponne to whom
the abbé owed his position as ambassador and to whom he spoke affectionately in his
dispatches.31
For as much as the Estrades clan was ingratiated into Pomponne’s circle of clients, they
were often annoyed with members of the Colbert dynasty – enemies of Pomponne – as the
correspondence of the abbé and the marshal attested.32 Work required that both ministers interact
with Colbert and members of his family, but neither the seasoned plenipotentiary nor his son
cared for the Colbert clan. The Estrades languished under the financial burden of diplomatic
service. Both were subject to Colbert’s tight reign on Crown finances and remuneration of
personal expenses used in royal service.33 Friction between great ministers close to the monarch
posed difficulties – especially regarding finance – for their creatures.34
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The Estrades’ complaints about the Comptroller General of Finances showed no
sympathy for the strain that expenditure for the war provoked. Both ambassadors complained of
Colbert’s slowness in paying Crown stipends and the embarrassement arrears caused them with
creditors. Marshal d’Estrades worked closely with Colbert’s brother, the Marquis de Croissy,
who served with him as plenipotentiary at the congress. The Marshal complained to his son that
the Comptroller ignored his requests for funds, and remarked of Colbert’s brother, Croissy, “he
is a man of incompatible humor and I get along with him only because the King expressed his
desire for me to do so….”35
Financial difficulties aside, the Marshal d’Estrades warned his son that his career
depended upon his performance as ambassador in Venice saying, “You must do everything
possible to remain in service because you will have no other opportunity than that in which you
find yourself to advance your fortune.”36 During the abbé’s years in the republic, his father
reminded him of familial obligations and the effect his role as ambassador might have on his
relations. The abbé’s younger brother, Jacques, Chevalier d’Estrades, was a maitre-de-camp in
the royal army. He was imprisoned in the Bastille in January 1677 “for malversations committed
in his regiment” the marshal wrote to the abbé, “this greatly worried me for a number of
considerations of which you can well judge the consequences.”37 Estrades’s tenure in the
republic positioned him to succeed in further royal service, and his success could provide a
buffer against embarrassing mistakes within the Estrades family when ministerial clans vied
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against one another for royal favor at the council level and when his own relatives looked for
preferment through them.
His father importuned the abbé on a number of occasions to assist members of their
family through his position in Venice. The marshal asked Estrades to find military employment
in the republic’s armies for his older brother, Louis, and a family cousin, the Marquise de
Saumerdik, niece of the former French ambassador to Venice, the Comte d’Avaux. The marquise
was engaged in a costly court case against her mother and for whom it was thought the abbé
could use his influence to procure funds Venetian creditors owed former Ambassador d’Avaux
to assist the family in the case.38 Neither request proved possible to fulfill, but it was believed
that the abbé might help in these matters. The pressure was on the ambassador from his father to
pursue family interests as well as those of Louis XIV when he entered the republic.
Estrades and the Failed Election of Giovanni Battista Nani as Arbitrator to the Congress of
Nijmegen
An important facet of Louis XIV’s “holy intentions” for Venice and partially underlying
Estrades’s visit was facilitating the choice of emissary Venice might send to Nijmegen as a
neutral arbiter for the talks. He was also to warn Venice’s senate against collusion with Spain as
Louis XIV’s military successes during the ongoing war intimidated the republic.39
Plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen asked the senate to consider sending one of its patricians as an
intermediary at the congress, and the senate nominated the procuratore di San Marco, Giovanni
Battista Nani, for the duty. Louis XIV highly approved the choice.40 Nani served as
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extraordinary ambassador to France from 1659 to 1660 showing himself pro-French and
staunchly anti-Spanish in subsequent foreign affairs upon his return to Venice.41
Carlos II and Leopold I attempted to recruit Venetian sympathy against Louis XIV’s
incursions into Spanish dominions throughout the Italian peninsula toward which the republic
too nourished a definite fear.42 Both powers, however, blamed Venice for Spain’s ongoing
defeats in Sicily and Naples because the republic, in its neutral posture, denied imperial troops
passage through the Adriatic to fight the French. Spanish and imperial ambassadors argued
against Nani’s nomination, but their objections to the Francophile Nani were as much political
reprisals for Venice’s political choices as they were biases against the procurator’s approval of
the French.43
Estrades’s father strongly pressed his son to encourage Nani’s nomination among
Venetian patricians, and he reminded the abbé of the procurator’s qualities and experience and
the benefits for French policies he could provide in the negotiations.44 Venice’s senate used the
prospect of Nani’s nomination to rebuff the emperor and the Spanish while pandering to the
French making certain that his nomination was publicized but not a fait accompli. Estrades wrote
in March to Cardinal César d’Estrées, “the senate seems completely resolute to uphold its choice
[of Nani] in case it is obliged [to act], being dissatisfied with the House of Austria, whose
conduct could not be more imprudent and more advantageous to His Majesty’s interests.”45 As
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with many matters of foreign policy, the neutral republic dangled possible favors before the
states that most threatened it.
Venice’s losses to the Ottomans in 1669, however, caused the Venetians to turn inward in
succeeding years to deal with inevitable domestic conflict in the fallout.46 In the years following
Venice’s defeat to the Ottomans many nobles were censured for their personal gains in the war,
and the former Venetian commander, Francesco Morosini, faced an embarrassing trial for his
failure. Furthermore, the acerbic political climate inspired a debate over the limited number of
patrician families dominating the powerful Council of Ten and the tribunal of the inquisitors of
state.47 There had been controversial “corrections” – correzioni – of the Ten since the sixteenth
century, but the most recent came on the heels of the Candian War in 1668 and again in 1671.
The correction of the council was a means to limit the types of state prosecutions – many aimed
at patricians – that could fall under the Ten’s jurisidiction and, more importantly, to prohibit the
same noble families from repeated access to seats in the council and as inquisitors.48 A small
oligarchy of powerful patricians repeatedly held the offices abusing their influence and wealth
while fueling patrician grudges.49 Throughout 1676 factions in the maggior consiglio, jealous of
inequalities of wealth and access to the highest state offices, pressed for another correction. Soon
those in the consiglio calling for the correction convinced the body, and names were put forth for
elections as correttori.50 Giovanni Battista Nani was prominent in the debate, and despite
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venerable service to the republic, his reputation among the partricians fell by the end of 1676 as
he lobbied against the Ten’s authority.51
Meanwhile, as the tumult in the Venetian government continued, other facets of
Estrades’s embassy related to French foreign policy in Italian and Mediterranean affairs emerged
bringing Estrades closer to the intervention in the life of Alessandro Stradella. Stradella’s
misfortune would occur almost two years into Estrades’s tenure in the Serenissima, and,
uncharacteristic of Estrades’s judgment as it was the affair demonstrated the abbé’s loyalty to
constituents sympathetic to France and to his career that he was constructing throughout 1676.
The roots of the scandal lay in 1676 as Estrades pressed for Nani’s election as a mediator.
The French offensive against the Dutch and the Spanish off the Southern Italian coasts provided
leverage for the French at the congress as the war dragged on. Estrades’s father remarked in June
1676 that his son’s communiqués regarding French success there “will help me not a little to
influence affairs for peace.”52 Estrades also became convinced throughout the year that Venetian
senators were favorable to the French cause and thus also to Nani’s election. Secret meetings
with patricians led Estrades to suggest an open alliance between Venice and Louis XIV who, in
turn, promised renewed access to port cities that the republic had lost during the war if they
would raise no objections to his continued offensive against Spain and the United Provinces in
the south. The king and Pomponne agreed that such offers — easily revoked — would dissuade
Venice from siding with the Spanish who pressured Italian states to rebuff Louis XIV.53
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Estrades was to insinuate this offer in private conversation with Venetian senators rather
than make overt statements to the senate as he had proposed.54 The ambassador reported his
compliance using circumstances like a private audience accorded to the outgoing Venetian
ambassador to France in 1676, Domenico Contarini. Contarini, having a “great inclination for
France used all of his credit to go there out of the fear that he had that he would be sent to
Spain.”55 Estrades flattered Contarini even further, remarking to him “that his house was already
well-considered, and that his person would be much esteemed [in France].”56 Such flattery was
hoped to inspire assistance in Nani’s election and to entice republican politicians away from
France’s enemies.
While Venice’s senate considered the position of mediator and officially nominated Nani
to attend the congress, the senate’s confirmation of the procurator to the post was hindered
through the objections of Leopold and Carlos. Through their ambassadors they refused to begin
peace negotiations until Nani’s nomination was either withdrawn or mitigated through the
election of a co-mediator with less sympathy for the French. Finally, Estrades regretfully wrote
to Pomponne in December that “no one speaks any more of the departure of Monsieur le
Procurator.”57 If French enemies had not succeeded in blocking Nani’s nomination outright, their
prostrations in conjunction with the senate’s manipulation of its possible intervention in the
congress, impaired the election beyond hope.
The refusal to elect Nani as a mediator was a slight setback for French influence at the
congress to be sure, and it can also possibly be explained because Nani was a proponent of
limiting the Council of Ten during the months in which his election was debated. His subsequent
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inclusion as one of the five patricians elected in February 1677 to correct the Ten possibly
provides further insight as to why the factions in the government may have denied him another
prestigious international appointment.58 The republic responded to the geopolitical threats
materializing around it in the late 1670s seeking to distance its internal political structures and
state secrets from foreign emissaries through the surveillance of the same Council of Ten and the
state inquisitors whose authority “troubled” Venetian patricians and for which the 1677
correction materialized.59 As domestic political debates continued, Venice still remained
uncertain of the objectives of neighboring states in Italy – especially those of Louis XIV. The
Venetian government could not be certain of the complete allegiance of its own aristocracy like
Contarini who maintained affinities for foreign courts.60 Estrades’s efforts to sweeten the ears of
Venetian politicians for Nani’s election had failed, but he had gained allies among patrician
households like the Contarini clan and the access they provided to state secrets.
Estrades as “Case Officer:” Webs of Intelligence Within Venice
The republic’s formalized yet porous government institutions left the ambassador to rely
more heavily upon clandestine sources of intelligence, as Filippo De Vivo asserted, “In practice,
it proved impossible to stop informal communication.”61 The king’s international successes
during Estrades’s embassy in conjunction with negotiations at Nijmegen exacerbated Venetians’
fear of the French. Informants working for the Abbé d’Estrades confirmed royal successes in
Messina and Naples and provided intelligence from within the Venetian goverment. Similarly,
Venetian spies reported rumors of Louis XIV’s initial movements to supplant Spanish rule in the
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Milanese adjoining the terraferma.62 The industrious confidente, Camillo Badoer, apprised the
inquisitors of these rumors and the names of numerous agents supplying Estrades data.63 Badoer
seems to have made the French embassy his particular concern over the next decade, and he
cultivated an affable and familiar relationship with anti-French informants detailing intimate
conversations with the Spanish ambassador and with associates in the English and imperial
embassies as well.64 Badoer’s focus, however, was the lista dei francesi where had no less than
seven contacts in the French embassy proper including one of Estrades’s secretaries.65 The
majority of Badoer’s reports revealed a distinct distrust for the French ambassador, his
household, and his network of informers ranging from prostitutes to high-ranking Venetian noble
houses like the Contarini.66 Badoer’s evidence reflected the role of the ambassador himself as a
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spy who on one hand represented officially the image of Louis XIV while on the other hand
labored as the purveyor of secret and privileged information that could only be acquired through
espionage.
For this reason Venice maintained tight scrutiny through the inquisitors informants of
those whom De Vivo called “professionals of intelligence” interacting with foreign
ambassadors.67 Estrades became an important patron and protector of sources useful to French
needs, entertaining spies from across Italy who brought information to share with colleagues in
Rome, his father at the Congress, and with the foreign ministry. Spies informed the inquisitori di
stato that through myriad intermediaries the abbé received constituents in Venice such as the
Messinese Don Domenico, who relayed “secret letters that he had from Rome and Messina”
containing “many notable avvisi.”68 Writers of anti-Spanish memoirs in favor of the French
seizure of Sicily and known informants like the Jesuit Father Francesco Maria Leone, a priest
bringing frequent news of Spanish actions from his native Messina, looked to Estrades for
safety.69 Pomponne’s dispatches relayed the king’s pleasure at such resourcefulness, and the
inquisitors’ domestic agents’ riferte – referrals – corroborated the scale of information exchange
that fed the abbé’s dispatches to the foreign ministry and the plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen who
continually requested more.70
Spain aimed to silence Estrades’s sources in Venice. Through the influence of their
ambassador, the Marquis de la Fuentes and the Hispanophile papal nuncio, Airoldi, Spain
Constantino] kept far away from Venice.” It seems though that his brother returned to Venice by February 1676.
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employed spies and pamphleteers in the republic for its use or to sequester them and to have
them expelled. When the marquis himself failed to bribe Leone he engineered the priest’s arrest
and interrogation before a Jesuit tribunal.71 In a demonstration of loyalty to his source, Estrades
petitioned the senate to allow the priest to leave Venice. Highlighting Louis XIV’s protection of
him and his own seeming attachment to the father, Estrades stated that the king regarded Leone
“as his own true subject,” adding that, “neither justice nor reason, nor any type of right can
permit me to suffer that anyone disturb the well being of Father Leone.”72 The ambassador’s
interventions went unheeded, however, and the republic, usually so caustic where the Jesuits
were concerned, deferred to the Company, drolly commenting that it never interfered in their
internal affairs.73
Sensing possibly that favors extended to Louis XIV might prove useful in its clashes with
the papacy and given French success in the south, Venice’s senate allowed the priest to leave for
Ancona. Exchanges between Estrades and Pomponne revealed that Louis XIV granted the priest
permission to take refuge in France should he believe himself safer there than in Rome.74 The
priest did not waste the opportunity accepting the invitation. He opted for an indefinite sojourn
there after boarding a vessel from Messina.75 Estrades informed Pomponne of the informant’s
decision for asylum in France on 24 October 1676 after receiving a last letter from him. The king
showed no special sympathy for the Jesuit despite his service, but Estrades’s persistance
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demonstrated a considerable concern for the elderly prelate who was one of his earliest sources
of information after arriving in the republic.
Venice, as much as Spain, considered Estrades’s sources dangerous because of their
involvement in French interventions in Italy.76 The Venetian government recognized a long-term
threat in the exchange of clandestine information. Informants maintained careful surveillance not
only of spies but also of authors writing anti-Venetian propaganda and gazetteers in the city that
praised foreign authority and publicized sensitive information in the many avvisi and gazettes to
be read there. Printing houses and published works were of special concern to the inquisitori di
stato who collected evidence of memoires impugning the republic and its government.
The French ambassador encouraged and sustained some of these authors.77 In December
1676, Badoer asserted: “Venetian liberty, which permits authors to write what they want in its
[the republic’s] periodicals, in the circumstances of the present wars, has made them increasingly
venal, to such a degree that no one expects them to write the truth, but to satisfy foreign wit in
favor of their own interests.”78 To support his own criticism of the republic’s liberality toward
the press and pamphleeters’, he reported that the gazetteer Benedetto Giuliani, “supported the
party of France in his papers,” and that protected by “ministers of that Majesty, he had secured
an annual stipend of fifty doppie.”79 What Badoer did not report to the inquisitors in detail,
however, as Estrades informed Pomponne two months earlier, was that the Spanish ambassador
threatened Giuliani’s life for refusing thirty écus a month to write on Spain’s behalf.80
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After explaining to Pomponne the nature of Venice’s economy of information, the abbé
petitioned the king to provide a stipend to Giuliani, a service that Estrades “assured” Pomponne
“is more necessary in Venice than one would imagine.”81 The ambassador said Giuliani, “who
writes the broadsheets here, is attached by inclination to France… and he is the only one to write
for the advantage of our people.”82 Having procured the pension of five hundred livres, the
ambassador remarked: “he is very useful to the King’s service through the ease with which
Italians believe the news that one puts out and through the other advantages that our enemies find
in publishing false (reports).”83 Estrades framed the discussion around Giuliani’s safety, but
certainly he knew that the writer’s services could be bought if the French refused him a better
offer. The ambassador also omitted the extent of Giuliani’s usefulness to him that became clearer
in the negotiations for Casale in 1677. The abbé learned to spend for intelligence and the loyalty
of his sources. Indeed, Estrades’s beneficence towards Giuliani earned a lifetime supporter of
French interests, and Giuliani’s loyalty would, as chapter four will show, bring tragedy to his
own family.
Although the king was known to be generous in paying for information, the state of
Estrades’s finances indicated that more than likely he was expected to pay sources out of his own
income.84 Some sources, however, received gifts directly from the court. Badoer warned the
inquisitors that the Marchese Annibale Porroni, and accomplices who, through letters written to
France, “had offered themselves against enemies in the event that the king decided to bring
armies into Italy.”85 He added that Porroni “dedicated his book to the Dauphin of France coming
off the presses five months ago and entitled Trattati Universal Moderno. I know that the
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ambassador, Signor Abbate d’Estrades sent abroad the books and dedicatory letters to both the
King and to the Dauphin on his behalf.” “The Signor Marchese,” the confidente added, “speaks
badly of the Venetian nobility through ignorant concepts… and in the bottegha of the earlier
mentioned Nicolini [a publisher] foments many unjust ideas.”86 Estrades verified Porroni’s
attachment to France, and he delivered the works of Porroni to whom the Dauphin made a gift of
diamonds and a personal letter.87 Political literature became particularly unsettling to the
Venetian government in 1676, and the French government tolerated works that undermined
Venice’s mythologized stability and freedoms.
Printed Friction between Louis XIV’s Monarchy and Venetian Republicanism
For as much as Louis XIV publicly courted Venice as an ostensible ally, his broader
pretensions to expansionism illustrated the possibility of encroachments upon Venetian
authority. Estrades relayed that a senator made reference to Charles VIII’s Italian campaigns
while discussing the growing presence of the French in Sicily.88 If Louis XIV promoted antiSpanish propaganda in the south and in Lombardy fomenting rebellion, then French
encouragement of anti-Venetian propaganda and of proponents of a French military presence in
the peninsula indicated that the king’s future ambitions could include hegemonic policies in
Italy. Venetians’ traditional affinities for the French as counterpoise to the Habsburgs tensed
after the loss of Crete and as French military might in Italy promised to grow.
The diminished stato da mar injured Venice’s reputation abroad enough, but published
critiques might undermine the reputed domestic tranquillity of the Serenissima in the eyes of its
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European neighbors exposing its weaknesses to future depredation.89 The unfolding correction of
the Council of Ten added evidence to an international audience that Venice’s famed stability was
not without its limits. The state inquisitors sought even to control unflattering literature beyond
its borders. Their response to the French publication of Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la
Houssaie’s Histoire du gouvernement de Venise in March 1676 underscored the republic’s
insecurity toward works publicizing domestic dysfunction.90
Amelot de la Houssaie had been secretary to Estrades’s predecessor, the Président de
Saint-André. In his two-volume work Amelot described in uncomfortable detail the institutions
of Venice’s government, and the secretary asserted that the losses to the Ottomans in the
sixteenth century and in the recent Cretan war contributed to the republic’s “decadence.”91
Although decline was not yet a certainty, Amelot painted a picture of a fractured government
tyrannized through the Council of Ten and plagued with patrician greed and immorality.92
Amelot revealed the alleged realities of a state that prided itself upon the impenetrability of its
institutions. That these assertions came from a French secretary heightened the government’s
distrust of subsequent French envoys as Louis XIV’s authority expanded.
According to Lucien Bély, Amelot’s work no doubt delighted Louis XIV as the king
disdained republics.93 The Histoire earned Amelot a short stay in the Bastille after protestations
from ambassador Domenico Contarini. Contarini claimed to suppress “the torrent” attempting to
have all of the copies siezed “to stop prejudice” that “mortally wounds” the image of the
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republic.94 Estrades’s dispatches affirmed Amelot’s allegations of an ongoing crisis among the
Venetian aristocracy. The abbé confirmed the rifts in political allegiance among patricians
through the immense authority councils like the Ten held over the mechanisms of state. The Ten
threatened nobles’ privileges and status within the hierarchy, but information leaks from within
the government seemed to justify the harsh measures the Ten and the inquisitors employed.95
Through its detailed coverage of Venetian government practices Amelot de la Houssaie’s history
underscored the permeability of the republic’s government and the leaks of intelligence through
government officials feeding ambassadors like Estrades with Venice’s state secrets to the benefit
of France.
Estrades’s Judgment Compromised: Pandering to Venetian Patricians and Alessandro
Stradella’s Misfortune
Studies like Amelot de la Houssaie’s indicated the breech in the attempts of the Ten and
the state inquisitors to control information leaking from within the government through the
aristocracy to foreign envoys. Investigations of Estrades’s correspondence reveals that his
information networks consisted not only of spies and newswriters. The French ambassador
maintained associates at the highest levels of the feuding Venetian patriciate. His role was to
strengthen French policy in the republic, and the fissures among Venice’s nobility proffered
nobles eager to benefit from the French association augmenting their prestige as well as swinging
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the ostensibly neutral political elite further toward France. Throughout 1676 Estrades came to
believe that many Venetians in the government were inclined to an alliance with France, and
closeted conversations with senators and the efforts of operatives with access to the Venetian
aristocracy sustained his assumptions.96 The confidenti confirmed that Estrades consorted with a
number of patrician families. Those with whom he did not have personal access like the
Contarini provided Estrades with news of the state’s internal politics gathered from them through
associates like Father Bonaventura, an “intimate confidente of the Lord Ambassador of France.”
Badoer relayed, that, although apparently speaking French only “barbarously,” Bonaventura
frequented patrician homes posing as a docent of the language.97
Included among the other patrician families to which the ambassador was linked were
some of the republic’s oldest clans like the Mocenigo, Giustiniani, and Delfin. These
relationships compelled Estrades to provide favors. The various branches of the Contarini family
held high offices in Venice. Another member of the clan, Alvise II Contarini, was elected as
doge in 1676 during the abbé’s embassy.98 Estrades worked to maintain links with those like the
Contarini, “a family which,” the abbé said, “has already given [the city] so many leaders that it
would seem the throne is hereditary due to the virtue which it [the house] is clothed.”99
Estrades’s communication networks and his relationship with pro-French Venetian
nobility, like the Contarini, created the first strand linking him to the attempted murder of
Alessandro Stradella. Luigi Contarini hosted Stradella in Venice after he fled Rome. The
composer’s behavior in Venice and escape to Turin then prompted Contarini to capitalize on his
family’s association with Estrades. The composer’s employment in the household of Luigi
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Contarini prompted Estrades’s ill-advised letter to the Marquis de Villars in a bid to placate the
patrician. The ambassador’s career, however, necessitated that he use an international network in
his own interests as well. The letter was compensation for services rendered to him as much as a
political connection in Venice for Louis XIV.
Estrades, Stradella, and the Veneto-Roman Connection
The second strand linking Estrades to Stradella and evincing his abilities to create
networks resulted from French aims in Northern Italy and in Rome. Venice was a beehive of
information for purveyors of news.100 Keeping Estrades’s finger on the pulse of Italian politics
along with private informers from Southern Italy were myriad contacts comprising cardinals in
Rome. Louis XIV’s tense relations with the papacy became a matter of concern for the abbé.
Most immediate to understand the Stradella affair were the abbé’s links in the Roman curia as
the struggle between France and Spain required communication between the ambassador in
Venice and the papal court.
The long fingers of Spanish authority reached across Italy to Venice through the proSpanish papal nuncio, Airoldi, with whom Estrades had an uneasy yet officially cordial rapport
and through Spanish emissaries. The republic believed Spain an optional ally should warnings of
further French invasions in Italy hold true.101 The senate considered buying land near Cremona
from Spain to increase its own terraferma territory, a prospect that Louis XIV would view,
according to Pomponne, as Venetian support for Spain.102 Incipient French seizure of Venetian
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merchant ships off of the coast of Sicily, Naples, and Livorno as the royal navy dominated these
waters in early 1677 provoked the republic’s disgust and a deeper sympathy for Spain.103
Whereas Estrades claimed Venice’s attachments to Louis XIV strong in 1676, the outrages of the
French navy made 1677 uncertain.104 The republic wanted to be “the peaceful and absolute
master of the (Adriatic) gulf,” and French movement ever closer into eastern waters piqued the
senate.105 1677 would prove a crucial year not only for France’s rapport with Venice but also for
Estrades’s personal fortunes in which Spanish cardinals took a role.
Spanish authority in Italy and the Mediterranean persisted in the late seventeenth
century106 Indeed it would not be until after Nijmegen that Spain’s international might declined
definitively before French predominance. Regarding Italian potentates and the Roman curia, “the
Spanish monarchy had not suffered irreparable damage,” as Gianvittorio Signorotto averred, “for
the church, it (Spain) continued to represent the greatest source of benefits and wealth”
supplying notably “most of the cardinals” in the papal court.107 For Estrades the failing health of
octigenarian Pope Clement X Altieri in 1675 and the anticipated conclave of 1676 represented a
web of negotiations with Venetian and other Italian cardinals sympathetic to Louis XIV – the
king and Pomponne foresaw the need to strengthen this web.108
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The virulence of Franco-papal relations from the time of Alexander VII Chigi endured
throughout the Clementine pontificate. As the curia anticipated the ailing pontiff’s death, Louis
XIV pressed Venetian cardinals and those in Rome like Cardinals Chigi and Maidalchini to sway
an imminent conclave in France’s favor. They instructed Estrades to remind cardinals of their
attachments to France.109 Gallican policies toward the French clergy’s responsibilities to the
monarchy and the king’s ability to control clerical nominations would be affected through the
choice of Clement’s successor. Religious concerns – among them Jansenism and papal
interference in the rights of the régale – and the problematic preponderance of Spanish influence
within the curia with its extensive Italian networks were in the balance.110
The conclave of 1676 saw the election of Innocent XI Odeschalchi – a pontiff concerned
with ecclesiastical reform and purportedly opposed to bilateral papal alliance with any one
dynastic power.111 The pope soon put this policy into practice. Estrades informed his father that
the pontiff blocked a Spanish ship en route to Sicily carrying troops acquired in Rome from
leaving the city. He remarked “His Holiness showed through this action that he wanted to be
neutral and that he did not at all wish to permit either the French or the Spanish from levying
troops in his states, which is all the two states could hope from him given his role as common
father and mediator of the peace talks.”112 The pope’s publicized move against Spain, however,
although perhaps inadvertently, aided French victories in the south.
The months preceding the election witnessed the exchange of gestures to improve the
Franco-papal rapport. From Venice Estrades solicited pro-French clergy such as Cardinals
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Rospigliosi and Chigi, and he cultivated a relationship with papal secretary of state Cardinal
Alderano Cibo while ingratiating himself with Venetian prelates.113 Cardinal Delfin supported
France, and the abbé reminded him of his obligation to the king.114 Princes of the Church could
inspire papal cooperation with Louis XIV in Rome and counter the Hispanophile nuncio, Airoldi,
in Venice with whom a number of them clashed personally.115 Estrades’s correspondence
throughout his embassy confirmed Sebastiano Foscarini’s belief that Bourbon foreign policy
meant to “snatch the states of Italy from the Spanish.”116 The ambassador strove to promote
French predominance in Venice and at the papal court through links with cardinals favorable to
the king and others cardinals, like Maidalchini, to whom the French king paid handsome
stipends.117
Knotting the Strands of an International Scandal
Estrades’s career aspirations – and those of his father for him – intertwined with royal
and ecclesiastical affairs. The ambassador received the nomination to the abbacy of Moissac in
1669 before he left for Venice, yet he had not received the expensive papal seals – or bulls – that
legitimized the sinacure’s revenue.118 The cost of maintaining a magnificent household in Venice
and payments to informants was far from negligible, and, as Saint-Simon averred much later, the
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abbé “had indebted himself greatly” in his Venetian embassy.119 A legal struggle with the Bishop
of Cahors for supremacy over the abbacy of Saint Melaine, favors paid for the possibility of a
nomination to the archbishpric of Bourges – for which Estrades’s father lobbied for his son – and
the latent revenues from Moissac bottlenecked Estrades’s income further in 1677. Such debts
could only be settled finally through the bulls’ conferral.120
The abbé and his father explained the difficulties of personal finances and the necessity
of the bulls to Pomponne, Innocent XI, Cardinal Cibo, the Venetian Cardinal Basadona, and
Cardinal d’Estrées.121 Estrades petitioned to have the bulls gratis foregoing the requisite – and
costly – tax to the papal chancery.122 The business dragged on for months during which time
Estrades curried Cibo’s patronage in particular to expedite matters and to demonstrate the “care
that he had taken to manage the court of Rome.”123 The ambassador did not want to appear
unable to command ties in the curia. To encourage respect in Rome he undertook special favors
even for his French benefactor Cardinal d’Estrées providing protection for the singer Catarina
Nardi. The songbird was a Roman protégé of Estrées’ going to Venice possibly to further her
career at the new opera house of San’ Angelo that opened in 1677.124

119

“He was the son of Marshal d’Estrades and he was a great success in Venice and in Turin where he was
ambassador, but he endebted himself greatly.” Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, Mémoires complètes et
authentiques du Duc de Saint-Simon sur le siècle de Louis XIV et la Régence, vol. 12 (Paris: A. Sautelet, 1829), 134135.
120
La Haye, “Un Bénéfice aux Pays Bas,” 8.
121
Although the abbé had never met the Hispanophile cardinal, he asked Basadona for assistance in acquiring the
bulls. BnF, CL, vol. 584, Estrades to Card. Basadona, 6 Feb. 1677, F. 83.
122
For the only brief discussion of the role of the tax that I have found see: Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and
England During the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216-1227) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 4748. It can be assumed through Estrades’s troubles regarding the tax that the system Sayers describes survived in the
papal chancery into the early-modern period.
123
BnF, CL, vol. 584, Estrades to Card. d’Estrées, 10 Oct. 1676, F. 417; Ibid., Estrades to Card. d’Estrées, 31 Oct.
1676, F. 437; BnF, CL, vol. 584, Estrades to Card. d’Estrées, November 14, 1676, F. 437r; BnF, CL, vol. 582,
Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 18 June 1677, F. 507; see also La Haye, “Un bénéfice aux Pays Bas”, 8.
124
BnF, CL, vol. 585, Estrades to Card. d’Estrées, 6 Feb. 1677, F. 79; Ellen Rosand, “Opera in Venice from
Monteverdi to Vivaldi,” in Art and Music in Venice: From the Renaissance to the Baroque, ed. Hilliard T. Goldfarb
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 200; Giovanni Salvioli, I teatri di Venezia nel secolo XVII (16371700: Memoriche storiche e bibliographiche (Milano: Università degli Studi, 1879), 15.

135

Meanwhile, the Marshal d’Estrades recommended his son personally to the king, the
pope, and Cardinal Cibo in hopes that he might receive the gratis for the bulls and, of greater
importance to the Estrades clan, a nomination to the archbishopric of Bourges which fell vacant
in 1676.125 The Marshal likewise worked in concert with the curia to negotiate the status of
Cardinal Bevilacqua, the papal nuncio at the congress, in the hierarchy of ambassadors and
plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen and in his controversial request for the personal use of one of the
city’s churches. Given the tensions surrounding the negotiations, Estrades’s maneuvers were no
small matter.126 His efforts undoubtedly contributed to his son’s favor with the pontiff.
Finally, in March 1677, Estrades’ entreaties and favors prevailed. Innocent XI granted the
gratis for the bulls no doubt also as a boon to Louis XIV and the marshal at Nijmegen.127 The
abbé noted that “...even My Lords the Spanish Cardinals were favorable to me.”128 Estrades
immediately set about gratifying those, like Cibo, who acted on his behalf through favors.129 By
so doing the other strand in the Stradella affair emerged. Cibo was implicated when the
composer and a castrato of his acquaintance contrived to extort ten thousand scudi from a Roman
woman engaged into the Cibo family. The scheme failed leaving the Cibo family humiliated.
Fleeing for his life, Alessandro Stradella left Rome taking refuge in Venice bringing the
composer into Contarini’s household as a musical protégé.130 In Contarini’s service, Stradella
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encountered his Venetian patron’s mistress, Agnese, with whom he began a love affair. The
musician’s subsequent irritating behavior among Venetian nobility, the jealous Alvise Contarini
in particular, opened a clear path for Estrades to show his gratitude and to strengthen French
aims in Venice and Rome through what seemed a trifle.131 When Stradella fled Venice for Turin,
Estrades complied with Contarini’s importunements to assist in his revenge against the
composer.
Here the strands of the Stradella case merged. The abbé provided Contarini and his men
with the letter to be delivered to the Marquis de Villars in Turin. “It is true, Monsieur,” the abbé
claimed to Cardinal d’Estrées, “I was told if Stradella refused to marry the girl he abducted
(Agnese van Uffelle), which was the only way to satisfy M. Contarini, that he would be
beaten…. The request (for the letter) did not seem violent, and as I have a natural repugnance for
action of that nature, it did not win me over even when I learned that the musician often merited
a more severe punishment. But what persuaded me further was that he cruelly injured Cardinal
Cibo in Rome.”132 Estrades claimed innocence in the affair’s violence, but as the acknowledged
representatives of Louis XIV, the participation of his ambassadors leant an air of royal approval
to an extraterritorial act of aggression.133 Calm soon returned to Franco-Savoyard relations
through the ministrations of Estrées in Turin and Cardinal Delfin writing on Estrades’ behalf.134
In a Christmas Eve letter Estrades’s father remarked, “I am very pleased to learn…that the affair
causing so much noise is over.”135 The marshal confirmed, indeed that “…the King no longer
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thinks of it.”136 The young ambassador still believed that his reputation, however, could be
compromised in the last month of 1677. He penned a long letter to Louis XIV containing
documents that he hoped would fully rehabilitate him and his efforts.
A Penitent Abbé d’Estrades Outing the Negotiations for Casale
The Stradella incident resulted from the lengths to which Estrades went to secure an
intelligence community in Venice and the continued loyalty of the pro-French members of its
patriciate in the service of his career and of Louis XIV. The ill-advised involvement in
Contarini’s vendetta, however, left him embarrassed, and it compromised his reputation with the
king and his patron, Pomponne. The end of 1677 was a low point in Estrades’s nascent career,
and as an ambassador maintaining royal favor came through prudent negotiation and personal
engagement. Estrades labored under an absolute monarchy constructed through functionaries’
abilities to promote and seamlessly utilize personal bonds of fidelity. These were deployed both
vertically and horizontally abroad and in the domestic hierarchy. Louis XIV’s eventual purchase
of Casale from Ferdinando-Carlo di Gonzaga-Nevers, Duke of Mantua through Estrades’
connections must be analyzed through the lens of the humiliating Stradella affair and his father’s
earlier warning to remain in royal favor.
Count Ercole Francesco Maria Mattioli’s final confirmation to Estrades in November
1677 that the Duke of Mantua was willing to sell Casale to Louis XIV arrived at just the moment
when Louis XIV’s opinion of Estrades needed bolstering.137 The abbé awaited the Duke’s
unreserved declaration to enter into negotiations with Louis XIV for the fortress for four months
before writing of it to the king.138 Perhaps because of the Stradella debacle the ambassador
believed he should come clean about the heretofore-secret negotiations. His first letter in
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December after learning the king pardoned him for the miscalculation opened submissively.139
Then followed twenty-two coded folios detailing secret meetings and correspondence in concert
with Count Mattioli and the above-mentioned pamphleteer Giuliani. Estrades detailed the duke’s
exact motivations for offering the fortress to Louis XIV. The gratifications the abbé secured for
Giuliani in December 1676 were not solely for pro-French broadsheets in Venice. Giuliani
served Estrades as intermediary in the early stages of talks just as Mattioli served the duke. The
ambassador and Mattioli maintained the deepest secrecy throughout — evading even the vigilant
Badoer.140
The Duke’s positive response prompted the abbé to solicit a letter to Louis XIV from the
count and an exact plan of the fortifications of Casale’s citadel. Estrades included a coded copy
of Mattioli’s letter in his dispatch to his master.141 In the letter Mattioli opined that of all the
ambassadors the king sent to Venice that Estrades “surpassed them all.” Through his negotiations
with the ambassador Mattioli knew him to be “seeking…to procure for Your Majesty the most
considerable expansion.”142 The count added that his master, alongside his Nevers roots, were
“Princes more French than Italian,” and that the current duke desired to accommodate the
king.143 Mattioli concluded saying that through his efforts and those of the abbé that they also
heard from many contacts in the Milanese willing to be rid of Spanish rule there and favorable to
the French.144
Details of the subsequent dealings between Estrades and Mattioli for the final French
purchase of Casale have been described adequately elsewhere so that a retelling is not necessary
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here.145 Accounts of the negotiations leading to Louis XIV’s acquisition of the stronghold in
September 1681, however, have not fully described Estrades’s motivations through the process
before his December 1677 letter of apology to Louis XIV. In his full treatment of negotiations
for Casale, Carlo Contessa mentioned only Estrades’s inducements for preferment but nothing of
his thorny ordeal in relation to Alessandro Stradella.146 Indeed to understand the personal nature
of Louis XIV’s foreign ministry and the abilities of its actors to create networks of information
dependent to some degree on them as individuals such description is illuminating.147
Sebastiano Foscarini, Venetian ambassador to France (1678-1683), understood the
personal nature of the international system in which he and the abbé negotiated. Through the
trenchant reportage of his 1683 relazione to the senate he analyzed not only the hegemonic
intentions of Louis XIV, but he captured succinctly Estrades’s personal inducements. Foscarini’s
report coupled with Estrades’s letter of 18 December 1677 depicted a clear image of the
arrangement’s nuances prior to the well-documented events of 1678-1679 that effectively
clenched the deal in favor of France.
Foscarini described in a bleak synthesis his observations in France. For Louis XIV,
according to Foscarini, the seizure of Casale, already a fait accompli by 1683, allowed the king a
stronghold in Northern Italy and it, along with Pinerolo in Piemonte, provided two “piazze” from
which to intimidate the Duke of Savoy who held “the keys to Italy.”148 The ambassador
summarized, that while difficult to obtain, the king’s intentions to expand French authority
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throughout Europe could materialize with further acquisitions in Italy like Casale.149 He
expressed Louis XIV’s aspirations to a universal monarchy, admitting that the Duke of Mantua
offered himself, perhaps unwittingly, as part of this design. He opted ostensibly to negotiate with
France to maintain some semblance of his authority and to augment his pitiful finances.150
Foscarini then described Estrades’s contribution to the potential growth of French
hegemony in Italy. The duke was in part pressured from the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs to
render Casale to them on a variety of pretexts.151 They beset the Duke of Mantua threatening to
wrest Casale from him by force. Rather than posit French threats along with those of Spain and
Austria, the “…Abbé d’Estrades, at that time the Crown’s ambassador to Your Serenity,”
Foscarini continued, through an “active intellect,” manipulated the duke’s vanity. The
ambassador, from Foscarini’s perspective, convinced the duke that by “putting Casale in the
hands of the Most Christian King,” that he would “…confound the pride of the Spanish….”152
Estrades was “happy to keep the threads of the negotiation in his hands until the most opportune
moment, neither pulling them too hard nor abandoning them.”153 Foscarini implied the abbé, like
the Bourbon foreign policy he served, saw that the acquisition of Casale – in conjunction with all
of Louis XIV’s other seizures of Spanish territories and piazze across Europe – would allow
France “…to render its kingdom inaccessible [to attack].”154
The Venetian ambassador relayed the strategem of the negotiation to the senate. He
explained the method through which Estrades plied the prince’s defenses. Well-acquainted with
the institutions of French absolutism through his four years at the court, Foscarini understood
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Estrades’s position and that his future depended on performance.155 He offered then an
explanation for the abbé’s personal interest in the arrangement. Having admitted Estrades’s
intelligence, Foscarini said the ambassador was “…eager to give birth to a transaction in an
otherwise fruitless ministry.”156 The abbé was indeed unable to persuade Venice from its
neutrality despite his best efforts through secret channels and through direct representation.
Foscarini recognized that the abbé was in Venice for that reason, and he undoubtedly knew that
Venice had no intention of allying overtly with France as French forces gathered around Italy
and as the king’s plenipotentiaries “dictated rather than contracted peace” at Nijmegen.157
Conclusion
Foscarini’s observation of Estrades’s conduct in his final year in Venice was more
precise than he might have known. The Abbé d’Estrades’s work in the republic provided French
leverage at the Congress of Nijmegen to gain “overlordship of the maritime ports of the
Kingdom of Naples and to reenter Sicily.”158 He had relayed details of French entry into Spanish
dominions in Italy and into the “commerce of the Levant and the Mediterranean…impeding its
resources to all others” through his dispatches.159 Estrades reinforced French networks in Rome,
and he upheld Franco-Venetian relations in a moment when the republic was growing anxious
about its ally’s intentions.160 Yet, he had failed earlier to secure Giovanni Battista Nani’s
nomination as mediator, and he could not shake the Venetians from their position of ostensible
neutrality; a neutrality that allowed the republic an economic and geopolitical respite in the years
following the loss of Crete. In this period, Estrades made use of the Duke of Mantua’s
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predicament during the fallout of the Stradella case, writing “…Sire, this misfortune obliges me
to act henceforth in all things through a greater circumspection for which I hope Your Majesty
will never have reason to be dissatisfied with my conduct.”161 He sensed that his reputation and
his future came close to ruin. His advancement depended on some advantage to offer the Crown
as Venice stubbornly resisted an alliance and became increasingly anti-French.
The duke’s final decision to negotiate with France for Casale through Count Mattioli
arrived just as the abbé reeled from the Stradella affair. The confluence of these events, so well
symbolized through Estrades’s penitent letter to Louis XIV in which he enclosed those of
Mattioli, proved to be the conjuncture of events – both international and personal – to which
Sebastiano Foscarini referred. Estrades waited for a fortuitous opportunity before he divulged the
secret negotiations with Louis XIV and Pomponne. The prospect of a tidy purchase at Spain’s
expense intrigued and pleased the king securing Estrades’s position as successor to the Marquis
de Villars as ambassador to Turin where he served from 1679-1685.162 The French siezure of the
enclave in 1681, however, would take place as Louis XIV’s authority across Europe swelled to
an alarming degree from the vantage of other European rulers. In the early 1680s an embittered
Venice would interpet the French occupation of Casale in conjunction with the king’s emergent
politics of réunions and refusal to succor Leopold I against the Turks as evidence that he might
soon seek to incorporate other Italian lands into his kingdom. Venetian amity toward the king
was to shift to the House of Habsburg.
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The Ambassador as a Target:
Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot (1682-1685)
The Sieur d’Amelot attended the solemnities for the Feast of Saint Anthony in the
basilica of Saint Mark on 13 June 1684.1 Inside the sanctuary, Amelot, the French ambassador,
accompanied Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani, Venetian officials, and other foreign dignitaries.
Meanwhile, outside in the crowded piazza, the captain of the sbirri — the guards of public order
— conspicuously shoved two of Amelot’s liveried gondoliers and a French tailor living in the
city through jeering spectators gathered in Venice’s most public space.2 The captain arrested the
men for allegedly instigating a brawl in a cabaret abutting the piazza. Rather than moving the
men to the prisons in gondolas away from the crowd, he made a scene of their arrest sending
messengers into the basilica to alert members of the Council of Ten of the tumult. There
followed an aggressive escort through the crowds after which the French prisoners were cast into
the “black prisons.”3
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This was the fourth and most public incident involving members of Amelot’s household
since his arrival in Venice; it would not be the last. Amelot’s experience in the republic was
punctuated with such events. He feared for his reputation with his master, but he maintained that
these humiliations were “premeditated with enthusiasm” and aimed at his legitimacy as
ambassador and at the king’s dignity.4 Since Louis XIV’s successes through the treaties of
Nijmegen and Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1678-1679, the acquisition of Casale in 1681, and the
ensuing politics of réunions, many in Venice became hostile to the French.5 Despite the
controversies surrounding Amelot and his repeated pleas that the king demand satisfaction from
the republic, Louis XIV kept the novice ambassador in Venice for almost three years.
Amelot’s service in Venice from May 1682 to February 1685 was the most acrimonious
of any French ambassador there in the late seventeenth century. His tenure coincided with
France’s greatest territorial expansion and arguably the final ascent of Louis XIV’s authority in
Europe.6 That the king allowed Amelot to suffer degradations underscored the objectives of
French foreign policy in the early 1680s.7 Venetian treatment of Amelot revealed anti-French
sentiment in these years reinforcing the republic’s pro-Habsburg foreign policy. Venice could
not afford openly to attack Louis XIV as his international authority expanded. The government
could, however, use state mechanisms to make his representative’s life miserable; it did so as
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Louis XIV asserted international pressure that threatened Italy and as Venice's senate debated an
alliance with Leopold I just prior to the formation of the Holy League in 1684.
Amelot’s embassy illustrated the evolution and the restrictions of the louisquatorzien
foreign relations apparatus at the apogee of French international authority. Correspondingly,
Amelot revealed a republic persevering as a sought-after military and diplomatic ally in Europe
and the Mediterranean.8 The French foreign ministry’s responses to the ambassador in these
years showed that Louis XIV understood this.9 The king believed it necessary to threaten Venice
with the possibility of war in Italy to avoid opposition to either French territorial designs in the
empire or to compromise Franco-Ottoman relations.10 Incidents such as that in the Piazza San
Marco during the Feast of Saint Anthony allowed the king leverage with the republic while
focusing his attention on the depredations of the Spanish Netherlands and the German frontier.11
The king proved through reprisals since 1661 that humiliating or attacking his emissaries
was intolerable. That he allowed his ambassador in Venice to undergo embarrassment with no
retaliation reinforced the reality that Venice posed a viable risk to French international policy in
the early 1680s. France needed a neutral Venetian government vis-a-vis the Habsburgs.12 French
territorial and commercial policies, however, compelled the republic into a pro-Habsburg
alliance that was to last until the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699.13 Dangling the inexperienced
Amelot in the void, Louis XIV intentionally gave Venetian antipathy a target at which to fire in a
8
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bid to stop the senate allying with Leopold I while giving a novice ambassador a lesson in
diplomacy.
Amelot in Venice: A New Man in the Administration of Colbert de Croissy
Amelot succeeded the Sieur de Varangeville (1679-1682) as ambassador to Venice.14
Varangeville maintained the Franco-Venetian rapport after the Abbé d’Estrades’s negotiations
for the acquisition of Casale.15 Casale cemented France’s foothold in Northern Italy after the
Congress of Nijmegen, and the purchase hinted at what many feared were Louis XIV’s designs
to incorporate Italy piecemeal into his kingdom.16 The shift in foreign ministers that occurred
after Arnould de Pomponne’s disgrace in 1679 also unsettled the Venetian government. Charles
Colbert, Marquis de Croissy (1679-1696), although friendly to the republic, was unknown
among foreign states regarding the direction of French foreign policy under his supervision. The
concomitants of French support for Hungarian rebels under the leadership of Count Tekely
against Leopold I and the establishment of the first controversial chambre de réunion of Metz in
1681 contributed to the senate’s continued disillusionment toward their ostensible French allies
and the new minister of foreign affairs.17 Consequently, Venice was predisposed to mistrust
Louis XIV’s newest emissary.
Of Picard origin, Amelot was born in 1655 to Charles Amelot, Seigneur-Baron de Neury
and Brunelles (1620-1671) and Marie Lyonne daughter of Jacques Lyonne, Seigneur de Cuilly
and Livri, a former grand audiencier de France.18 Charles Amelot became a conseiller in the
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parlement of Paris the year Louis XIV was born. In 1674, at the age of nineteen, Michel followed
his father in this capacity, and in 1677 Amelot purchased the position of maitre de requêtes
ordinaire de l’hôtel du roi.19 These charges soon brought him into the closed circle of conseillers
du roi dans ses conseils d’état et privé - “the central nervous system of the government.”20
Diplomacy became more centralized and systematic under the direction of Colbert de
Croissy.21 As in other areas of louisquatorzien bureaucracy, there was a push to elevate men of
robe origin to diplomatic posts.22 Attachment to the king and Croissy rather than noble birth
propelled their careers.23 They owed continued preferment to the king, and under Croissy the
push to control the training of the crown’s foreign ministry and its functionaries became
exacting.24 In the context of a centralizing administration and the promotion of able servants,
Amelot was ideal for elevation into Croissy’s ministry. His duties in the king’s conseils no doubt
brought Amelot to the attention of Croissy. He received instructions on 17 February to leave for
the Republic of Venice.25 As Louis XIV was installing his court definitively at Versailles in
1682, the twenty-seven year old Michel-Antoine d’Amelot embarked upon his new career as an
ambassador.
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He arrived in Venice incognito on 10 May along with his suite and an expensive cargo of
furniture and plate for the embassy.26 The ambassadress, Catherine le Pelletier de la Houssaie,
followed her husband.27 Although his official entrée would not occur until 23 September,
Amelot’s troubled rapport with the Venetians began while still incognito.28 Venetian suspicion
revolved around members of Amelot’s household. His secretary, lackeys, and gondoliers became
suspects involved in incidents ostensibly regarding the franchises that all foreign ambassadors
claimed in Venice. It is uncertain how many servants Amelot employed, but it seems he had
fewer than the Bishop of Beziers.29 Bonsy, for example, noted that he had eight gondoliers in his
retinue whereas Amelot employed only six.30 The sources attest that serving Amelot in particular
were Roger de Piles, his personal secretary, and a Signor Bartolomeo Franceschi, a “secretary of
the Italian tongue.”31 For the first time an ambassador in Venice claimed the French consul there,
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Jean-Guillaume Le Blond, and the vice-consul, Comel, as part of his retinue sharing in the
privilege of duty free comestibles he dispensed to his household.32
The enterprise of diplomacy and its consequences for foreign policy were not solely
dependent upon the ambassador. The details regarding Amelot’s household that emerge from
dispatches, affidavits, and the avvisi from the inquisitors’ spy, Badoer, revealed the extent to
which the ambassador’s dependents fed the organism of espionage. They played a vital role in
collecting the news informing the ambassador’s dispatches. Amelot was inexperienced with and
allegedly arrogant toward the Venetian government. The discourse regarding diplomatic
immunity and Amelot’s prejudice toward his hosts highlighted the problematic nature of early
modern diplomats as individuals in representative roles. The scandals of Amelot and his staff
exemplified incidents Louis XIV’s foreign ministry hoped to circumvent through the later
creation of the académie politique.33 The foreign ministry increasingly believed a centrally
trained pool of ambassadors and secretaries might protect state secrets and avoid mistakes on the
part of diplomats.34
Amelot’s papers demonstrate the praxis of Colbert de Croissy’s reorganization of the
ministry of foreign affairs after 1679.35 Croissy’s creation of a foreign affairs archive began
during Amelot’s embassy, and the ambassador’s correspondence with Louis XIV and Croissy
highlighted the attempt to control information vertically that characterized the foreign ministry
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for the rest of the reign.36 Previous ambassadors to Venice, as I have shown, corresponded with a
number of ministers at court and ambassadors abroad. Bonsy and Estrades independently
undertook cultural and commercial tasks expanding the scope of foreign relations at the
instigation of ministers outside the ministry of foreign affairs like Jean Baptiste Colbert.
Estrades’s embassy underscored the problems that arose through an ambassador’s independent
correspondence, but such interventions are largely absent from Amelot’s papers.
Amelot entered a hostile republic torn, as was Leopold I, between Mehmet IV in the east
and the Ottomans’ French ally to the west.37 The ambassador was to report to Louis XIV any
information of Venice’s relationships with Leopold and with Mehmet.38 Of critical importance
too were the Venetian senate’s reaction to French movements in Italy and the republic’s possible
negotiations with the Habsburgs in Italian affairs.39 Copies of communiqués between Amelot and
other French ambassadors are rare in the sources. Amelot corresponded often with the
ambassador in Constantinople, Gabriel-Joseph de Lavergne, Comte de Guilleragues, but this is
evident only through references he made to Guilleragues in dispatches to the king. The
correspondence with Guilleragues came as a direct order from Croissy as Venice was the closest
destination for packets going from Constantinople to France that were to be included in those of
Amelot coming from Venice.40
The relative dearth of Amelot’s letters to and from other French emissaries in dispatches
is, however, hard to account for. A possible explanation is that Amelot’s robe origins and his
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relatively new post in the king’s conseils of 1677 left him dependent upon Louis XIV and
Croissy until he was established within broader information circles. Amelot’s status as a new
diplomat restricted a priori international networks at his disposal. He had no experience with
intelligence networks beyond France as had Bonsy and Estrades. Amelot too was the first
ambassador in Venice whose communication with Jean-Baptiste Colbert does not survive if it
existed. Throughout his embassy Amelot corresponded directly with Louis XIV, writing letters
to and receiving letters from Croissy infrequently; this was a different practice compared to
previous foreign ministers who maintained triangular correspondences with ambassadors and the
king.
Amelot’s inexperience showed in his early writing as Louis XIV instructed Amelot to
write more detailed information in his early dispatches.41 The reports of Amelot and Venetian
ambassadors’ in Paris attest that he corresponded with personal acquaintances and members of
other government ministries in France to be sure.42 None of these letters, however, found their
way into the state archives as had Bonsy’s and Estrades’s. In fact, under Croissy’s ministry, the
king forbade ambassadors to include personal papers in official dispatches and packets. This
practice reflected the complex divisions among Croissy’s commis who had little enough time to
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handle copious official communications.43 Louis XIV and Croissy wanted to control the flow of
sensitive information with fewer intelligence breaches; fewer distractions from the ministry’s
instructions to the ambassador; and no cluttered packets complicating the work of Croissy’s
commis overseeing the synthesis of foreign intelligence sources and composing official
responses.44 Amelot complied with this innovation.45
A further novelty appeared in Amelot’s instructions. Scholars of early-modern Europe are
familiar with the relazioni of Venetian ambassadors; these extensive reports possibly prompted
Croissy to command the ambassador to write a final report.46 No previous ambassador to Venice
was asked to do so. This suggests the affinity for documented information that Jean-Baptiste
Colbert imposed throughout Ludovician bureaucracy. Colbert’s methodical control of affairs
through meticulous documentation influenced his brother’s methods as foreign minister.47
Curiously, if Amelot wrote a final relation it did not survive among his papers in the archives.
Perhaps it has simply been lost although this would be uncharacteristic of Croissy’s formation of
the first systematic diplomatic archive in France.48 Further examination of Amelot’s experiences
in Venice, however, may help to understand why the document was either never written or
omitted from the ambassador’s extant correspondence.
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Amelot Reports the Venetian Response to Louisquatorzien Foreign Policy: Prelude to a
Mediterranean War, 1682-1684
Amelot’s communication with Louis XIV provides evidence of the monarch’s
overconfidence in his intelligence system to predict the capacities of perceived weaker states visà-vis French policy.49 An examination of Amelot’s embassy in the Serenissima amplified the
limitations of Louis XIV’s authority. The king and Colbert de Croissy followed a policy meant to
maintain peace with the Habsburgs after Nijmegen. Correlative and injurious to this course was
the further annexation of lands through the chambres des réunions that the king believed legally
belonged to him pursuant to the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nijmegen.50 Croissy’s imperative
was to maintain peace while courting states, like Venice, whose loyalty could help avoid another
war with the Habsburgs as his politics of réunions’ progressed.51
Amelot revealed that the king and the foreign ministry underestimated the resilience and
military strength of the republic and of Leopold I.52 The foreign ministry could not curtail
Venice’s disapproval of Louis XIV’s seeming greed and treacherousness. The king’s relatively
healthy relations with the Ottomans in the early 1680s provided an opportunity to filch territory
along the Rhine while the emperor’s resources were directed toward Hungary and while Venice
gauged which enemy was the most pressing – Louis XIV or the Sultan.53 In Venice many - both
commoners and aristocrats - believed them to be one and the same.54
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Amelot began relaying detailed knowledge from the republic. Initially he hypothesized
that Venice was engaged in diplomatic and military negotiations with Leopold I and Spain to
neutralize the French presence in Italy and the western empire.55 It is easy to understand why
Venice’s concerted mobilization of military forces in 1682 and 1683 appeared directed against
the French as much as was Venetian public opinion.56 The purchase of Casale in 1681 provided
Louis XIV a stronger presence in the peninsula.57 The arrival of French troops into Casale
occurred on the same day as the annexation of Strasbourg after the deliberations of the first
chambre de réunion.58 Casale and Pinerolo provided territories with fortresses allowing the king
enclaves of authority in which to station French military presence in Italy. These spaces lay
suspiciously near the Spanish Milanese although the king claimed he had no intention to expand
there.59 The Duke of Mantua’s further cession of lands in Monferrato to the French in February
1683 seemed to contradict royal reassurances.60
The king’s growing rivalry with Pope Innocent XI too gained strength in 1682 as the feud
over the rights of régale culminated in the Paris parlement’s acceptance of the Four Gallican
Articles cementing Franco-papal tensions for the rest of the decade.61 It appeared to the Venetian
senate that the king might force his will upon Northern Italian princes as he had imposed it upon
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the Dutch and the Spanish in the treaties that followed Nijmegen.62 Louis separated these states
allowing France the upper hand on its eastern boundaries as a possible war on two fronts loomed
before Leopold I. The king and Croissy believed Leopold would avoid a double front assuming
he would concentrate his forces against the Turk and the rebelling Hungarian nobles under Count
Tekely.63 Louis covertly encouraged both of Leopold’s eastern enemies in a bid to keep the
emperor engaged by supporting Tekely with subsidies and reassuring Mehmet IV he would not
help the emperor.64 Amelot indicated that imperial envoys were in Venice and the Milanese
suggesting that the senate prepared to join an anti-French coalition in Italy; many in Venice
believed they should do so.65 The republic’s Bailo in Constantinople, Giovambattista Donà,
struggled to sustain peace with the Ottomans. Although the senate voted to augment troops and
to fortify its traditional chain of strongholds along the Dalmatian coast and in Friuli, there was no
indication yet that it aimed to enter a protracted Mediterranean conflict against Mehmet IV.66
The announcement of the league between Leopold I and Jan III Sobieski soon changed this
assumption.67
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From Amelot’s arrival in the republic and throughout 1683 Venice began to mobilize
military and naval forces.68 The ambassador reported to the king that the senate debated
extraordinary measures to raise funds. Among the proposals were the augmentation of the
nobility and the recall for payment of banished subjects.69 The government considered levying
sums owing to the state too from religious houses throughout the republic.70 The monies the
senate raised, according to Amelot, paid for an extraordinary mobilization that the republic could
still scant afford. Among the preparations in early 1683 were the construction of six galleys and
three other vessels in the arsenal and a search for prisoners to man them.71 The republic sent
thirty thousand ducats to Amsterdam to purchase iron cannons for galleys.72 By the end of the
year the senate augmented preparations in the arsenal to construct thirty more vessels and fortify
twenty eight existing ships.73 Venice also hoped to rent existing ships from neighboring states
such as Genoa.74 Amelot’s skillful reportage incensed the Venetian government, and it began to
consider how to stop information leaks to France.75
Detailed reports of the senate’s financial and military preparations still provided no clear
indication of where Venice meant to direct its resources. The republic’s uneasy peace with the
Ottomans became increasingly fractured through the weakness and poor negotiations of Donà.
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The Bailo made unauthorized promises that Venice would pay large sums to maintain a distinctly
disadvantageous peace that permitted the Turks to edge closer to Venice’s Dalmatian
dominions.76 Ultimately, the recall and subsequent imprisonment of Donà in May 1683 saw the
collapse of Venetian-Ottoman diplomacy for the rest of the seventeenth century.77
The senate now seemed paralyzed in deliberation, and, aware that Amelot was feeding
Louis XIV news of its talks with imperial envoys, it hesitated to engage overtly with the
Habsburgs.78 The siege of Vienna from July to mid-September intensified the senate’s fear of
Mehmet IV, and pressed the republic to send more troops and materiel to its Friulian borders.79
The King’s refusal to aid the emperor during the siege infuriated many in the republic and
throughout Northern Italy where he was reputedly known as the “Most Christian Turk.”80
Louis disbelieved Venice would declare war on the Ottomans in concert with the
emperor.81 The king was certain of Leopold’s unwillingness to fight a two-front war. Should
Venice declare openly an alliance, he wrote Amelot, the republic would be left alone to fight the
Turk if Leopold refused to accept further French acquisition of territories in the empire pursuant
to the negotiations at the Diet of Ratisbonne.82 The king pressed Amelot to court the senate away
from the emperor, but the pervasive anti-French sentiment that Amelot described in Venice

76

AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 27 March 1683, Fs. 328v, 329r-329v, AAE, CP, Venise, vol.
107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 28 April 1683, F. 346r.
77
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 22 May 1683, F. 386r; Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks,
256-257, 258-259.
78
ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Badoer to Inquisitors of State, 24 July 1683; ASV-IS-RC, Busta 547, Badoer to
Inquisitors of State, 11 Aug. 1683.
79
ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Badoer to Inquisitors of State, 24 July 1683.
80
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108, Pietro Boselli to Amelot, 12 Oct. 1683, F. 198r.
81
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Louis XIV to Amelot, 31 March 1683, F. 319v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Louis
XIV to Amelot, 25 May 1683, F. 376r.
82
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Louis XIV to Amelot, 25 May 1683, F. 376r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Louis
XIV to Amelot, 453r.

160

indicated that the government and its subjects were indeed favorable to a Habsburg alliance.83
The king’s augmentation in September of twenty six thousand infantry and fourteen thousand
cavalry in his Italian enclaves pushed the republic closer to the Habsburgs. Venice shared the
threat of the Turk with Leopold I, and the senate and people of Venice now distrusted Louis XIV
completely.84
Visits from imperial emissaries with the senate increased after the league formed
between Leopold I and the Polish king.85 With the Ottoman siege of Vienna, the pope too
pressed the republic to join its forces to the league. In the closing months of 1683 the senate was,
according to Amelot, now fully in favor of allying with the emperor, the Polish king, and the
pope.86 He remarked that many principal noble families expected that an alliance against the
Ottomans would allow them to regain a Mediterranean empire and enrich themselves as many of
them had done in the Candian War.87 Entreaties from Jan III Sobieski and subsidies from
Innocent XI in December emboldened the senate further to consider the league.88 The death of
Doge Alvise Contarini in January 1684 provided the opportunity the senate needed to make a
final decision.89 The traditionally pro-French Contarini and his faction in the senate were the
voices calling for prudence and impeding the league. Amelot reported that within days of
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Contarini’s death the senate passed the measure spearheaded by Francesco Morosini to join the
league with sixty three votes for and thirty against.90
Soon after the election of Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani, Venetian plenipotentiaries
departed to join imperial and Polish diplomats at Lindz, and the senate dispatched a delegation to
Rome.91 Amelot reported the official announcement of the Holy League in Venice on 12
March.92 Venice’s government had cast its lot with Leopold, and the alliance was to have
profound effects for Franco-Venetian diplomacy later in the century.93 The provisions of the
treaty stipulated that each party pledged perpetual membership in the defense of the others and at
least six years offensive membership in the league. Each party was to eschew unilateral peace
with the Turk and come to the others’ aid in any future war with the Ottomans. The members
were allowed to attack Mehmet IV’s forces wherever each found the most advantage and
pledging to cede ecclesiastical dominions to the pope.94 Venice enlisted a rehabilitated Francesco
Morosini, the hero-cum-scapegoat of the Candian war, to lead its forces as captain-general in the
coming conflict.95 By June, Venice, in conjunction with Innocent XI and the allied forces of a
number of German princes, most notably the Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg who supplied Venice
infantry in three regiments, was ready to proceed.96 With auxiliaries from German princes, the
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Grand Duke of Tuscany, the pope, and the Knights of Malta the republic assembled a flotilla of
seventy three vessels and twelve thousand men for Morosini to lead.97
Louis XIV was certain that the senate made a mistake joining the league.98 Leopold I
refused to accept French suzerainty of lands wrested through the réunions, and there seemed no
alternative to a war with the emperor on the Rhine. In this event, Venice, he warned would suffer
the brunt of Turkish wrath. The king instructed Amelot to urge the senate to influence the
emperor to concede at Ratisbonne.99 Leopold opted throughout 1684 to let Spain counter Louis
XIV. The latter declared war on France in December 1683 in response to French depredations in
the Low Countries.100 The Venetians feared that Spain’s war and Leopold’s interventions in the
east would bring French ire definitively down upon Italy, and the vicious French bombardment
of Spain’s ally, Genoa, in May 1684 lent credence to the republic’s fears as it did to all Italian
states.101 The king, however, seemed more concerned with the ratification of the treaty of
Ratisbonne; the humiliation of the Republic of Genoa was meant to warn Spain to sue for peace
with France more than signal a French offensive into Italy.102 Amelot was to reassure the
Venetians that his attack on Genoa should not concern them, and he sent his formal, although
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sarcastic, congratulations upon the formation of the league.103 The ambassador was to specify
that the king wished the republic every success in taking back the three kingdoms the Turk had
stripped them of in the last three centuries.104
Venice’s war began in earnest in early July as Morosini moved against the Ottomans at
Santa Maura.105 The republic was greeted with an early victory strengthening its resolve, and the
general crisis in the Ottoman government weakened the Turks in the face of the league’s
offensives.106 Leopold I’s armies under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, routed the Turks near Pest
as Morosini advanced against Santa Maura.107 Invested in the treaty with the League, the
emperor could not continue to resist the French on the Rhine.108 On 15 August he accepted the
twenty- year peace laid out at Ratisbonne.109 The treaty allowed Leopold to maintain nominal
lordship of lands taken by France before 1679. Louis XIV kept Strasbourg, and he demanded
Luxembourg from Spain. The treaty seemed to promise a period of stability along the Rhine
while the Holy League advanced. Europe waited to see if Louis XIV’s ambitions subsided after
the truce.110 Meanwhile, with almost lightning speed, Morosini reclaimed Venice’s lost
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Dalmatian dominions adding much of the Morea early in the war portending the reestablishment
of a Venetian Mediterranean empire.111
Amelot and the Protection of French Commercial Interests in the Mediterranean Sea
Amelot’s portrayal of Venetian foreign policy suggested that Venice’s government
believed the French king posed the greatest threat to its Mediterranean trade and dominions in
the 1680s. Only the Turk frightened Venice more. The king’s commercial relations with the
Ottomans made Louis XIV as much of a menace on the sea as his armies made him on European
soil. Venice, as we have seen, was uncompromising in regards to its traditional claims of
lordship over the Adriatic Gulf.112 The government sought to press its dominance in the gulf and
to counter Louis XIV’s pretensions pursuant to the 1673 capitulations with Mehmet IV as war
seemed imminent in 1683-1684.113
The king was adamant that the republic’s claims over the Adriatic were no longer valid,
and he warned that its alliances against the Turk must in no way damage French commerce.114
Amelot and the king agreed that the Venetian Bailo, Donà, sought from 1682-1683 to hinder the
Count de Guilleragues’s efforts in Constantinople. He defended the imperial ambassador’s
precedence above the count as the “affair of the sofa” unfolded, and he allegedly impeded the
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expedition of Guilleragues’s dispatches to Amelot hampering communications with the king.115
These were attempts to destabilize French authority in the eastern sea. Meanwhile, in the west,
Livorno’s importance as a duty free port and Marseille’s vessels and aggressive merchants
amplified the threat to Venice’s income as a port city.116
At the death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert the 6 September 1683 the French navy and
merchant marine had grown from the insignificant number of fifty six vessels in 1661 to two
hundred seventy six ships either in the water or under construction.117 Departing from Marseille
and Toulon French ships traversed the Mediterranean elevating the French commercial and
military presence in the sea as never before in spite of the fierce competition that characterized
maritime commerce on the sea.118 Amelot was the first of Louis XIV’s ambassadors in Venice to
undertake outright mediation for French commerce in Venetian waters, and the king lauded his
initiative.119 Furthermore, he undertook commercial negotiations seemingly with no prompts
from Louis XIV or the Marquis de Seignelay who succeeded his father, Colbert, as secretary of
the marine. Mention of Venice’s pretensions to dominance in the Adriatic can be found in the
dispatches of previous ambassadors, but Amelot was the first ambassador in Venice to see
commercial mediation there as related to foreign policy.
Whereas under ambassadors like Bonsy and Estrades French commerce in the sea had not
yet achieved a sufficient foothold to require negotiation in Venice, the situation was different in
115
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the 1680s. Amelot’s successful interventions on behalf of the commercial fleet ranged from
demanding the return of sequestered cargos to negotiating the end of a moratorium on vessels
coming from Toulon when the senate alleged that some ships from the port carried plague - a
charge Louis XIV denied saying he would know better than anyone if there was plague in
Toulon.120 As in foreign policy, the senate could not control French policies outright, but it tried
to slow them down in its traditional spheres of authority.
Amelot protested against the molestation of French vessels, merchants, and cargo as
consuls from the Levant reported incidents to him as the war of the Holy League began.121 The
exchange between French consuls and Amelot corresponded to Colbert’s regulation of consuls
and their responsibilities in l’Ordonnance de la marine du mois d’aout, 1681.122 Again, under
previous ambassadors in Venice, consuls did not petition them for assistance in commercial
affairs. The ordonnance stipulated that consuls were to petition the highest French minister near
them for assistance, and thus, the role of ambassadors in Constantinople and Venice took on
another facet.123 The return of war to the Mediterranean in 1684 saw an increase in consuls’
correspondence with Amelot in matters related to French merchants living in Venice’s stato da
mar during the conflict. The ambassador complained to the senate when its officials abroad
120
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intentionally demonstrated prejudice against the business of French captains and merchants.124
The senate promised to maintain “the most cordial negotiations with the French…” in these
instances.125 As chapter five will show, French maritime complaints against the Venetians only
increased as Francesco Morosini led allied forces in reclaiming Venice’s Mediterranean
territories. The Venetian senate became less accommodating as the war progressed.126
The Ambassador and the Venetian Public’s “Blind Rage Against the French”:127
Venice sought to regain its dominions through the Holy League. The republic rallied
regardless of the image of the weak state Amelot depicted. The Serenissima was highly capable
of wielding influence, and the senate attracted cooperation from formidable international allies
still in the late seventeenth century. Through the Treaty of Lindz, the republic pledged to assist in
crushing Turkish power in Eastern Europe and the Western Mediterranean.128 Despite the
financial turmoil Venice suffered in the decade following the loss of Crete, it rearmed in
response to the threat of Ottoman and French encroachments in the early 1680s.129 Ultimately,
the question of French aims in Italy was left open-ended, but Amelot’s reports could veil neither
Venice’s readiness when war came nor the antipathy of Venetians for Louis XIV.
In Venice’s public spaces, according to Amelot and the inquisitors’ confidente, Badoer,
many in the republic demonstrated hatred for the French.130 The ambassador informed the king
of the depths to which the people’s sentiments towards France plummeted. The Venetian
populace’s anger coincided with details of the insults and accusations the republic’s government
124
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leveled at the ambassador. Amelot indicated that Venetian inquisitors sought to curb discourse in
public spaces as the international situation deteriorated to protect state secrets and quieten
tensions in the city. While the senate deliberated whether the state should counter French
intentions in Northern Italy or against Mehmet IV in an alliance with Leopold I, the inquisitors
forbade ice cream shops from staying open throughout the night to inhibit “young nobles and
foreigners” from engaging in political discourse.131 Some months later the senate passed
legislation prohibiting banks, apothecaries, and fresh water vendors from keeping or displaying
inflammatory pamphlets and gazettes in their establishments enjoining captains of the sestieri to
arrest anyone speaking insolently of “crowned heads.”132
Despite such measures Venice’s populace continued to make its anger toward Louis XIV
known. Venetian ire stemmed from alleged French involvement in Count Tekely’s revolt in
Hungary and the French alliance with the Ottomans.133 The growing presence of French troops
and arms in Northern Italy too terrified and incensed the populace.134 Nobles in the Piazza San
Marco were heard to shout “twenty one Frenchmen are twenty one devils,” and in February 1683
Amelot reported to the king that:
“...such discourse is in the mouth of the people as well as the nobles... . In a word,
the French embassy, which has always been here, and which should be of the
highest luster everywhere, is falling into the greatest disdain…. The evil, Sire, is
greater than I can describe…. One speaks currently in such an outrageous manner
one to another that I feel exposed to a thousand affronts everyday.”135
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The ambassador was not alone in reporting Venetians’ prejudice. Badoer sent a copy of a
widespread broadsheet to the inquisitors in which the traditional Te Deum was reimagined
likening Louis XIV to Satan. The screed claimed that “The heavens and earth are full of your
awful heresies,” and it called upon the judgment of God against the king and those who allied
with him.136 The king’s refusal to assist Leopold I during the siege of Vienna drew the greatest
outcry from Venetians.137 The siege coincided with the death of Queen Marie Thérèse, and some
reportedly claimed that his queen’s death was the first divine scourge unleashed upon the king
for his crimes.138 Some members of Venice's government refused to go into official mourning in
protest drawing fulminations from Louis XIV.139
The king’s alliance with the Mehmet IV infuriated many in the republic.140 After the
siege of Vienna was lifted in September Venetians were heard cursing the Turk and Louis XIV
during the city’s rejoicing.141 Popular anger followed the suite of Venice’s new ambassador,
Girolamo Venier, to Paris in December 1684. On 8 March Venier wrote to the state inquisitors
that one of his lackeys, in a moment of drunkenness, boasted that he would assassinate Louis
XIV for “one hundred or even for twenty five dobles.”142 Croissy summoned the ambassador to
ask that he deliver the Italian into French custody. To preserve Venice’s “reputation and the
immunity and decorum of its public grandeur,” Venier complied publicly divesting the lackey of
136
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livery and remanding him to French justice.143 The inquisitors approved Venier’s response to his
servant’s “diabolical utterances,” believing the servant merited his subsequent incarceration in
the Bastille.144 The republic could not afford controversy as the recent alliance with Leopold I
and Spain’s declaration of war against France left Venice vulnerable to possible French
retaliation.
The French bombardment of Genoa in May increased popular outrage almost to the
breaking point.145 Amelot believed that his reputation and that of the king were completely
compromised in the republic. By October he pleaded with Louis XIV to recall him to France.146
The king did not seem particularly concerned with either Venetian popular discontent or
Amelot’s fears; he seemed pleased rather to allow the ambassador to undergo a series of
accusations and trials against this volatile backdrop. Amelot described the republic as having a
violent atmosphere where rumor and the protection of kinship and honor fueled murder and
violence on a regular basis.147 He feared for his reputation, his life, and the well being of his
household. The allegations brought against him personally and those serving him occurred in the
dangerous context of Venetians’ visceral anti-French sentiments.
The Formation of an Ambassador: Domestic Arrangements, Two Murders, and a
Contraband Ring
The controversies unfolding around Amelot and his retinue in Venice's reputedly violent
climate demonstrated the Venetian government’s response to the information networks
143
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informing Amelot. Ultimately, his experience in the republic highlighted too the brutal resolve of
Venice’s counterintelligence system as the senate prepared for war. The republic’s heightened
security and measures to increase revenues to fund the war effort provoked attempts to stop the
sale of contraband.148 Ambassadors in the city complained that the senate seemed to want to
restrict their privilege to acquire wine, flour, and bread without paying duties as the clandestine
sale of these items hindered Venice’s economic stability.149
Amelot noted the presence of Venetian spies observing ambassadors and the goods they
ordered.150 He indicated that he believed the French embassy was under closer surveillance than
any other. The state inquisitors were investigating the ambassador’s household and how he
utilized diplomatic privilege. Amelot worded his complaints to the king regarding the republic’s
hostility toward his immunities to depict a republic in open defiance of French might, but the
story that emerged in the riferte of the inquisitors’ spy, Badoer, and the ambassadors in Paris
proved that the inexperienced ambassador had not yet learned to cover his informants’ tracks.
The broader story can emerge, however, only after examining Amelot’s perspective.
A document from 1664, “concerning rights and useful prerogratives,” described French
ambassadors’ rights in Venice to import wine and flour into the embassy and its environs without
paying duties.151 These were commodities that could not be sold freely in the republic, and so,
ambassadors’ passports were required to accompany the products’ transport to the lista dei
francesi. Ambassadors were allowed sparingly to sell a measure of these goods in this space. The
diplomat’s protection was extended to anyone carrying his passports or lettres de familiarités –
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letters of recognition – and, theoretically, these documents conferred the same rights the
ambassador held to the individual possessing them.152
Amelot was first charged with abusing his immunities while incognito in March 1682.
Customs officials refused to recognize passports he provided gondoliers to transport wood and
wine from Vicenza because he had not yet performed the entrée legitimizing his role as
ambassador.153 He wrote to the king of the incident after complaining to the senate.154 Venice’s
then ambassador in Paris, Sebastiano Foscarini, supplied reports from his government’s
investigation of Amelot’s mistake to Croissy and the King. A letter sent from Louis XIV to the
Venetian senate seemed to remedy the matter. He pledged the ambassador would regulate his
domestic arrangements better and acquaint himself with Venetian protocol.155 Amelot apparently
prejudiced his reputation early on in the republic through the arrogant language and “insults” he
employed to negotiate the incident.156
A second, and more violent, altercation occurred in November with Amelot present. The
king and Croissy angrily demanded an explanation from the representative.157 Amelot explained
that he returned from a hunting trip in the country when Venetian inspectors approached his
retinue demanding to search the gondolas for contraband. The Italians allegedly attacked when
the ambassador and his lackeys refused. Amelot remarked that since he believed the senate
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would not protect his immunities he “decided to exact justice himself.”158 He ordered his
servants to fire warning shots, but a mêlée ensued in which a Venetian was stabbed to death.159
Foscarini reported the matter to Colbert de Croissy and Louis XIV first.160 Amelot initially chose
not to speak of the affair to the king alleging that he had handled himself properly.161 Louis XIV
was furious at the ambassador's presumption and the unseemly violence.162 He and Croissy
upbraided Amelot for the effrontery of thinking that he, as a mere royal representative, was an
arbiter of justice.163 The diplomat added insult to injury daring not to inform the king of the
incident immediately. Louis XIV was humiliated. He commanded the minister to govern himself
and his household and to make restitution to the dead man’s family.164 A chastened Amelot
claimed his best intentions in the matter audaciously reprimanding the king and Croissy for not
defending his actions to Foscarini and the republic: the king had sent him there, and he should
support his decisions.165
The ambassador’s alleged controversial behavior from 1682-1683 drew a series of
exchanges between the state inquisitors and Foscarini in Paris. Amelot posed a double threat to
the republic in relation to Versailles as Venice determined whether or not to ally with Leopold I:
he presented Venice as a state hostile to French foreign policy, and he acquired dangerously
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sensitive information for Louis XIV regarding its pro-Habsburg policies and its military and
naval preparations.166 The republic’s government resolved upon a two-pronged strategy couched
in both diplomatic immunities and the red herring of the senate’s sensitivity to contraband.167
Foscarini was to downplay Amelot’s depiction of anti-French sentiment in Venice at the French
court, but behind the scenes, he was to persuade Amelot’s connections at court to intervene.168 It
was hoped the young minister would fear enough for his reputation and career that his alleged
anti-Venetian zeal could be reformed before he turned the king against the republic.169 Foscarini
met clandestinely with Amelot’s mother asking her to warn her son of the danger in his attitude
toward his hosts.170 The Venetian ambassador met too with the Marshal de la Feuillade - one of
the few individuals who could actually claim friendship with Louis XIV - to assure the monarch
of Venice’s enduring amity despite the ongoing crises with Amelot.171
The investigation continued in Venice.172 The state inquisitors targeted the ambassadress
and Amelot’s secretary, Roger de Piles, as links contributing to the ambassador’s anti-Venetian
reportage.173 For the sake of diplomacy, Foscarini was to lay the blame almost entirely on the
secretary.174 Amelot’s father employed de Piles in 1662 to oversee Michel’s education, and he
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became an accomplished art historian before his service in Venice.175 De Piles received much of
the inquisitors’ venom as Badoer reported that he facilitated the exchange of information for the
ambassador through a network of spies under his oversight.176 Worse still, Badoer relayed that
the ambassadress collaborated in espionage employing a teacher of the organ who doubled as
one of her husband’s spies.177
While in France Foscarini aimed to discredit Amelot, but the state inquisitors undertook
more visceral measures to silence the sources feeding Amelot with state secrets. In the previous
chapter I have shown that ambassadors in Venice “inherited” informants loyal to the French
faction. Amelot reported to Louis XIV that he received news of the senate’s debates and
decisions from senators themselves and from members of their families or households.178 The
ambassador maintained a close rapport too with previous ambassadors’ agents like the Cavaliere
Beaziano and also the family of Marchese Benedetto Giuliani who supplied the French embassy
with news during the embassy of the Abbé d’Estrades.179
The marchese was instrumental in negotiations for Casale, and the republic’s menaces
forced Giuliani to accompany Estrades to Turin where he remained while Amelot was in
Venice.180 Giuliani’s family continued to work for the French. His sons nurtured a close
relationship with Michel Amelot providing sensitive information from within the Venetian
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government and continuing a communication link with the Duke of Mantua.181 Benedetto’s son,
Paolo, critically relayed information regarding imperial agents working in Northern Italy to form
a league of Italian princes against Louis XIV.182 During Carnaval 1683 a group of maskers
attacked and beat Paolo Giuliani in Piazza San Marco.183 By July of 1683 a number of reports
arrived to the state inquisitors that Paolo was filtering news of Venice’s negotiations with the
emperor’s envoy to the Italian princes, the Count Martinitz, who was then in Venice, and the
imperial ambassador to the republic, the Count della Torre.184 Finally, he was summoned before
the inquisitors on 6 July, but he refused to attend.185 The young man was a threat to Venetian
state security.
Amelot wrote to the king an outraged addendum to a dispatch of 10 July 1683 that Paolo
was murdered that morning.186 He was assassinated in the Piazza of San Francesco della Vigna; a
square where the ambassador himself often promenaded.187 Amelot accused the state inquisitors
of having Paolo shot because of his friendship with him, and he pleaded with the king to
intervene with the Venetian ambassador and to grant a royal gratification to the family.188 The
confidente, Badoer, sent a riferta to the state inquisitors recounting the details of the
assassination and of the rumor already circulating that it was at the Ten’s command.189 Louis
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XIV agreed with Amelot that the Venetian government ordered the murder, but he believed it
necessary to let events take their course with no official remonstrance from him.190
In the months preceding the murder, Badoer informed the state inquisitors of Giuliani’s
role as “secret correspondent” to Amelot and the friendship of his family with the ambassador.191
He detailed the tearful visit Amelot paid the victim’s household after the crime and the
ambassador’s promises of revenge.192 In Paris the event apparently caused enough scandal that
Foscarini was obliged to visit with Croissy to promise that the republic would investigate the
crime and execute justice.193 Ultimately, no sources detail how the case ended. Amelot’s
successor, Denis II de la Haye-Vantalet, remarked in 1688 that the murder, while unresolved,
was still attributed to the Ten.194 Although no direct proof exists that the Council of Ten ordered
the murder, the flurry of reports to the Ten regarding Giuliani in the days just prior to his death
and his failure to appear before the inquisitors' tribunal suggest the council believed him too
dangerous to ignore.
In his seminal work on the Venetian secret service, Paolo Preto used Giuliani’s
assassination as an example of how the Ten dealt with Venetian traitors.195 The murder served
also as a demonstration of the controversial authority the Ten held over Venetian society
prompting debates about the nature of the council’s continued role in the republic’s justice
system.196 The dangers associated with state secrets in the Venetian crucible taught Amelot
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valuable lessons in espionage, but the situation in Venice alarmed the French court. Foscarini
reported to the state inquisitors as early as January 1683 that Louis XIV considered reposting the
novice ambassador to Portugal.197 It appeared, however, that the king opted to test Amelot in the
pressure of the Venetian vise. He was after all relaying information sensitive and veridical
enough to elicit vehement reaction from the republic.
Sebastiano Foscarini departed Paris for Madrid in September 1683 sending his relazione
to the collegio on 22 March 1684. The ambassador remarked that Amelot “destroyed in every
ordinary dispatch the profit and repose that (ambassadors’) negotiations (in France) worked to
bring to the patria.”198 Amelot’s reports of Venice’s philo-Habsburg politics were a threat.
Foscarini noted the care he had taken “to nullify the false and poisonous seeds” Amelot was
spreading, adding “that without pulling the plant out by the roots...every initiative would have
been in vain.”199 Foscarini “applied ingenuity...persuading the king” to promise Amelot’s recall
from Venice.200 Although Foscarini was confident in Louis XIV's remarks, Amelot remained in
the republic for another year.
Girolamo Venier replaced Foscarini in Paris in December 1683 by which time the
inquisitors reported to him the discovery of Amelot’s network of informants and the means
through which he paid them.201 Badoer pieced together that, with Amelot’s knowledge, Roger de
Piles used official passports to collect and arrange stockpiles of contraband commodities that
were then used to pay agents for information.202 French spies allegedly infiltrated the highest
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levels of government through access to secretaries and notaries of the pregadi and the
quarantia.203 The spy ring stretched from Venice as far afield as Vicenza, Mantua, and Rome
through informants like Paolo Giuliani whose connections in these cities supplied Amelot with
knowledge.204 Additional informants included pro-French noblemen in the Valier, Bernardo,
Grimani, and Duodo clans who relayed news from within the senate.205 The ambassadress’s
music teacher infiltrated other aristocratic homes while spies of less exalted social rank
connected these households to de Piles who arranged contraband commodities to facilitate the
exchange of information.206 According to the avvisi of Badoer, the houses of French merchants
and tailors in residence in Venice served as spaces to store contraband and to exchange news.207
Locations like the brothel of the whore, Pasqueta, and the church of the Madonna dell’Orto, just
yards from the French embassy, served as points of exchange and as scenes of violent encounters
with Venetian officials.208 The nuns of the convent of Sant’Alvise allegedly acted too as
informants for the French.209 The lista dei francesi became a collecting space for the seepage of
state secrets through the sieve that was the Venetian government, and Amelot poured the news
into his dispatches.
Venier added in his reports that Amelot supplied the French foreign ministry with much
information regarding Venice’s negotiations to ally with Leopold I and the Poles. To incite
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further turmoil through the revelation of the contraband ring could damage the Franco-Venetian
rapport beyond remedy.210 Venier learned that Amelot remained in favor with the king at court
through the protection of the Grand Chancellor, Michel Le Tellier, the marquis de Barbézieux,
despite the calumnies he and Foscarini reported and Amelot’s vehement denial of charges of
malfeasance.211 Venier counseled the government to relax its approach to Amelot and curb antiFrench sentiment in Venice suggesting to suppress the damning evidence of Amelot’s illegal
activities.212 Venier’s lackey’s embarrassing threat in March 1684 to assassinate Louis XIV
added weight to his counsel. Undoubtedly too the bombardment of Genoa in May halted further
Venetian action.
The episode opening this chapter illustrates, however, that Amelot’s position in Venice
did not become much easier in 1684. The imprisonment of his gondoliers and the French tailor
implicated in the contraband ring after allegedly instigating a brawl when Venetians mocked
their nationality and their subsequent interrogation before the Ten highlighted the republic’s
ongoing efforts to intimidate Amelot. Venetian officials stopped Amelot’s gondoliers on one
further occasion in 1684 before the ambassador again begged to leave Venice.213 By October the
king announced the decision to post Amelot in Lisbon, but he allowed the ambassador to come
back to France in February 1685 for a respite.214
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Venier observed Amelot and his family upon his return to gauge if they would slander the
republic. He reported that Amelot seemed chastened.215 The king’s elevation of his lands to a
marquisate in May indicated royal approval of his service. It demonstrated the success that robe
functionaries could achieve through loyalty and service to the crown. Croissy’s new ambassador
plied the foreign ministry with critical information at a time when it needed assurance that
Leopold I was preoccupied in Hungary with the Turk and the Hungarian revolt. The
ambassador's reports informed the king of the Habsburg’s interactions with Venice. Amelot
supplied the information Louis XIV and Croissy required while the republic tried to keep the
roots of an alliance with Leopold I secret in order to avoid bringing the French war machine into
Italy and to buy time to raise a fighting force.
Louis XIV miscalculated Venice’s willingness and readiness to commit to another
Mediterranean war, but Amelot layed open the republic’s deliberations in the build-up to the
Treaty of Lindz. The king was pleased with the ambassador’s ability to acquire information and
the lessons in diplomatic maneuvering that he learned. He left Amelot to languish in the republic
buying time to pressure Leopold I at Ratisbonne. In the meantime, events in the east evolved to
the point that the emperor conceded to French demands and turned his forces against the
Ottomans. Through the Holy League Venice began the reacquisition of its Mediterranean empire.
Amelot’s breach of the republic’s foreign relations system revealed its rehabilitation as a player
in Mediterranean diplomacy and exposed Louis XIV's inability to command the Serenissima’s
foreign policy outright.
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Fig.10

183

Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet (1685-1701):
Looking Back at Ludovician Politics from Venice and the Mediterranean in 1688
Wreckage from an abandoned French tartane washed ashore in the port of San Nicola on
Cerigo during winter storms at the close of 1687.1 The new Venetian provveditore da mar in the
Morea, Giacomo Corner, sequestered the flotsam. Captain Foucas of Toulon, the tartane’s
owner, and his crew deserted the vessel after corsairs allegedly overtook and stripped it in
Venetian waters. Learning that the incident occurred in territory under Venice’s jurisdiction
acquired in the War of the Holy League, Foucas appealed to Louis XIV’s secretary of the
marine, the Marquis de Seignelay.2 The captain sought to recover the price of his ship and to
have restitution from the republic for the purloined cargo of wheat and the ship’s sails and
anchors.3
Foucas’s appeal to Seignelay set in motion the machinery of Ludovician centralization
governing French interests in the Mediterranean Sea by the late 1680s. Concerned for the
Crown’s reputation as a major competitor in Mediterranean commercial and political affairs,
Seignelay entrusted the matter to the French ambassador in Venice, Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de
Vantelet (1685-1701), and the French consul, Jean-Guillaume Le Blond (1679-1718).4 The
secretary expected la Haye to compel the republic to explain its failure to protect a French vessel
1
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in its waters and Le Blond to use his networks in Venice and across the Adriatic and Ionian Seas
in the investigation.
The level of cooperation between the ambassador and consul in cases not linked to the
ministry of foreign affairs per se - such as Captain Foucas’s plight - illustrate the extent to which
new legislation regulating the marine’s consuls elevated the ministry and its agents. These links
evolved between marine jurisdiction and the ministry of foreign affairs after the death of JeanBaptiste Colbert in 1683.5 Communication between the ministers in Venice and Seignelay in the
late 1680s demonstrated the growth of the administrative system that bound Louis XIV’s
government to the contested spaces of Mediterranean commerce.
La Haye’s predecessor, Amelot, was the first ambassador in Venice during Louis XIV’s
rule to report frequently about French commercial interests in political negotiations. By 1688 the
correspondence between la Haye and Seignelay became a consistent thread in Franco-Venetian
diplomacy indicating the concern which Louis XIV’s administration held for commerce and the
king’s prestige in Mediterranean affairs as the First Morean War (1684-1699) repulsed Ottoman
authority in the sea. The collaboration between the ambassador and the consul in Venice served
as evidence not only of the importance of France’s economic interests to its international
engagements, but it highlighted the vital need for Ottoman slaves to man French galleys in the
Mediterranean fleet. As French relations with Leopold I and Innocent XI moldered in the face of
the French king’s expansionism the procurement of slaves required the increased attention of Le
5
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Blond after 1686, and Seignelay expected la Haye to assist the consul as international affairs
tensed.6
This chapter first explores the grim situation facing Louis XIV and his dynastic policies
to understand the relevance of incidents in the Mediterranean like that of Captain Foucas and the
French administrative machinery deployed in broader international politics. La Haye’s embassy
in Venice endured the close of the seventeenth century and the years in which Louis XIV’s
ascendance over European politics declined.7 1688 proved to be climacteric in European foreign
relations writ large, and, although la Haye represented the French king in Venice for seventeen
years, a sharp focus on 1688 indicates the direction that the king expected relations with Venice
to take as his dynasticism encountered substantive threats. In that year Franco-papal relations
reached their lowest point.8 The long feud between Innocent XI and Louis XIV saw the
humiliation of a new French ambassador in Rome pursuant to breaches of the 1664 Treaty of
Pisa. The embarrassment menaced another French invasion of Italy as the king’s authority
among German princes too diminished.9 Italian states experienced the king’s efforts to maintain
control of foreign politics, and la Haye used the Venetian senate's troubled rapport with the pope
to resolve France’s impending crisis along the Rhine.10
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French relations with Rome grew septic as the pope refused to invest the king’s
candidate, Wilhelm Egon, Cardinal von Furstenberg, to the archbishopric of Cologne.11 German
princes aligned as never before with Leopold I in war against the Ottoman Empire and against
Louis XIV’s incursions along Leopold’s western borders.12 The arch-episcopal-electorate
represented one of the few remaining bastions of French authority in the German principalities.13
Tensions mounted as the pope reclaimed Castro and Ronciglione from the Duke of Parma
providing the king further leverage to use in the quarrel over Furstenberg’s election.14 French
pressure to install Furstenberg as archbishop-elector has been cast as mere vainglory, but events
surrounding the election and the king’s menaces of an invasion of Italy in defense of the Farnese
must be seen in context as urgent correlatives.15
The most brutal French incursions into German territories began in September 1688.16
French tactics provoked the struggle between Versailles and the recently formed League of
Augsburg and its powerful allies that would last until 1697.17 As events led to this eventuality, la
Haye inflamed Venice’s senate against Leopold I.18 The king wanted to weaken the emperor’s
position in the east protracting the war with the Turk to facilitate the concretization of French
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authority along the Rhine and in Northern Italy as war loomed.19 If properly maneuvered, a
disillusioned Venice represented another dart to hurl at the emperor’s eastern flank.
The republic experienced a potential shift in its power structure in 1688 when CaptainGeneral Francesco Morosini ascended to the ducal throne while fighting in the Levant.20
Morosini’s war machine successfully regained Venetian dominions adding most of the Morea in
1687.21 Morosini’s forces became locked in the battle for distant Negroponte in 1688 interrupting
communications between the senate and their Captain-General-Doge for months.22 Venetians
and foreign emissaries alike awaited news from the Levant to anticipate evolving geopolitics
should Morosini succeed. La Haye alleged that the republic’s political system approached a
possible turning point as the doge’s fleet gobbled up territories.23 It was unclear if Morosini
would challenge the nature of Venice’s republican governance through the “full power” he
wielded at the head of a vanquishing military force.24 Venice’s allies in the league winced as the
republic’s confidence in Italian politics reemerged in its brief defense of French policies.
As Morosini capitalized on Ottoman weaknesses in the Mediterranean, continued respect
for French commercial and maritime interests became critical to Louis XIV’s foreign policies
and, by extension, to the secretary of the marine, Seignelay.25 La Haye’s interactions in Venice
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in 1688 highlight the position that the French foreign ministry - and the ministry of the marine believed the republic held in its policies towards Innocent XI, Leopold I, and France’s privileges
with the Ottomans. As la Haye maneuvered in Venice, the evolving institutional structures of
louisquatorzien bureaucracy came more clearly into focus.
The role of the ambassador extended now not only to traditional high politics. La Haye
assumed the task of safeguarding French maritime and commercial interests in Venice as never
before while Louis XIV edged toward a new European-wide war requiring resources from and
leverage on the sea.26 France’s predominance in European affairs depended too upon events in
the Mediterranean. Commerce in goods and slaves became high politics. The pleas of Captain
Foucas and the collaboration of the ambassador and the consul were not mere maritime
wrangling. The ministers’ interactions in Venice represented the measure and reach of the French
administration as Louis XIV struggled to control international affairs. Ultimately, they served as
one institutional model of commercial arbitrage in the Mediterranean Sea for the later eighteenth
century French “commercial boom.”27
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A Seasoned Ambassador in Venice: Emphasizing the Serenissima’s Importance to French
Foreign Policy in the Late Seventeenth Century

Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet (1633-1722) succeeded Michel Amelot as
ambassador in Venice. The fifty-two year old diplomat arrived there 9 February 1685 and made
the entrée on 8 July.28 The disastrous relationship of Amelot with the Venetian government eased
with the arrival of la Haye who informed Louis XIV that he would not have the same “patience”
with the senate as had his predecessor.29 The ambassador’s confidence came from years of
diplomatic experience. He had held no office other than ambassador. In April 1688 la Haye
became the longest serving French diplomat, proudly reminding the king of this fact upon the
Marquis de Feuquières’s death in Madrid making him “the doyen of Your Majesty’s
ambassadors.”30
Denis was the son of Jean III de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet and Marguerite de Polluau.
His parents were both of robe origin from Champagne. Jean began his career as an lawyer in the
parlement of Paris as did his wife’s father.31 Jean’s diplomatic career began in 1639 in
Constantinople, where he served Louis XIV until 1661, and Denis grew up at the foreign and
often-hostile Ottoman court.32 Denis’s career began in Constantinople where he served from
1665 to 1670.33 Louis XIV sent him to the Bavarian court at Munich as resident ambassador
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from 1675 until 1680.34 He received instructions from Croissy to travel to Venice in August
1684.
La Haye’s first wife, Louise, followed her husband to Venice.35 She was the daughter of
Guy-François de Montholon, Seigneur de Vivier and d’Aubervilliers, lawyer in the parlement of
Paris and a conseiller d’état. Her mother was Marie Lasnier, daughter too of a conseiller d’état.36
Louise allegedly loathed Venice. The inquisitor’s spy, Badoer, reported that the ambassadress
claimed she “...absolutely did not want to remain in this despised capital.”37 She died in 1690
prompting la Haye to petition Louis XIV to allow him to remarry the widow of a long-time
French spy from Vicenza, Cavaliere Giulio Cesare Beaziano.38
Amelot had successfully relayed information from the republic to the court to formulate
policies with Leopold I, but he had not dissuaded the Venetian senate from allying with Leopold.
The continuation of the war in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean became critical to the
longevity of French policies against its enemies and to the concretization of French territories in
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the Rhineland. The Franco-Ottoman alliance too was central to French Mediterranean
commercial, military, and maritime prowess.39 La Haye was well acquainted with Ottoman and
imperial politics. He was a logical choice to facilitate policies in Venice as the republic regained
dominions and menaced the position of France’s Ottoman ally.40
The anti-French sentiment in Venice from 1682 to 1685 precluded the dominance of
French influence among Venetian politicians. The senate avoided negotiations with Amelot, but
this would not be the case with la Haye.41 He demanded invitations to state functions
complaining in 1685 that respect for Louis XIV required representation.42 He described his
participation in many state functions over the years alongside four doges with whom he alleged
frequent personal conversations.43 The improvement in Franco-Venetian relations through la
Haye’s experience can also be seen as the reports of the confidente, Badoer, to the inquisitors of
state focusing on the French slackened after 1685.
La Haye’s long correspondence from Venice reveals his exactitude in communicating
news to the court. Likewise, the twenty one volumes of his dispatches reinforce the previous
chapters’ assertions about systemic trends that Croissy, and after 1696, Croissy’s son, the
Marquis de Torcy, introduced into the foreign ministry. La Haye’s dispatches contained almost
no personal letters, and they were addressed with relatively few exceptions to Louis XIV alone.
The greatest innovation in Venice was the ambassador’s correspondence and collaboration with
39
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the secretary of the marine and the French consul. This communication reveals the emergence of
another administrative tether binding the ambassador to bureaucratic developments at Versailles.
La Haye’s communication with the foreign ministry in conjunction with that of the ambassador
and Seignelay contradict historians’ assertions that the level of information flowing to the French
court diminished after the death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert.44 Information increased from Venice
feeding two ministries. Contextualizing la Haye as correspondent to both ministries serves as
evidence that the role of French ambassadors became increasingly bureaucratic and
functionalized.
France and Venice Counter Innocent XI
In 1688 French authority stretched beyond the limits that European rulers would allow.
At William of Orange’s urging in 1686 the League of Augsburg had formed to countermand
further French expansion into the Spanish Netherlands, the Empire, and Northern Italy.45
Leopold I’s struggle to contain and overthrow imperial opposition in Hungary expanded his
authority there to its greatest extent.46 Imperial forces under the Duke of Lorraine dominated the
Hungarian nobility and pushed the weakened offensive armies of the Ottomans to Belgrade.47
Consequently, Louis XIV feared the emperor’s strong position in the east would prompt Leopold
to sue for peace with the Ottomans freeing the imperial army to counter French acquisitions
along the Rhine.48 The gains of the réunions and the terms of the Truce of Ratisbonne tenuously
left territories, most notably Strasbourg and Luxembourg, in French hands.49 Louis pressed to
44
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make the truce binding as a treaty to assure these dynastic holdings, but the emperor stalled in
this as he had formally to join the League of Augsburg.50
It seemed increasingly likely that Leopold would turn his armies westward.51 French
subsidies and pressure upon German princelings lost much of their allure by 1687 as Leopold I’s
advances against the Turk elevated the emperor’s political caché in the Empire.52 France’s hold
over German rulers dwindled to two principals. Louis XIV’s cousin, the Wittelsbach Elector of
Bavaria, Maximilian II Emanuel, and Maximilian’s cousin, the Archbishop of Cologne,
Maximilian-Henry, remained critical. The Elector of Bavaria vacillated in his loyalties to see
where his house could achieve the most gain. His 1685 marriage to a daughter of Leopold I,
Maria Antonia, and his military leadership against the Ottomans indicated Habsburg loyalties.53
Ultimately, the Archbishopric of Cologne in the Rhineland-Palatinate was paramount for Louis
XIV’s authority in imperial politics. Maximilian-Henry, however, despite years of French
allegiance, impeded the elevation of the pro-French Cardinal von Furstenberg to the succession
of the electorate.54
The death of Maximilian-Henry in June 1688 left a political vacuum that discomfited
Louis XIV. Louis pressed for the elevation of Furstenburg to the archepiscopacy.55 Leopold I
accused the pro-French Furstenberg and his family of treason blocking the election.56 The
greatest challenge to Furstenberg, however, was Innocent XI who preferred Clement-Joseph,
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brother of Maximilian Emanuel. The pope believed conferring the title upon Furstenberg would
signal a breach of canon law in the empire, and Innocent was weary of Louis XIV’s defiant
policies vis-a-vis the debates over the régale.57 Additionally, the Holy League’s successes
against the Ottomans disinclined Innocent to irritate Leopold I through the installation of a
candidate that could weaken conditions in the western empire undercutting Christian advances in
the east. Innocent posited himself in 1687 and 1688 not only as a barrier to Gallicanism but also
as a challenge to Bourbon dynastic politics along the Rhine and in Northern Italy.58
The stipulations of the 1664 Treaty of Pisa seemed distant by the 1680s. The pope had
reincamerated Castro and Ronciglione from the Duke of Parma again upon the duke’s failure to
pay the indemnities outlined in the treaty. Similarly, in 1687 Innocent also revoked the treaty’s
guarantee of ambassadors’ extraterritorial rights in their Roman quartiers.59 The pope’s refusal
to honor Alexander VII’s treaty provided Louis with leverage in Italy and over papal enclaves in
France to force the election of Furstenberg.60 The prospect of a defensive war to protect France’s
borders was something to which Louis XIV was unaccustomed. Threatening an invasion of
Northern Italy, Rome, Avignon, and the Comtat Venaissin represented the lengths to which
Louis would go to force Furstenberg’s election and protect dynastic territorial gains.
In November 1687 Louis XIV dispatched Henry-Charles de Beaumanoir, Marquis de
Lavardin to Rome as extraordinary ambassador escorted by an entourage of one hundred officers
from Seignelay’s marines.61 The unusual martial display was to inspire acquiescence in the pope
57
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toward the king’s demands regarding the quartiers and on behalf of the Duke of Parma and
Furstenberg. Lavardin’s controversial and flamboyant entrée into Rome only strengthened
Innocent’s resolve.62 He refused to acknowledge Lavardin as official ambassador forbidding the
Sacred College and the chefs of religious orders from engaging with the envoy.63 The pope went
further. In December he excommunicated the Church of San Luigi dei Francesi in Rome where
French ambassadors traditionally attended mass.64 As a counter measure to papal intransigence,
the king ordered a contingent of thirty-six French galleys prepared to cruise near the Italian
coast, and troops mobilized to descend into the peninsula and papal enclaves in France.65
As in the Corsican guard crises of 1662-1663, the Venetian senate interposed its
ambassadors in Paris and Rome as mediators between the French king and the pope.66 The
senate's primary concern was the successful prosecution of the war against the Turk; its members
feared the threat of French invasions along the Rhine and in Italy would constrain Leopold I to
withdraw from the east.67 La Haye’s correspondence with Louis XIV from Venice in the early
months of 1688 dealt primarily with the debacle in Rome and Venetian diplomats’ role in its
resolution. The king instructed la Haye to reassure the senate that he had no intention of invading
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along the Rhine.68 These measures were to facilitate continued Venetian support at the Roman
court and to show French solidarity with the senate in its quarrels with Innocent.
Although Innocent XI provided Venice with sizeable contingents of troops, ships, and
money for the ongoing war with the Turk, the senate tangled with the pope over ecclesiastical
appointments.69 As promised in his 1676 election, Innocent proved to be an almost-incorruptible
protector of the church’s privilege to nominate or approve candidates to vacant sees across
Europe. He hindered the Venetian senate’s nominations to the bishopric of Cremona and
Spaletro during Amelot’s embassy, and Venice’s government continued to spar with Innocent in
1688 for control over the loyalty of its clergy.70 Venice too had quarreled in 1678 over the
quartiers of its former ambassador to Rome, Girolamo Zeno. Consequently, the senate, in high
dudgeon, recalled Zeno leaving its Roman embassy vacant. The formation of the Holy League
renewed Venice’s diplomatic relations with Rome, and in 1683 the republic elected Girolamo
Lando as envoy to the papal court.71
Venetian successes in the Mediterranean from 1684 to 1687 tempered its government’s
interactions with Rome further, and the Venetian ambassador in Paris, Girolamo Venier
negotiated along with the papal nuncio, Angelo Ranuzzi, to halt French merchant vessels
covertly providing military equipment and provisions to the Turks - actions that had enraged the
republic and Innocent.72 La Haye indicated that the pope’s patience with Venetian ecclesiastical
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policies, however, thinned again by 1688 especially as the republic’s ambassador in Rome,
Lando, refused to ostracize the Marquis de Lavardin and purportedly upheld French demands at
the papal court.73
Giralomo Venier reported that, in spite of the pope's warnings, Lavardin bribed and
threatened cardinals to counter Innocent XI’s opposition to Furstenberg’s election.74 Louis XIV
expected Lando to follow Lavardin’s example pressuring the pope to relinquish Castro and
Ronciglione to the Duke of Parma and to vet Furstenberg.75 La Haye praised the senate for
upholding French interests in Rome and Northern Italy, and the king lauded the republic’s
equally stubborn refusal to allow Innocent XI to dictate ecclesiastical nominations in its states.76
Louis cast himself as an admirer of the senate’s devotion to its temporal sovereignty, and he cast
Innocent XI as their common adversary in domestic matters of state. La Haye, however, was to
use this commonality to pressure the Venetian senate as the king claimed that its members would
share the blame if he brought war into Italy.77
Venier and Lando allegedly continued to negotiate an accord between the king and the
pope throughout 1688, and as Morosini’s forces besieged Ottoman Negroponte in July la Haye
reported that Innocent XI and Leopold I complained that their Venetian allies became arrogant in
Italian affairs.78 The ambassador reported the pope was certain to disregard the senate’s
injunctions against investiture of non-Venetians in vacant dioceses in its territories, and he
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remarked that the senate’s sympathy for Louis XIV’s policies regarding the pope grew.79 The
republic’s government saw Innocent’s refusal to nominate Furstenberg as further proof that he
ignored states’ temporal interests, and its members believed the pope’s suppression of
Furstenberg’s election signaled a dangerous resurgence of papal power in matters of state.80
Venice’s domestic dual with the pope escalated in August when a fight among parochial
curés and monks over disputed burial plots in the city pitted the republic against Rome for
control over jurisdiction of Venetian ecclesiastical properties in the capital city itself.81 The
Venetian pregadi sided with the curés, and, as la Haye predicted to Louis XIV, Innocent XI
defended the monks.82 The rapport between Venice and Rome at the end of 1688 was as tense as
was that of France, but the senate, still dependent upon Innocent’s support in the Mediterranean
conflict, could not afford to repulse the pope as fully as could the French king.83 The senate’s
support of French policy in Rome was little more than an irritant to Innocent as long as it
depended upon papal subsidies in the war.
The senate’s quarrel with Rome remained open-ended in September 1688 when the
Grand Dauphin and Sébastien Le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban led French troops into the
Palatinate. In that same month French forces descended into Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin,
and the king ordered the sequestration of Ranuzzi in Paris.84 Innocent XI’s intransigence
contributed to forcing Louis XIV’s panicked policies as Venier opined the circumstances relating
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to Cologne “...could be said to be the first causes of the present universal conflagration.”85
Ultimately, Innocent XI died on 12 August 1689 less than a year after the outbreak of the War of
the League of Augsburg. In October the Venetian Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni became Alexander
VIII through the machinations of the new French ambassador to Rome, the Duke de Chaulnes,
and Lando in conjunction with French and Venetian cardinals. His election briefly resolved
Venetian and French relations with Rome.86 It came too late, however, to halt the advent of war.
France, Venice, and the Direction of Turn-of-the-Century International Affairs
Louis XIV was unwell in 1687 and 1688. Historians agree that a number of health
problems afflicted the king, and, as Giralomo Venier reported, a miasma of depression followed
the fifty-year-old monarch.87 Undoubtedly, the increasing hostility of European states against the
king’s dynastic policies exacerbated his illnesses as much as they contributed to the controversial
decisions the king made just prior to the War of the League of Augsburg.88 The most pressing
concern for French foreign policy in 1687 and 1688 was shoring up the uncertain security of
France’s Alsatian possessions that the Truce of Ratisbonne only temporarily buttressed.
Louis awaited Leopold I’s reply to his requests that the truce be cemented into a treaty.
Leopold’s avoidance of the question and the pressure of waiting unnerved the French king.89 The
suspended climate forced Louis to fight Innocent XI for Furstenberg’s election in Cologne.
Moreover, Leopold’s uncertain intentions contributed to Louis’s fears that the emperor might
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settle with the Ottomans. If this occurred before the truce solidified, Bourbon dynastic gains
along the Rhine, in the Spanish Netherlands, and in Northern Italy could be lost.90 News that
Carlos II’s government pressured Ferdinando-Carlo, Duke of Mantua to accept Spanish troops
into Guastalla threatened France’s grasp on the duke’s loyalty. Safeguarding the boundaries of
the kingdom and hegemonic interests in Italy seemed to hinge upon events in Eastern Europe and
in the Mediterranean Sea.91
Since the beginning of the War of the Holy League Venetian forces under Morosini
claimed more territories in the Mediterranean than they had held in previous centuries. The
captain-general’s conquests by 1687 counted the Morea – as Venetians called the Peloponnese;
in December Morosini quartered in Athens planning to continue eastward in spring 1688.92 War
and an outbreak of plague diminished his forces, but the senate promised infusions of manpower,
ships, and munitions in the coming months.93 Extraordinary levies, assistance from German
princes, Swiss mercenaries, and Innocent XI provided these.
La Haye reported that the pope regarded the senate’s renewed belligerent defense of the
Venetian clergy a result of Morosini’s wins, and Leopold viewed the republic’s support of Louis
XIV’s policies in Cologne and the claims of the Duke of Parma as a betrayal of the senate’s
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alliance with him and Habsburg interests in Italy.94 The king simultaneously encouraged the
senate to press on in the war, and, pursuant to la Haye’s reportage of the friction among the
members of the Holy League, he conspired to drive a wedge between Venice and Leopold.
Imperial armies besieged the Turks at Belgrade, and Leopold I controlled much of the Balkans.95
The Venetian senate feared he would press for peace with the Ottomans as much as did Louis
XIV. The continuation of the war for Venice depended upon Leopold, and the French king hoped
to poison the rapport between the republic and the emperor in an effort to shake Leopold’s
confidence.96
The king craftily relayed rumors to la Haye in February that Leopold accepted forty
thousand écus from the Republic of Ragusa for the investitures of Herzegovina and Bosnia. The
king instructed la Haye to inform Doge Giustiniani personally of this news at the next possible
public ceremony. He was curious to know if this were true and what the Venetian senate’s
response would be in this event.97 Venice had promoted its claims to Herzegovina and Bosnia in
Vienna since 1684 as imperial forces pushed further into Hungary.98 The Republic of Saint Mark
believed Ragusa and its Dalmatian territories should be fully under its authority rather than a
rival in Mediterranean commerce. The governments of the two republics had been rivals for
centuries, but traditionally the Ottomans or the Holy Roman Emperors asserted themselves as the
protectors of Ragusa to Venetian chagrin.99
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Ragusa had become increasingly weak since a devastating earthquake in 1667, and
Dubrovnich’s senate petitioned Louis XIV and other European monarchs for protection as it
recovered.100 Venice’s government watched with hungry eyes for an opportunity possibly to
annex the republic, and news that Leopold empowered its small adversary as he overran the Turk
in the Balkans annoyed Venice’s senate against him.101 La Haye investigated to learn if this
morsel was true, and, ultimately, it appeared that Leopold did receive money from Ragusa for the
investitures. Venice’s senate threatened to invade Ragusa in this eventuality.102 To preserve the
alliance with Venice the emperor did not concede the investitures, but he renewed the pledge to
protect Ragusa against future Venetian predations.103
Aggravating Veneto-Habsburg relations prevented the Venetian senate from cooperating
with other Italian princes against French interests in the peninsula. Members of the League of
Augsburg petitioned Italian sovereigns to commit to an anti-French coalition, and a number of
Italian heads of state had met German princes in Venice during the carnival season in 1687 to
discuss the proposition. The senate, although aware that the princes convened in the city, was
unwilling to risk any action that would prompt French invasive action along the Rhine or in Italy
that could cause Leopold to withdraw from the war in the east or to send imperial troops into
Italy.104 The senate warned la Haye of the interviews the princes held in 1687, and the
ambassador kept Louis informed of rumors that the princes were to meet again in Venice in
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1688.105 Ultimately, most Italian princes avoided allying outright against Louis XIV or the
emperor.
The Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs sought to augment their authority in Northern Italy
as war approached. The Duke of Mantua entertained Austrian and Spanish entreaties to accept
Habsburg troops into his remaining lands to counter the French. News arrived in May that the
duke accepted infusions of money from Leopold I and that he negotiated with Spain for the
installation of troops in Guastalla.106 To balance Louis XIV’s authority in Casale and Pignerol
and his relative, although diminishing, influence over the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and Savoy,
the Spanish government conspired to add Guastalla to its Italian territories.107 Louis XIV
expressed his confidence in the Duke of Mantua’s French loyalties, but the possible entry of
Spanish troops into Italy concerned the Venetian senate believing Spanish actions indicated a
French attack along the Rhine or an invasion of Italy imminent.108 The senate, however, refused
Leopold I’s request to allow imperial troops to pass through the terraferma to supplant the
French in any event.109 The emperor’s protection of Ragusa in conjunction with the build-up of
Habsburg forces in Italy forced the senate to defy Habsburg interests to upset Leopold’s certainty
in the advantages he now held in the Balkans and those of Spain in the peninsula.110 This action
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would have continued consequences for Franco-Venetian relations a decade later when Venice
could no longer afford to jilt the emperor as the War for the Spanish throne began.
Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani died in March 1688, and Captain-General Francesco
Morosini was elected in April.111 La Haye noted that Morosini’s election came with almost no
opposition but that his command of the republic’s armies gave him an almost absolute power
over the government.112 Venice’s power structure, according to the French ambassador, allegedly
came under threat as Morosini controlled news arriving from the Levant and, hence, the senate’s
decisions as the war continued.113 La Haye believed Morosini was jealous of his power and that
he might prolong the war to augment his authority.114 The Captain-General-Doge’s siege of
Negroponte began 23 July, but the paucity of information from the east left the senate in an
uncertain position as much as was Louis XIV regarding Leopold I’s irenic overtures to the
Ottomans.115 In much the same way that relations with Innocent XI and Leopold prompted
developments in French foreign policy, so too, the Venetian senate juggled its own politics along
with that of its European neighbors awaiting dispatches from Morosini’s distant progress. The
senate’s initial elation at Morosini’s election to the dogeship soon soured, and the loss of
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Negroponte 20 October meant that many in the government gnashed their teeth at the doge
concluding that Venice too should consider peace with the Ottomans.116
The static atmosphere in the autumn of 1688 resulting from the uncertain relations among
the members of the Holy League and the prosecution of the war with the Turk contributed to
Louis XIV’s decision to send a French army to besiege Philippsbourg in September 1688.117 The
king awaited the turn of events as long as he could when Belgrade finally fell to imperial troops
6 September.118 Louis used the rights of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte, Duchess of
Orléans's hereditary claims to the Palatinate as his ostensible reasons for the invasion.
Throughout the year the king denied any intent to move along the Rhine to the Venetian senate.
The uncertain news from the war theaters of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea in
conjunction with Habsburg maneuvers in Northern Italy in concert with Innocent XI supported
French fears that the members of the Holy League neared a peace with the Ottomans and that
Spain readied for war.119
International events in 1688 forced Louis XIV’s hand as never before. The loss of
Cologne and that of England as an ally through the imminent accession of William III and Mary
II to the throne further compromised French dynastic policies in Western Europe.120 France’s
invasion of the Palatinate in September and declaration of war against the United Provinces in
November, in part, resulted from Louis’s inability to foresee events in the east and the
116
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Mediterranean. The collusion of the members of the Grand Alliance as war began foreshadowed
the anti-French balance of power that would determine coalitions in the later War of the Spanish
Succession.121
Venice’s traditional position as a neutral counterpoise to dynastic politics in Northern
Italy shifted in favor of Leopold I with the Treaty of Lindz in 1684. Venice needed Leopold in its
war through which it still hoped Morosini could regain Crete and Cyprus, and the senate’s formal
alliance with the emperor continued until the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz.122 It can be argued,
however, that the republic’s rhetorical politics of neutrality only reemerged in 1688. Venice was
forced to devote its political authority among European states once again to the preservation of
Italian stability as the peninsula became a central battleground in Bourbon-Habsburg dynastic
warfare.123 Neutrality was, however, to be a fiction from the French vantage.
La Haye and Jean-Guillaume Le Blond: Administrative Collaboration or Competition
among the Colbert Clan’s Agents in Venice?
Louis XIV had warned the Venetian senate in 1684 that the Holy League’s war against
the Turk should in no way damage French commerce.124 After the capitulations of 5 June 1673
between France and Mehmet IV, Louis XIV imposed the privileges of the Franco-Ottoman
alliance in the sea upon other states - especially the Venetians, Dutch, and English and others
trafficking in the Mediterranean.125 The Serenissima, however, boasted a much longer tradition
of Mediterranean commercial and political involvement; Morosini’s successes revivified the
senate’s assertions vis-a-vis its time-honored position as “mistress of the [Adriatic] gulf” and

121

Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, 121.
Domenico Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1997), 13; Spielman, Leopold I of Austria,
167-168; Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks, 404-405, 407.
123
Sella, 15, 18
124
Saint-Priest, Mémoire sur Le Commerce et La Navigation de la France en Levant, 105.
125
Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 40-41.
122

207

now the Ionian seas.126 Morosini compromised the already moribund Ottoman maritime presence
in the Levant.127 Captain Foucas’s misfortune highlights that the king expected la Haye and JeanGuillaume Le Blond to ensure the liberty and status of French vessels as Mediterranean
boundaries shifted.
Arbitrage of French commerce in Venice’s expanding empire became more frequent
before the senate requiring investigation and negotiation from the French consul and
ambassador. La Haye’s rapport with Le Blond could be described as that of a supervisor, but it
can be argued that the duties required of these ministers in Venice reflected the shift in the role
of the ambassador from that of a sacral representative of royal majesty to that of a professional
functionary. Prior to the 1680s, French ambassadors in Venice dealt tangentially with the consul.
Consuls in the republic worked as lesser extensions of the foreign ministry.128 La Haye’s
predecessors looked to consuls for information regarding ceremonial protocol and for news
received in Venice that might affect the negotiation of foreign policy.129
In the Venetian context there existed no equal interaction between ambassadors and
consuls in Crown affairs. Ambassadors corresponded with Louis XIV and the secretaries of
foreign affairs and occasionally with Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Extant letters from consuls Paul
Vedoa, father and son, in Venice before 1679 were most often requests for wages sent to Colbert
via diplomats’ dispatches or news reports sent from Venice to the secretary of foreign affairs
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when no ambassador was in residence.130 Ambassadors documented hardly any representation
before the Venetian senate in matters relating to French commerce or seafaring, and the Vedoas
functioned as obvious subordinates to the ambassador in service to the ministry of foreign
affairs.
The nature of the professional rapport between French diplomats in Venice and the
consul changed after Colbert issued the Ordonnance de la Marine du mois d’août 1681. The
Ordonnance outlined and defined the jurisdiction and limits of the marine and its officials within
the boundaries of the kingdom and beyond. In Title IX of Book One, Colbert delineated the
expectations of “the consuls of the French nation abroad.”131 The articles stated the qualifications
for consuls and the extent of their authority. They were to be educated in maritime law, and they
were to serve as arbiters in French affairs in the environs of their posts.132 Additionally, the
Ordonnance reaffirmed the responsibility of consuls as purveyors of information. They were to
provide the secretary of the marine with a “faithful memoir of important affairs from their
consulate….”133 The consul was officially to fulfill the same task of information gathering for
Secretary Seignelay as the ambassador fulfilled for that of foreign affairs.
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As French legislation elevated consular service it streamlined that of the ambassador.134
Colbert’s Ordonnance legitimated the role of consul beyond that of a minor functionary in
foreign affairs to that of a critical link in the navy, and the Crown’s, chain of command. The
consul became another instrument supplying Colbert and the ministries he and his clan
dominated with the information feeding what Jacob Soll has called a “secret state intelligence
system.” Michel Amelot was the first ambassador in Venice to claim the French consul as part of
his household, but Amelot made no mention of collaborative negotiations with Jean-Guillaume
Le Blond and no correspondence with the secretary of the marine such as that la Haye
described.135
By 1688 the Marquis de Croissy was secretary of state of foreign affairs, and JeanBaptiste Colbert’s son, Seignelay, had taken up command of the ministry of the marine as
secretary.136 It made sense then that the direction of both ministries collaborate in more tangible
ways after Colbert’s death in 1683 under the direction of the Colberts in opposition to the
powerful Le Tellier clan.137 However, Croissy and Seignelay competed in their respective
ministries for the reception and use of the knowledge they received from abroad. La Haye and Le
Blond found themselves caught up in a family feud over information benefitting French
international relations and commercial representation. Another factor effecting family dynamics
was the reality that Seignelay did not yet sit on the conseil d’en haut as a minister of state. His
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elevation depended, as with others in Louis’s government, on the benefits he procured for his
master.
The Venetian context demonstrates that the push to acquire knowledge affected the
working relationship of the ministers serving Croissy and Seignelay outside the kingdom. That
the ambassador corresponded with the secretary of the marine and the consul as well as
communicated with the minister of foreign affairs, Croissy, indicated the triangular bonds
connecting the two ministries. It would not be until the late 1680s, however, at least in the
Venetian context, that the close connection of the two ministries’ interests merged in actual
documented practice. It would be incorrect, however, to say that the Colberts’ competition
manifested itself in the collaboration of the ambassador and the consul.
There was a brief comment in 1687 from Seignelay’s envoy to Italian states, Paul de
Louvigny d’Orgement, that indicated la Haye feigned his loyalty to Seignelay.138 Louvigny
claimed the ambassador withheld information from Seignelay while appearing “all heart and
affection” in his letters.139 This seems to have been corrected as there is no later documented
evidence that la Haye failed to please Seignelay in his duties, and there are no extant letters to la
Haye from Croissy that might indicate the foreign minister resented the ambassador’s work with
Seignelay. On the contrary, the exchanges between la Haye and Le Blond evolved into a system
that emerged after 1685, and, by the beginning of 1688, became fixed and, according to la Haye,
almost daily.140 Louvigny testified to la Haye’s supervision of Le Blond, and, in a letter from
Seignelay to la Haye of 15 January 1688, the secretary informed the ambassador that he was to
make careful reports of the consul’s service.141 The correspondence from la Haye and Le Blond
138
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to Seignelay testified to the newly regularized nature of their interactions. A brief examination of
their collaboration provides a more detailed picture of the two ministers’ working relationship
and the ways in which they served the secretary of the marine.142
Protecting French Mediterranean Commerce in Venice:
Wartime reacquisition of territories bolstered Venice’s claims to dominance in the
Adriatic and the Ionian Seas.143 Corsairs allegedly overtook Captain Foucas’s tartane in the
waters of the Ionian. It then came into the hands of the newly appointed provveditore da mar of
the Morea, Corner. Such incidents were common in the insecure maritime atmosphere of the
Mediterranean.144 How these cases were dealt with in Venice underwent a change by 1688
especially as Louis XIV could now hold the Venetian senate responsible for infractions
occurring in waters it claimed from the Turk.
In 1688 la Haye and Le Blond worked to resolve five ongoing cases related to the attack
or detainment of French vessels in Venice’s maritime territories.145 Foucas’s case provides an
example of how these incidents were resolved. In the months following Seignelay’s initial letter
to la Haye regarding the French tartane, the ambassador and the consul investigated the
circumstances. As ambassador, la Haye petitioned the Venetian senate insisting that it recognize
the injury such incidents caused to Louis XIV’s reputation in Mediterranean commerce and
requesting its intervention. La Haye first bent the ear of Doge Giustiniani personally on Foucas’s
behalf during a ceremony on 1 February, and he subsequently sent an official written report to
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the senate on the matter.146 According to the senate’s response to la Haye the consul Le Blond
provided them details of consular agents’ investigation of the crime.147
Over the next months the Venetian government opened an inquiry, and drew upon
information from the Levant received from its by then Captain-General-Doge, Morosini. By 15
April, after conferring with provveditore Corner, Morosini responded that Foucas’s tartane was
first attacked outside the frontiers of Venetian protection and that winds blew the ship to
Cerigo.148 In its concluding report of 5 May, the senate remarked that it was not, lamentably,
responsible for Foucas’s loss, but it would continue to do all it could to accommodate Louis XIV
in commercial affairs whenever possible.149 The senate’s judgment in the matter was in response
to la Haye’s and Le Blond’s shared investigation in conjunction with its own sources.150
Although the republic decided it was not at fault in the incident, the case documented that the
ambassador and the consul worked in tandem to resolve cases related to French maritime
interests in the shifting boundaries of Venetian waters.151 The senate’s responses in these cases
denoted Venetian confidence in negotiations with Louis XIV regarding commercial issues
attributable to Morosini’s conquests.
The Venetian senate’s measures to augment finances for the war also affected French
commerce. Seignelay wrote to la Haye on 5 June 1688 that the king was surprised to learn that
the senate imposed a twenty percent duty on vessels docking in ports throughout its dominions.
The secretary asserted that this levy was a novelty, and he wondered if the senate enacted it to
146
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pay for war costs. He enjoined the ambassador to investigate upon what authority the republic
could enforce the tariff upon French merchant vessels given the privileged status Louis XIV
believed his ships held.152 Seignelay requested a copy of the letters patent legitimating the
levy.153 La Haye found that the republic had, since the time of Amelot, claimed the right to
impose new tariffs at will upon ships in its jurisdiction as it was “mistress of the [Adriatic] gulf.”
While there were no letters patent, la Haye sent to Seignelay the memo on tariffs that Amelot had
left in the embassy archives.154 Short of complaints to the senate, la Haye was unable to
challenge the republic’s policy, and Seignelay made no further protests.
Venice controlled commerce in the maritime territories under its jurisdiction, and it
experienced stable commercial success until the end of the century in spite of the war.155 In the
cases where the republic’s government believed it was within its sovereign rights, it did not
hesitate to uphold its decisions in the face of foreign pressure. The senate did, however,
accommodate Louis XIV in cases where French vessels or subjects were slighted unjustly
reminding the ambassador that it wished to maintain good relations with his master.156 La Haye
and Le Blond alike received instructions from Seignelay to insure French commercial interests. It
fell to la Haye to represent French interests before the senate while Le Blond interacted with
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other French consuls and French merchants trading in the Mediterranean to facilitate commerce
in conjunction with Venetian law. Le Blond reported the findings of his inquiries or news from
French consuls to the ambassador who used them to formulate his interactions with the Venetian
government. Both ministers provided Seignelay accounts of the progress of commercial cases.157
The Ambassador and the Consul Trade in Slaves
The atmosphere of the Mediterranean was volatile in 1688. The successful military
campaigns of Leopold I’s armies against the Turk in Hungary combined with Venice’s victories
at sea left many Ottomans prisoners and slaves providing what Bamford called “‘windfall’
shipments” to interested parties.158 The slave market swelled in the lands imperial forces overran,
but there was fierce competition for slave labor as belligerent states like Venice, the papacy, and
the empire needed manpower to serve their military needs.159 The feud between Louis XIV and
Pope Innocent XI regarding the election of the archbishop of Cologne pushed the king to order
thirty six galleys readied in the port of Marseille to intimidate the pope.160 The galleys required
many men to propel them, and the secretary of the marine was expected to obey the needs of
French foreign policy requiring naval intervention.161
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The search for slaves to man the entire French fleet of forty galleys preoccupied
Seignelay in this turbulent international atmosphere. The secretary first wrote to Le Blond of the
necessity to find slaves on 16 December 1686 reiterating to the consul the primacy of the
demand for Turks in January and April 1687.162 By extension, it became a second shared task for
la Haye and Le Blond throughout 1688 when the secretary ordered la Haye’s oversight of Le
Blond.163 They used their location in Venice to attempt to fill a ministerial order for three
hundred suitable slaves in the competitive market.164 The brunt of the charge fell to Le Blond,
and his letters to the secretary outline the complex channels of finance, transport, and
information the consul relied upon.
Writing to Seignelay of the subject on 3 January, la Haye assured the secretary that he
would oversee Le Blond in his efforts to find and purchase slaves.165 Attempts to strengthen
Louis XIV’s military and naval apparatus were not well received in the late 1680s as French
might in Europe and on the seas portended war in Europe. French use of Ottoman slaves was
also in contravention of the 1673 capitulations with La Porte, and broadcasting the search for
slaves was impolitic. The consul, therefore, worked under the strictest secrecy to obtain slaves
for French vessels.166 Beyond the political and financial difficulties entangling the purchase of
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manpower to serve the marine’s needs, the slaves themselves were often too young or sick.167
Others maimed themselves fearing the horrors of the galleys.168
The dispatches from la Haye and Le Blond to Seignelay illuminate the financial
apparatus the ministry of the marine used in Venice to achieve its needs and the roles of the
ambassador and the consul when using ministry funds. Seignelay sent bills of credit to la Haye in
Venice.169 Seignelay ordered the ambassador to follow the exchange of money and the ways in
which Le Blond utilized it.170 The secretary required the consul to account to la Haye and to him
for every expense incurred once the Venetian banker, Piatti, delivered the funds.171 Le Blond
carefully noted the exact amounts he provided to his agents, to the ships he rented and their
crews, and the sums left at his disposal.172 Monies unused were again changed and returned to
France; the consul noted exactly the exchange rates and each transaction in his reports. La Haye
consistently checked the consul’s accounts commending his performance.173
The sums sent to Le Blond were to expedite the process of finding slaves and paying for
their upkeep and transport back to Marseille. He utilized a network of informants ostensibly
sworn to secrecy stretching from Buccari in Imperial Istria, all along the Dalmatian coast, and as
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far north as Vienna.174 These men were to locate healthy specimens, and they were provided
funds to buy and ship the slaves to two French and two rented English ships anchored at Pirani
for transport.175 The ships’ écrivains communicated with Le Blond to ensure that they were paid
and that the ships were stocked and victualled to furnish the crews and to receive slaves as they
trickled in over the months.176 La Haye monitored Le Blond’s search for slaves during the
year.177 Ultimately, small groups of slaves arrived as the months passed, but in November the
consul still dealt with obstacles in filling Seignelay’s demands.178 La Haye and the consul
maintained a detailed correspondence with Seignelay throughout the process, and their letters
indicated that the collaboration functioned under Seignelay’s supervision with no sense of
ministerial competition among the two ministers in Venice.179
Conclusion
The military and political circumstances that made the search for slave labor difficult
attested to the violent and urgent attempts of European states to dominate the sea’s access to
commercial and strategic resources in the midst of the War of the Holy League. In 1688 alone no
less than five European states - France, Venice, England, the Dutch Republic, and the Empire competed with one another or against the faltering Ottoman Empire for dominance in the
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Mediterranean Sea.180 Others, like Malta and the Republic of Ragusa, fought to maintain a share
of the sea’s bounty amid the conflicts of the great powers. As the seventeenth century closed this
competition only increased.
The evolution of Louis XIV’s government responded to the now global race to dominate
the Mediterranean. French ministers outside the kingdom worked to ensure safety on the seas
and access to a thriving and rich eastern trade as well as maintain the reputation of the king as
the reputedly senior European competitor in the sea. To facilitate these ends, new legislation
from the early 1680s highlighted and informed expectations for French consuls abroad like the
ambassador and the consul that concretized into documented practice later in the decade. The
consul was no longer a minor functionary in the ministry of foreign affairs but a link between
ministries. Additionally, the secretary of the marine expected ambassadors like la Haye to
promote, supervise, and collaborate in business related to French commerce in the Mediterranean
and the operations required for the French navy as geopolitical circumstances required.
Although Louis XIV’s government could not control the reactions of states like Venice to
its demands, it guaranteed that even subjects like Captain Foucas of Toulon could appeal to the
state and its apparati for redress in a global maëlstrom. The European geopolitical tide turned
against Louis’s dynastic policies, and as the War of the League of Augsburg began in 1688 the
example of the French ambassador and consul in Venice demonstrated the methods of control the
louisquatorzien machine could impose upon its personnel outside of the kingdom in an effort to
facilitate French interests. The rapport between la Haye and Le Blond illustrates too the
development of Louis XIV’s administration in which ministries composing the French
bureaucracy, while in competition at Versailles, compelled cooperation among ministers abroad
in response to an anti-Ludovician European international landscape as the seventeenth century
180
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waned. The emerging conflict for the throne of Spain revealed a French government willing to
menace Venetian interests in the sea. Diplomacy would not stop French ships’ efforts even to
control Venetian ports as the eighteenth century dawned.
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PART III:
Venice Impotent Before Louis XIV, 1700-1702
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César, Cardinal d’Estrées (1701-1702) ambassadeur extraordinaire:
The Expansion of French Authority in the Mediterranean and Venetian Neutrality
Debunked
Venice’s inquisitors of state ordered strangled two thieves in the prisons of the ducal
palace at midnight 12 June 1702.1 The bodies of brothers Gian-Paolo and Gian-Battista Rizzati
were then immediately hung between the two pillars of the piazzetta near San Marco for all to
see at sunrise. The captain of the sbirri searched for the Rizzati for months, and the inquisitors
purportedly ordered their capture and execution for crimes as blockade runners for the Duke of
Mantua. The deaths of the bandits would have been irrelevant to the world stage had they not
possessed letters patent from the new French ordinary ambassador in Venice, Joseph-Antoine
Hennequin de Charmont (1702-1704), and passeports from René de Froulay, Comte de Tessé,
one of the chefs of French military forces in Northern Italy.2 The Rizzati brothers were under the
extraterritorial protection of Louis XIV, and the broader implications of their executions
effectively rendered fruitless Franco-Venetian diplomacy in the eighteenth century.
The executions of the Rizzati coincided with the tenure of Cardinal César d’Estrées as
extraordinary ambassador to Venice from 1701-1702. The cardinal capitalized upon the
diplomatic implications of the smugglers’ deaths to facilitate French interests in Northern Italy
and the Adriatic Sea after a year and a half of indecisive negotiations with the Venetian senate.
Estrées arrived in Venice 22 January 1701 to negotiate the descent of French troops into the
1
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terraferma. Additionally, he solicited the Venetian government’s cooperation in countering the
armies of Leopold I in Northern Italy and the Adriatic despite the republic’s ostensible neutrality.
The senate, however, as had happened since the 1680s, proved evasive toward French interests
vis-a-vis the emperor. The deaths of the Rizzati occurred only months before Estrées departed
the city to serve in Madrid, and the episode threatened to bring Louis XIV’s vengeance down on
the republic as the senate’s affinity for Leopold I belied neutrality to be a geopolitical ruse.
Estrées’s manipulation of the deaths of two Italian miscreants in 1702 highlights three
arguments connecting the chapters of this dissertation. First, the years of Estrées’s embassy were
decisive for the history of Venice and the stalling of Franco-Venetian relations in the broader
discursive context of a Venetian “decline.” Scholars comment on the “beginning of the end” for
the Republic of Venice with no clear consensus. I have suggested through an examination of
Franco-Venetian relations, rather, that in the context of the final decades of the seventeenth
century, Venice remained vital and active among European states. There was no clear-cut
discussion of a moribund republic that neighboring polities discounted or ignored.
Europe’s late-seventeenth-century monarchs courted the republic as a useful ally in
European and Mediterranean political and commercial endeavors; Venice’s political apparati and
its military-naval forces proved resilient and capable of withstanding and standing with the great
dynastic monarchies albeit increasingly requiring financial subsidies from its neighbors.
Venice’s successes against the Ottomans in the Morean War reinforced that the republic
continued to wield diplomatic and maritime authority. Its most recent alliances after the 1684
Treaty of Lindz affected international realignments that had, by the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz,
reasserted Venetian authority as far afield as Southern Greece and islands of the Ionian Sea.
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The build-up to and the advent of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701-1702,
however, created a context in which Venetian resources and political rhetoric faltered in terms of
one diplomatic relationship.3 The republic’s government could not sustain its pretensions to
neutrality towards the Bourbons and the Habsburgs while trying to defend its authority in the
Mediterranean and Italian theaters. Through the negotiations and observations of Cardinal
d’Estrées, I highlight that the pressures of the war revealed the over extension and limits of the
Venetian government to the French. Venice’s senate struggled to protect its sovereignty in the
terraferma and Mediterranean territories against impinging French and imperial armies while
protecting and re-acculturating its newly reacquired spheres of authority in the eastern sea. The
small republic could not be neutral in the power politics of the great dynastic states as they again
brought war into Northern Italy and the Adriatic.
The discourse surrounding the Rizzati affair and the republic’s unwillingness to disavow
strategic ties with Leopold I illustrated that Venice’s government ceased to be a beneficial
diplomatic and tactical partner for Louis XIV. And in this context, the diplomatic relationships
between Venice and France destabilized. Venetian international involvements decayed in
specific rapports. By 1702 diplomatic relations with the republic ceased to provide France with
reciprocal benefits; one might claim the photodegradation of Venetian relations with Louis XIV.
Reference to the dissolution of Franco-Venetian relations in 1702 also underscores the further
enervation of Louis XIV’s influence in Italian affairs suffered in the war for the Spanish throne.
Already curbed at the end of the Nine Years War, French authority diminished further in the
Italian peninsula as war progressed with the ultimate installation of Austrian dominance there
3
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through the 1714 Peace of Rastatt.4 As Estrées’s embassy revealed, however, French maritime
and commercial authority in the eighteenth century Mediterranean Sea rose also at Venetian
expense.5
This brings me to the second theme of this chapter. Cardinal d’Estrées’s embassy was
ineffective in persuading the Venetian senate to ally outright with France against the
replenishment of Prince Eugène’s forces in the terraferma.6 Venetian vessels in the Adriatic
allegedly sustained Eugene, the imperial generalissimo in Italy, through replenishments coming
into the lands of the republic and the Duke of Modena from the sea.7 Venice’s maritime officials
protected ships and ports in the same endeavor.8 Estrées pressured the Venetian senate: it could
either chase imperial contingents from its lands; assist French naval forces in securing the
Adriatic against the passage of imperial troops and material to Italy; or recognize the end of its
time-honored sovereignty over the sea.9
Venice’s government continued to maintain a fighting naval presence in the
Mediterranean until 1718.10 The republic’s attempts to deny French ships from passing into the
Adriatic in 1701-1702 with no defensive naval contingents to reinforce its complaints against
them, however, demonstrated that its maritime authority in the Adriatic was severely impaired if
not finished. Ultimately, Venetian protestations against the attacks of the Chevalier de Forbin’s
squadrons underscored that Venice could no longer claim to be “Mistress of the Adriatic;” the
4
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senate nearly cancelled the ceremonial sensa – marriage of the sea – as a result of its impotence
before Forbin. By August 1702 the chevalier’s vessels even came within sight of the bell tower
of San Marco to destroy an armed English vessel.11 Forbin bragged this action left him “master
of the Gulf.”12
Finally, it was through the initiatives of the seventy-four-year-old Cardinal d’Estrées that
these extractive shifts in Venice’s international utility for France emerged. Estrées’s series of
private conferences with Venice’s savvio del consiglio, Benedetto Capello, demonstrated the
cardinal’s difficulty at holding the Venetian government’s proverbial feet to the fire to make
good on its claims of neutrality early in the conflict. The republic’s senate stopped neither
Franco-Spanish nor imperial armies from passing through the terraferma. As a gesture of
goodwill Louis XIV removed his troops in the winter of 1701, whereas Prince Eugène prolonged
his withdrawal.13 Estrées’s repeated complaints that Venice made no move to ally with France in
response to Eugène’s belligerence served as the first evidence to the French of compliance with
Leopold I.
As the struggle for Spanish dominions increased and saw the Bourbons and Habsburgs
sparring across Venetian lands, the republic’s government could not eschew Leopold I
completely as the threat of Ottoman resurgence in the east made Venetian reliance on the
emperor non-negotiable.14 The republic’s refusal to aid in the blockage and destruction of the
vessels assisting Prince Eugène from the Adriatic served as added evidence of the senate’s

11

AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to Louis XIV, 10 Aug. 1702, F. 312r.
Mémoires du Comte de Forbin, Tome II, 113.
13
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 133, Estrées to Louis XIV, 19 Nov. 1701, F. 341v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 133, Estrées to
Louis XIV, 3 Dec. 1701, Fs. 358r-358v.
14
Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 51.
12

227

alleged partisanship if not of its outright participation in the emperor's aims.15 The frustration
emerging from Estrées’s correspondence showed that, by late 1702, the French government
prepared either to force Venetian compliance both on land and sea; to humiliate the republic
outright; or at least to have the Venetians think it would do so.16
The Venetian inquisitors of state condemned the Rizzati brothers amid this turbulence.
This diplomatic windfall provided Estrées an excuse to challenge Venice. He used the affair to
avenge Venetian unwillingness to damage imperial advances laying bare the inconsistencies in
Venice’s neutrality and the secret institutions of its polity. Heretofore Louis XIV and his
ambassadors respected the autonomy of the Venetian government as a sovereign equal. French
ambassadors observed the strains that (shadow) councils like the Ten and the state inquisitors,
who arguably controlled the Venetian state behind the republican façade, placed upon Venetian
foreign and domestic political culture, but they made no attempts to undermine the republic’s
polity. Thanks to Estrées, the Rizzati affair brought these abstruse ministers headlong into a
contest with Louis XIV threatening to subvert the inquisitors’ power publicly.
The affair afforded the king an opportunity to menace the republic with harsh retribution
if it refused to punish the inquisitors.17 At this point in its history, Venice would have had no
leverage to stem an all-out French onslaught, and the senate and people of Venice came to fear a
French naval bombardment. A reading of Estrées’s correspondence with Louis XIV provides a
diplomatic lesson. The affair revealed the long years of experience of Louis XIV and the cardinal
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as these aged statesmen manipulated an event that would have been of “least importance” to the
almost utter submission of the republic before the king.18
The republic avoided the king’s ire in diplomatic altercations since the 1660s while
observing from afar Louis XIV’s penchant for humiliating and humbling diplomatic enemies like
the papacy and the Republic of Genoa. The senate could either submit to the authority of Louis
XIV or suffer the consequences. As will be argued further along, the ambassador’s
manipulations in the affair and the humiliating outcome for Venetian government prepared the
ground for Venetian submission before Louis XIV signalling the the disintegration of FrancoVenetian relations and diminishing the maritime authority of one French competitor in the
Mediterranean.
France and Venice after the Treaties of Ryswick (1697) and Carlowitz (1699): Toward the
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713)
Since 1688 Louis XIV’s dominance in Europe slackened. The Nine Years War pitted the
Grand Alliance against the French, and by the time negotiations concluded at Ryswick in 1697 it
was clear that French dominance in Europe was recognized but contained.19 Among the
stipulations set out in the treaty, France maintained Alsace and Strasbourg, and Louis withdrew
his support of Cardinal von Furstenberg for the Electorate of Cologne. The king relinquished
territory in the Spanish Netherlands and the French Palatinate duly recognizing too William III
as king of England.20
It was in Italy where the Nine Years War cost Louis XIV the loss of all small but potent
territorial gains with their access to authority over Italian princes. As the Nine Years War neared
its end, Louis and his ambassadors enticed the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, to abandon the
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alliance against France.21 Leopold I’s 1695 plan to attack and wrest Casale from the French
unsettled the duke, and he softened toward French advances rather than risk a full Habsburg
presence in the peninsula.22 Louis empowered the Comte de Tessé to treat secretly with the duke
in 1695-1696. The resulting 1696 Treaty of Vigevano, a measure to avert the descent of war into
the Milanese, compelled the king in its measures to relinquish Casale back to the Duke of
Mantua after demolishing its fortress; the Abbé d’Estrades’s 1677 initiative was undone.23
French gains in Italy were lost in the final negotiations with the Savoyard court through the 1696
Treaty of Turin. Louis ceded the fortress of Pignerol to the duke.24 To finalize the FrancoSavoyard alliance, the king agreed to the marriage of the duke’s daughter, Marie-Adélaïde, to his
grandson, the Duke of Burgundy.25 These losses curtailed Louis XIV’s grasp over Italian
politics, and Northern Italy represented again territories over which the Bourbon and Habsburgs
would contend in the eventuality of Carlos II’s death.26
The 1697 Treaty of Ryswick could be interpreted as evidence that Leopold I and his
government were still more concerned with the establishment of imperial rule in Hungary and
the Ottoman threat to the east than with Louis XIV.27 The Grand Alliance and the impositions of
the treaty underscored that Louis could be quelled in the west through a coalition of European
princes. The menace of Hungarian malcontents and the Turk to imperial gains and borders in
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Hungary and the Balkans, however, remained very real in Vienna.28 The war that raged in
Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean since 1684 finally came to a conclusion with the 1699
Treaty of Carlowitz. The treaty ostensibly confirmed Leopold’s dominance over Hungary, and
the proximity of Sultan Mustafa II's forces to major urban centers within the empire was
temporarily repulsed. It was uncertain, however, if the Ottoman court would try to reclaim its
losses, and so, imperial attention and resources turned to fortify and protect the installation of
Habsburg authority in the east.29 The question of the Hungarians and the Ottomans continued to
plague the government of Leopold I, but the Ottomans terrified the Venetians.30
Venice’s senate concluded its second seventeenth-century war with the Turk at Carlowitz
bringing its formal alliance with Leopold I and the papacy to an end. After a series of financially
crushing campaigns, the republic regained sovereignty of almost all of its former Mediterranean
territories through Francesco Morosini’s successes in 1687-1688, but the republic’s monetary
and naval resources were exhausted; the public debt soared as the century closed.31 To bring its
Mediterranean acquisitions under control, Venice’s senate left the majority of its naval fleet in
the east to safeguard against an Ottoman resurgence and to fortify the installation of Venetian
reggimenti.32 Expenditures for building and maintaining a redoubtable naval force in the years of
war, as we have seen, obliged the Venetian state to borrow funds from the papacy, to enforce
new taxes within the republic, to raise tariffs on foreign merchants and their goods, to debase the
ducat, and to promote the sale and expansion of its nobility.33 Historians have shown that as the

28

Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 51
Ibid.
30
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 130, la Haye to Louis XIV, 21 May 1701, 103v, 104r-104v, Setton, Venice, Austria, and
the Turks, 412, 414-415, 416.
31
Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, 425; Setton, 454.
32
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 130, la Haye to Louis XIV, 21 May 1701, 103v, 104r-104v; Setton, 398-399; Benjamin
Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period,” in A Companion to Venetian History, 146-147.
33
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 132, Estrées to Louis XIV, 9 June 1702, F. 267v.; Lane, 430
29

231

eighteenth century opened Venice’s commercial economy continued to adapt and to thrive, but
its state coffers depleted eventually seeing the debt accrue to fifty million ducats by 1714.34
The unstable empire of Mustafa II, therefore, remained a potential danger to both
Leopold I and the Venetian republic after Carlowitz.35 The emperor’s accord with the Grand
Seigneur, however, promised an ostensible twenty-year truce, whereas, the peace signed between
him and Venice's senate did not.36 A seriously impaired state treasury combined with an
uncertain peace and expanded maritime borders left Venice’s government unable to alienate
Leopold. The alliance between Leopold and the republic grew tense though as imperial authority
in the Adriatic threatened Venetian claims to the sea. Leopold bullied Venice’s Dalmatian rival,
the Republic of Ragusa, after Carlowitz pressing the republic for assistance against France in
1701-1702.37 He trumpeted his lordship of the port of Trieste becoming another adversary for
Adriatic trade.38 Still, the senate understood that it needed the emperor in the event of another
war with the Ottomans, and, ultimately, he too depended upon the Venetian navy to counter
Mustafa in the Mediterranean.39
Not long after peace between Mustafa II and members of the 1684 Treaty of Lindz, Louis
XIV accepted King Carlos II’s will. Carlos’s death 1 November 1700 tentatively elevated a
Bourbon to the Spanish throne, but Leopold I refused to accept the alienation of Spain and its
vast global patrimony from the Habsburgs.40 War seemed inevitable. The governments at
Versailles and Vienna almost immediately hastened military forces into Northern Italy to seize
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Spanish possessions.41 The Republic of Venice and its terraferma formed a corridor through
which imperial armies needed to pass en route to Milan and in which Franco-Spanish forces
could impede their progress. The belligerents hastened to gain the cooperation of Venice’s
senate.42 The republic’s own difficult international affairs, however, meant that French
ambassadors in Venice would be hard pressed to persuade Venice’s government to ally against
Leopold.43 The Venetian senate had no recourse than to hide officially behind the rhetoric of
neutrality.

Fig. 12

Cardinal d’Estrées incognito: Elderly Representative of Louisquatorzien Diplomatic Praxis
in Venice
Cesar, Cardinal d’Estrées’s arrival in Venice emphasized the crucial role that the
republic’s government still represented as hostilities related to the Spanish succession began. The
elderly ambassador arrived in the republic from Rome 22 January 1701 foregoing the ceremonial
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entrée.44 The cardinal elected to remain incognito throughout his tenure in the republic avoiding
time-consuming ceremonial and protocol requirements that he believed would hinder his tasks.45
Estrées believed too that the foreign policy demands that he was to make in Venice would be
compromised if they were not undertaken in the strictest possible secrecy. To aid in these
considerations, Estrées accepted the invitation of his long-time acquaintance, Vincenzo
Coronelli, the then Reverend-Father General of the Franciscan Order, to lodge in his apartments
in the Franciscan monastery of Santa Maria Gloriosa dei Frari.46 Centrally located in the city, the
Frari afforded quicker access to government messengers than the embassy in Cannaregio, and
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lodging there instead of the embassy distanced Estrées from the appearance of official diplomatic
service.
Estrées’s recondite embassy was unique among French diplomats in Venice. First, he was
the highest-ranking ambassador sent to Venice in Louis XIV’s “personal rule.” Secondly, at no
other point in the “personal rule” had an extraordinary ambassador been sent to the republic, and
finally, at no other moment did two ambassadors overlap there. Estrées’s tenure coincided with
the last months of Denis II de la Haye’s long service in late 1701 and the incognito arrival of his
replacement Joseph-Antoine Hennequin, Seigneur de Charmont, Baron de Chasenay in
September. Both of these ministers had orders from Louis XIV to defer to Estrées while he
negotiated in Venice. Their interactions with the senate were to follow Estrées’s lead, and the
cardinal made it clear that he was jealous of his primacy.47
Details of the long life and career of Estrées (1628-1714) are much better known than
those of Louis XIV’s other ambassadors to Venice and need not be recounted fully.48 Suffice it
to say Estrées’s family was of the highest nobility. The Estrées were of Picard origin; César’s
father, François-Annibale I, Marshal-Duke d’Estrées, was the brother of Gabrielle d’Estrées,
mistress of Henry IV. His mother, Marie, was a member of the Bethune-Sully clan.49 César and
his two brothers served Louis XIV faithfully: the middle brother, Jean II, was an accomplished
47
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naval officer. The eldest, François-Annibale II, Duke d’Estrées, served as French ambassador to
Rome from 1672 to 1679. In turn, César, the youngest, rose through the ranks of the church
receiving the beretta in 1671. He acted as a second French ambassador at the Papal See assisting
his brother and informing the court and French ambassadors (as we saw the Abbé d’Estrades
regarded Estrées as a patron) for over thirty years of news from the curia.50 His imperious
manner and the pride he demonstrated in his rank made him detestable to Popes Clement X and
Innocent XI at whose courts he upheld the Gallican pretensions of Louis XIV during the crises of
the 1670s and 1680s, and he was instrumental at the conclave following the death of Innocent
XII that elected the pro-French Clement XI.51
Estrées’s practices as an ambassador conformed to Colbert de Torcy’s “world of paper,”
while hearkening back to diplomatic correspondence from earlier in the reign of the king. The
three principal volumes of the cardinal’s numerous dispatches from Venice serve as additional
evidence that there was no shortage of information flooding into the foreign ministry after the
death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert eighteen years earlier or under former foreign ministers. Estrées’s
packets included letters to Torcy and, despite gout crippling his hands, many hand-written copies
of letters inter alia to the Cardinal Forbin-Janson in Rome and to the Comte de Tessé.52 As we
have seen, the inclusion of such letters had been curtailed in the official packets of French
ambassadors to Venice since Colbert de Croissy’s nomination as secretary of state in 1679.
Although it could be argued that the circumstances of Estrées’s embassy to Venice required the
inclusion of this information in his packets to the court.
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Documentational novelties appeared in the packets of the new ambassador, Charmont,
such as printed passports instead of the hand-written ones issued in previous decades.53 Such
items reinforced the move to the professionalization of diplomacy under Torcy whereas Estrées’s
correspondence adhered to earlier forms. Cardinals Estrées and Forbin-Janson were among the
last four high-ranking ecclesiastics the French foreign ministry utilized on relevant foreign
missions in the ancien régime. Two more cardinals would serve as ambassadors in the eighteenth
century, Cardinal de Rohan to Vienna and Cardinal de Bernis to Rome; both were sent as
courtesies to honor the prestige of the Austrian and papal courts.54
Estrées used a nom de guerre while negotiating. He met on a regular basis with the savvio
del consiglio, Benedetto Capello, under the pseudonym of the “Abbé de Rivalta.” From the
moment of their first interview, Estrées insisted that his diplomatic presence in Venice be denied;
he was not there personally as an ambassador but as a visitor maintaining cordial relations with
Franco-Spanish allies like the republic.55 In the secret conferences with Capello, however, he
was the “Abbé de Rivalta,” a liaison, speaking on behalf of the Cardinal d’Estrées who in turn
the kings of France and Spain empowered to observe from Rome and Venice on their behalf.56
For his part, Capello, made it clear that he really could only “listen and relay” for and to the
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collegio during their conferences.57 Estrées reported on their first meeting 5 February 1701 with
Vincenzo Coronelli making the introductions.58
“You judge correctly that the resolution of the pope and of the Republic of Venice will
determine those of the Princes of Italy”:59 The Myopia of Cardinal d’Estrées
The French foreign ministry believed the Republic of Venice and Pope Clement XI could
sway the princes of Northern Italy against Leopold I. Cardinal d’Estrées travelled to Venice to
impress upon the senate the need for an outright alliance with France or at least an alliance of
neutrality between the senate and the pope.60 The importance of this policy increased as the
situation in Italy became more volatile throughout 1701. First, Estrées was to insist that the
republic prohibit the emperor from sending troops across the Tyrol through Venetian lands
toward Milan.61 Leopold’s war council elected Francois-Eugène, Prince of Savoy to lead thirty
thousand imperial troops into Italy that massed just across the Venetian border.62 The French
army would soon comprise about thirty thousand men entering Italy piecemeal beginning in
January. They joined with Spanish troops already in the Milanais and those that Victor Amadeus,
Duke of Savoy pledged. The duke was elected generalissimo of the allied troops with inter alia
Marshals Catinat and Villeroy and the Comte de Tessé under his command.63 Estrées pre-empted
the passage of imperial troops arriving in Venice three months before Eugène’s army descended.
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Estrées worked to secure Venetian permission for French troops to cross from the Milanese into
the terraferma to oppose Eugène’s entry.64 Reluctantly the republic acquiesced to the passage but
not to an alliance with France.65
From January to May French leadership in Northern Italy negotiated with Clement XI,
the Venetian senate, the Dukes of Mantua, Parma, and Modena, and lesser potentates to establish
a defensive arc stretching from the Alpine border of the Milanese to the Adriatic coast.66 The
firmly pro-imperial Duke of Modena denied his assistance to Franco-Spanish armies early on.67
After decades of playing the puppet to Louis XIV's Italian policies, the Duke of Parma was
hardly pro-French, but Louis XIV promised major financial and military assistance against the
emperor for his complicity. Through the reluctant cooperation of the Duke of Mantua, FrancoSpanish forces stationed in his lands promising to do as little damage possible to the states of the
princes of the Paduan planes.68 The duke feared the possibility of losing his capital and Casale to
Leopold, and Tessé established a close link with the duke positioning the soldiers under his
command in the duke’s lands and residing variously in the ducal palace. The duke’s agents in
Venice served too as spies and blockade runners for Tessé which, as will be seen, included the
Rizzati brothers.
It remained to be seen if Venice would follow the example of the dukes of Mantua and
Parma formally impeding Eugène’s progress. Throughout the early spring Capello insisted to
Estrées that the senate was resolute that Leopold’s forces should not enter its state; Venice
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vaunted its neutrality.69 Tessé alleged that the senate expressed tacit permission for Leopold’s
troops to cross the Alps through their inaction, but Prince Eugène indicated that he led his army
into Italy in early May flaunting the warnings of Venetian provveditori in the Terra Ferma who
reminded him of Venice’s “pretence of neutrality.”70 Estrées could only express extreme chagrin
at what he believed was the senate’s ultimate betrayal of its promises to him that imperial troops
would not cross its frontiers when Eugène’s forces descended in late May soon encountering and
then overcoming those of Marshal Catinat at Carpi on 10 July and on 31 August at Chiari.71 The
remainder of the campaign season witnessed a number of skirmishes bleeding across the plains
and rivers of North-Central Italy to the advantage of Eugène.72 As the autumn approached the
patience of Louis XIV and Estrées with the senate’s allegedly neutral vacillations faltered, but
their attention had already shifted from the moot point of impeding Eugène’s forces in the
Veneto to pressing for an outright alliance between the Venetian senate and Pope Clement XI to
guard against the entry of more imperial troops and any attempt to march south toward the
Kingdom of Naples.73
Clement XI Albani became pope in 1700 only weeks after the death of Carlos II. The
pope immediately angered Leopold I upholding Louis XIV’s acceptance of the defunct king’s
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will, and he leant his support to repulse imperial troops.74 Louis XIV believed that an alliance
between the pope and the Venetians could possibly galvanize the other princes of Northern Italy
to league en masse against Leopold I, and the French agreed not to move any troops into the
papal states in exchange for Clement’s backing.75 Initially Estrées feared that if Venice allied
with Clement XI the senate’s own seeming affinity for the emperor could turn the pope against
Franco-Spanish interests.76 After the sound defeat of the French at Carpi and Chiari, however,
Clement XI appeared more vigorously than ever to oppose the emperor’s advances into the
peninsula especially as the revolt of the Prince of Macchia in Naples threatened traditional papal
overlordship in the south as much as it did that of Philip V.77 Protecting Naples against imperial
machinations to inspire further anti-Bourbon turbulence in the kingdom became critical as the
year passed, and Estrées seemed sure that Eugene's plans were to filter troops and, ultimately,
march himself to Naples.78 Adding to the case against Venice, from Rome the Venetian Cardinal
Vincenzo Grimani assisted the Neapolitan conspirators in favor of Leopold I.79
Estrées continued to add his counsels for an alliance between Clement and the republic in
his meetings with Capello.80 Through his correspondence with the papal nuncio in Venice and
the French ambassador, the Cardinal Forbin-Janson, in Rome, he reported that the Venetian
ambassadors at the papal court, Nicolò Erizzo and his successor there, Francesco Morosini, had
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instructions from the senate to cement a formal treaty for the “common security of Italy.”81 By
December a treaty was negotiated in which both Venice and Clement pledged at least to remain
neutral in the conflict.82 Estrées appeared enthusiastic about the potential effects of the treaty, but
as 1701 drew to a close the cardinal’s distrust for Venetian neutrality grew as the republic
continued to provide quarters, victuals, and forage to Eugène’s men and horses despite the
French troops’ withdrawal into the lands of the dukes of Mantua and Parma.83 As will be seen,
the Chevalier de Forbin’s alarming reports from the Adriatic Sea of blatant Venetian maritime
aid to imperial forces strengthened Estrées's belated incredulity. Louis XIV’s commanders in
Italy assured him that Milan was well-defended under the governor there, the elder Prince de
Vaudémont, and the attention of the French military command in early 1702 turned to Eugène’s
blockade of the city of Mantua and the march of imperial troops south to Naples.84
The King had desired that Venice ally outright with France and Spain, but the events of
the campaign season and winter of 1701 proved that the senate was either incapable of adding
any military assistance against Eugène’s troops or that it willingly allowed the prince to profit
from its lands. By late 1701 the correspondence between the cardinal and the king indicated that
they began to believe that Venice was anything but neutral.85 Estrées received instructions to
insist that Venice’s government demand the same behavior from the German troops in the
terraferma as they had from the French.86 The senate uneasily complied with French interests
throughout the campaign allowing Franco-Spanish troops into the terraferma to counter Eugène,
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and the senate reluctantly permitted the forces of Catinat and Tessé to forage as they had done
for those of the prince. Estrées and Tessé labored to assure the obedience and decency of the
French army among Venetian subjects, and with few official complaints from Venetian officials
it appeared that they succeeded.87
This had not been the case with German troops under Eugène. Still, the senate did not
ally with France to eject the Germans, and as the prince delayed the departure of his troops from
Venetian lands into Mantua until 21 November 1701, Estrées and the king became more
suspicious toward the senate’s tolerance for imperial forces.88 For the French, Venetian inaction
belied the rhetoric of neutrality; as the new year approached, the senate’s unwillingness to block
ships in the Adriatic Sea victualing and arming Eugène’s troops who entered and blockaded
Mantua heightened the king’s anger destroying the senate’s credibility and poisoning Louis
XIV’s ostensible good will.89 It seemed Estrées's ministrations and patience with the republic
regarding the French presence in the terraferma and the treaty with Clement XI left the cardinal
unaware of the extent to which the Venetians were assisting Leopold I's war effort in the waters
of the Adriatic. It took the persistence of the Chevalier de Forbin to “open the eyes” of the
cardinal and inspire him and the king to search for more effective measures to weaken Venetian
resolve.90
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The Chevalier de Forbin and French Dominance over Venetian Adriatic Sovereignty
Louis XIV understood from the beginning of the conflict that Venice might be reluctant
to forego the strategic advantages of ties with Leopold I after the recent war with the Ottomans.
The king empowered Cardinal d’Estrées, therefore, to assure the senate that if it allied with
France and Spain that it could expect French assistance and influence in the event that Mustafa II
should attack Venice’s territories in the Mediterranean or disturb its commercial interests.91
Louis had promised the Venetians aid against the Ottomans in the past with no real benefit to
them, and, as Capello opined to the collegio, the French always reminded them of their earlier
assistance when they needed something in return.92 For Venice the loss of Crete was still very
raw; Louis XIV did not appreciate the residue of Venetian resentment that ineffectual French
assistance from thirty three years earlier inspired in Venetian attitudes toward him. Energized
through the growth of its states after Carlowitz, Venice was in no hurry to upset Leopold I who
had helped acquire them.
The senate made no move to accept Louis’s offer to manage the Turks in 1701, and
throughout the year the question of Venetian sovereignty in the Adriatic became an increasing
matter of doubt and then derision for Estrées.93 Estrées believed there was no evidence in the
first six months of 1701 that the emperor planned to move troops, provisions, or arms through
the Adriatic to Italy despite rumors of an alliance between Leopold and Ragusa to that effect.94
The Venetians tried to use the evidence of this treaty to solicit the bombardment of its Dalmatian
rival. Venice's rancor against Ragusa and its call for a French naval bombardment was soon to
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come back to haunt it.95 Venice’s senate reassured Estrées that it would brook no such actions in
the sea contrary to its neutrality.96 In his memoirs, however, the Chevalier de Forbin contradicted
this information depicting an Adriatic teaming with Venetian agents and merchant ships
stockpiling and transporting provisions, men, and arms from Trieste in imperial Dalmatia to
ports along the eastern coast of Italy. Forbin alleged that the Venetians lied to Estrées throughout
1701 and early 1702, and he claimed that Louis XIV's eagerness to placate the "delicacy" of the
republic to secure French strategy in Northern Italy blinded Estrées to Venetian duplicity on the
sea.97
Forbin went to the Adriatic with orders only to guard against the eventuality of imperial
movements in the sea.98 As the months of 1701 passed, the chevalier increased attacks against
Venetian vessels threatening Estrées's sense of control in diplomatic relations with the republic
as he negotiated the alliance between the senate and Clement XI.99 The cardinal accepted
Capello’s assurances on behalf of the senate that it was unaware of these actions. He rebuked
Forbin for an impetuosity he believed endangered French manipulations of the Venetians in
regards to the logistical requirements of the French army and the possible alliance with the
pope.100 Forbin received orders from the court and from his uncle in Rome, the Cardinal de
Forbin-Janson, however, that he should continue locating and destroying any vessels in the sea
supplying imperial forces.101 The chevalier patrolled the sea searching scores of suspicious
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vessels of Venetian, Ragusan, and imperial origin burning those on which war material and
supplies of grain were found.102
As the Venetian senate’s complaints grew against his attacks, Forbin suggested to Estrées
and the new French ordinary ambassador, Charmont, that the senate require all of its vessels to
carry patents to prove they were not dealing in imperial munitions.103 The senate raged that the
French could not make such demands on its sovereignty, and it tried to tighten its control of the
sea further against the French closing all its Dalmatian and Italian ports to Forbin.104 These
actions compounded the evidence that Venice was covertly assisting imperial policies. In May
1702 Forbin sailed unmolested into the Venetian port of Chioggia up to the mouth of the Po.105
Some in the senate argued this action signalled they had already lost overlordship of the sea since
they could not repel him. A senator of the Erizzo clan lamented that the republic should cancel
the sensa as it would be ridiculous to make the ceremonial claim of maritime dominance when
foreign ships beset Venice’s ports.106 For some weeks the senate entertained the notion that it
would have to cancel the centuries-old nuptial ceremony, but Estrées assured the senate he would
protect against Forbin if it would give some sign of curtailing Prince Eugène.107 The ceremony
went ahead, but it was clear that Venice no longer had means at hand to defend its traditional
claims to the Adriatic. The majority of its navy remained in the distant Mediterranean, and the
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ships it could muster in the Adriatic would scarcely be able to fend off French squadrons in its
major ports should Forbin attack them.108
The circumstance that finally persuaded Cardinal d’Estrées of the extent to which Forbin
was correct in his assertions of Venetian cooperation with the emperor was the news that an
English vessel, the Bonaventure, was outfitted with fifty cannons and soldiers at Trieste in the
summer of 1702 and that upon its departure it saluted a Venetian admiral who returned the
salute.109 The vessel was armed to escort and protect smaller convoys carrying supplies to
Eugène on the mainland against Forbin’s squadrons. News arrived that the English ship aided
convoys sent with cargoes of grain from the Venetian port at Malamocco that were then
stockpiled in ports and fortresses belonging to the Duke of Modena.110 Forbin’s focus in 1702
became the destruction of this vessel.
The chevalier’s reports persuaded Estrées that the time for dealing softly with Venice was
over. For its part, the senate fulminated especially as Forbin bombarded Trieste and cannonaded
the armed English vessel at night within eyesight of San Marco in August 1702.111 The explosion
of its powder was so great that many in the city believed they were under attack.112 The chevalier
remarked that he had become infamous among the Venetians. They feared he could launch a
108
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bombardment on the city at any time; undoubtedly, the Venetians remembered the brutal French
bombardment of Genoa is 1684 in retribution for Genoese support of the king of Spain.113 Louis
XIV began to utilize Venetian fear and uncertainty asserting that it was time for the senate finally
to demonstrate that it was sovereign of the gulf and stop facilitating Prince Eugène’s success or
renounce its nominal lordship of the sea.114
Augmentation of French naval squadrons sailing to reinforce Forbin’s actions and Philip
V’s arrival in Italy to secure his possessions provided Franco-Spanish forces briefly with the
upper hand in the peninsula against Eugène’s increasingly depleted forces.115 By late-1702 news
that imperial reinforcements would not come to Eugène’s aid in the near future coupled with the
fear of the Venetian senate and populace that the French could bombard the city provided Estrées
with leverage in negotiations giving the senate pause as to what the French might do as evidence
of Venetian deference to Leopold mounted.116 In his important survey, Frederic Lane concurred
that the republic’s inability to repulse the entry of French vessels into the Adriatic and the
senate’s compulsion to assist the emperor and his allies in the Grand Alliance on the sea in 17011702 “signalled the end” of significant Venetian maritime sovereignty.117
The Circumstances of the Rizzati Affair
Franco-Spanish forces temporarily dominated in Northern Italy and the Adriatic Sea by
June 1702. Milan and Naples remained secure from imperial armies for the time being.118 In part,
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this success resulted from the diminished numbers of Eugène’s troops and finances.119 Another
contributing factor was the aggressive campaigns of Forbin in the Adriatic interrupting imperial
replenishments. Undoubtedly, French commanders, Villeroy, Tessé, and Catinat waged an
effective defense against the westward and southward deployment of imperial troops either into
the Milanese or to Naples. This defense had not come without numerous losses including the
embarrassing capture of Marshal de Villeroy.120
In November 1701 Prince Eugène’s troops at last retreated from the Venetian terraferma
obtruding on the lands of the Dukes of Parma and Mantua; these princes pleaded for French
succor.121 The Duke of Parma’s state was “reduced to the extreme,” and soon too Eugène
blockaded Mantua.122 During the “blocus” the Comte de Tessé was shut up in the city with the
ducal court and French troops. Forbin impaired the arrival of supplies to Eugène from the sea,
and the prince’s much reduced fighting force surrounded the city impeding the entry of
provisions swallowing up the meagre foodstuffs available in the countryside for his men and
animals.123 To prohibit further the victualing of the city, Eugène issued a command that those of
any nationality smuggling goods into or out of Mantua should be hanged.124 The situation was
dire as the blockade endured six months. Supplies became scarce for the Germans and the
French, and subjects and soldiers within the city depended on blockade runners for supplies,
money, and correspondence. Charmont wrote about gangs of bandits employed by the Duke of
Mantua, and he encouraged the French to use them to cause “much annoyance” to Eugène’s
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forces.125 The duke and the Comte de Tessé depended in particular on scouts coming from
Venice 126
With the arrival of French reinforcements into Italy under the Duke de Vendôme by 1
June 1702 Eugène’s blockade of Mantua ended.127 Eleven days later Cardinal d’Estrées wrote the
dispatch to Louis XIV detailing the executions of the Rizzati brothers. From the sources little can
be known about the background of the Rizzati or about the full scope of their involvement. What
is clear is that they were executed for smuggling goods and information for the Duke of
Mantua.128 Three points about the Rizzati and their executions can reasonably be concluded.
First, by April 1702, the inquisitors of state knew the brothers to be malefactors in the employ of
the duke. Estrées reported that they made themselves more odious to the inquisitors by taking up
residence in the duke’s palace in Venice during carnevale flaunting their attachments to the
Duke of Mantua flamboyantly appearing masked and in ducal livery during the festivities despite
the knowledge that they were being hunted.129
Secondly, the brothers possessed letters patent from the French ordinary ambassador in
Venice, Charmont, and passeports the Comte de Tessé provided them in which he claimed the
brothers as soldiers in the French army.130 Given the evidence that the Duke of Mantua and
Tessé relied upon blockade runners especially from Venice to carry official correspondence,
news, currency, and goods it is likely that these documents were given to the brothers to facilitate
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the passage of information and lend official protection to them in case of their capture. Finally,
the inquisitors’ search for the brothers throughout the spring and their ultimate capture and
execution occurred during the final weeks of the blockade of Mantua.131 They were apprehended
finally on 10 June and imprisoned.132 The execution of the Rizzati two days later could indicate
Venetian deference to the requirements of Prince Eugène: their strangulation and the subsequent
hanging of their corpses, while not uncommon in Venice’s prisons, mirrored Eugène’s field
order that blockade runners be hanged.133
The Rizzati Affair and Cardinal d’Estrées: The Strategic and International Implications
In any case, the Rizzatis’ executions set off a diplomatic furor that the French utilized
against the senate. It was Cardinal d’Estrées that Louis XIV pressed to use the Rizzati affair to
full effect. Estrées echoed strong royal complaints in his discussions with Capello throughout the
last three months of his tenure in Venice. The evidence of Venice’s “insidious conduct” toward
the French to the benefit of Leopold I became undeniable in the eyes of Louis XIV, the cardinal,
and the French military and naval leadership.134 Through the added weight of the Rizzati affair
the king and Estrées demanded that the republic add action to its rhetoric of neutrality either
joining the Franco-Spanish cause outright to push imperial troops to the coast of the Adriatic and
out of Italy and again take up true sovereignty of the Adriatic or risk the consequences.135
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Louis XIV demanded that the senate send an express courier to France to explain the
affair.136 The senate duly sent messengers to the French court and to Charmont claiming they had
no knowledge that the Rizzati were under French protection.137 Capello visited Estrées for the
first time after the executions only on 24 June claiming too the ignorance of the inquisitors.138
Estrées wrote the king that, given the particular moment in which French forces found
themselves in control of Northern Italy and the Adriatic, that the affair provided an opportunity
to frighten the senate into compliance with French war aims, and so, “without pressing this affair
more than Your Majesty judges [beneficial] it is necessary still to keep it alive until the moment
arrives...when one can put it to rest according to the resolutions Your Majesty would like to
take.”139 Louis XIV agreed seeing that this affair provided him with an added means to
intimidate the senate: “for my service it is [good] to make the Venetians fear my resentment, but
it is not necessary to reduce them to despair for an affair that is in itself of least importance.”140
The king decided that the Rizzati affair should be used to unsettle the Venetians throughout the
rest of the campaign season 1702 making the senate believe that royal retribution could come at
any moment.141
For their part the Venetian senate delayed response to angry French demands for redress.
They defended their neutrality and issued complaints that they had been very patient with French
armies’ usage of resources in the terraferma since 1701.142 They reiterated their outrage at
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Forbin’s attacks in their waters, and as the chevalier bombarded Trieste and burned the armed
Bonaventure within sight of the city in August.143 The senate now accused Forbin of destroying
Venetian merchant vessels and interrupting its commerce.144 Estrées, remarked that the king had
already forebore with the senate, and its refusal to rectify the Rizzati affair only heightened the
danger it faced from superior French military and naval forces. He pointed out to Capello that in
addition to the evidence that the senate favored the emperor over the past months that the
imperial ambassador in Venice maintained an armed escort contravening Venetian law with
impunity, and Venetian bankers exchanged bills of credit for Eugène.145
French pressure through the affair began to have its intended effect. By late August, the
Venetians permitted French troops back into the Veronese sending orders to the provveditori to
provide them with whatever resources they could reasonably afford.146 The king increased
Forbin’s naval forces just in case, and permission was given for the chevalier to continue raids
on Venetian commercial vessels.147 The senate learned that the French allowed Forbin to attack
Ottoman ships taking prisoners and cargo in Venetian waters for which the Turk could demand
redress from the senate.148 These actions combined with news from Constantinople that the
French sought to ally with the Turks to mount an offensive against the Venetians and Leopold I
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brought Venice to heel.149 By August 1702 the senate was ready and willing to placate the king
in regards to the Rizzati. The affair benefitted the French for four months. The measures the
senate at last agreed upon signalled the extent to which French threats intimidated and brought
them to submission before Louis XIV.
The Rizzati Affair and Diplomatic Implications: The Dissolution of Franco-Venetian
Relations in the Eighteenth-Century
The executions compelled the Venetian government to make strategic concessions to the
French. It became clear that Louis XIV intended to humble the Republic of Venice for its
associations with Leopold I. It is through the discourse Estrées used in his discussions with
Capello regarding the affair that we glimpse how well European states in the early-modern
period saw through the Serenissima’s mythologized political stability recognizing an allegedly
tyrannical oligarchy that its own patricians loathed.150 A brief analysis of the discursive strategy
the king and the cardinal employed in manipulating the affair reveals that the king wanted to
humiliate the Venetians.
Previous French ambassadors described the closeted authority of the state inquisitors to
Louis XIV. The senate tried to “correct” the growing power of the Council of Ten and the
inquisitors of state in 1677-1678 while the Abbé d’Estrades was in Venice.151 These ministers’
authority angered the patricians over whom they held seemingly absolute power.152 Estrades took
notice of the internal politics as they might affect French interests, but the turbulent internal
tumults wracking the republic were then of little consequence to French foreign policy as Louis
XIV’s authority increased relatively unimpeded during the Dutch War.
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It was, as will be remembered, during the tenure of the Sieur d’Amelot, that the French
ambassador almost clashed with the inquisitors as they allegedly ordered the murder of Amelot’s
associate and informant, Paolo Giuliani. The French foreign ministry expressed outrage at the
murder, but it was contrary to French strategy toward the Venetian government in 1684 to indict
the inquisitors’ truculence. The Rizzati Affair, however, interposed the authority of the three
inquisitors between the needs of Europe’s greatest monarchs in a heated diplomatic and military
context in which the services of agents like the Rizzati facilitated the movement of information
while the kingdom of Spain was en jeu. The affair occurred when Louis XIV needed to frighten
the Venetian government enough to make it remember its own tenuous defense against the
French in the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy.
From the perspective of the king the Venetian government at last rose above its station in
European affairs, and the inquisitors, heretofore left to direct the arcana of Venice’s polity from
the shadows, dared to oppose high French foreign policy.153 The king demanded the Venetian
government make an example of the three state inquisitors responsible for the executions of two
men in his service and defend against ministers who, it could be said, contradicted Venice’s
conciliar sovereignty and international reputation.154 Cardinal d’Estrées unleashed diatribes
against the inquisitors’ authority and the international implications for the republic’s
government. In the initial meeting 24 June after the executions Estrées remarked to Capello:
It would be too difficult [for the Venetians] to try and justify how the the sovereign
power of the Great Council, that is the general assembly of all the nobles, could be
transferred to the inquisitors of state to delimit; that this pretended sovereignty might
have control over private subjects of whatever rank they might be, but that the laws from
within the boundaries of their city and their states should have absolutely no effect on the
necessities of Foreign Princes especially the First Two Crowns of Europe. Moreover, it
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would be strange that one would make three subjects of the Republic arbiters to decide
whether to respect or not any person Kings would honor with similar dignity [that is royal
protection], and, moreover, even the collegio which represents the sovereignty of the
Republic even had no right to involve itself in such a case, but it seemed to suffice,
however, to be an inquisitor of state to ignore without punishment this respect…. I upheld
that in the present circumstances the actions of the inquisitors of state was inexcusable….
After such a precipitous action, the senate was now placed in a very embarrassing
situation as to what is might do: [Estrees’ suggested] they [the senate] should forbid them
[the current inquisitors] in perpetuity from holding a charge that they had abused with
impudence.155
On 1 July, Estrées “repeated and even exaggerated all of the circumstances that rendered that
action most offensive and which should oblige the Republic to repair it through all of the
satisfactions [sic] Your Majesty might demand.”156 The savvio, Estrées alleged, became very
agitated begging the French not to blame the entire Venetian “publico” for the conduct of “three
inquisitors over whom neither the collegio nor the senate had any authority and who acted with a
sovereign and absolute power in these types of cases.”157 Estrées rejoined:
I believed that I had to ridicule what he said by remarking that I did not know that there
was any other sovereign power in Venice other than the bodies of the Republic, and that
he was teaching me something new that I had never understood [about the Republic] like
so many other things; that if the fault lay with the three inquisitors and if they should be
considered the sovereigns over which the Republic had no authority, it should be,
therefore, these three sovereigns who should be held to account for their actions before
Your Majesty, and You would be forced into combat if they did not do so seeing that it
[the Republic] had already declared in so many ways against You and against the Spanish
Crown, for which it did not appear in the least embarrassed. I continued saying that the
Republic could clearly expect the power of these inquisitors to hold sway over
merchants, artisans, and the inhabitants of Venice, but to pretend that such [a system of]
laws permitted them to disrespect the just regard owed to Crowns and to such a great
King, that it would be too great a wrong toward the Republic to believe it capable of such
a thing….158
He added the republic could publicly demonstrate that this was not the case “...as they [the
inquisitors] merited to be deprived forever of the titles which they had abused to the degree of
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bringing the Republic into conflict with Your Majesty, and if the Republic facilitated their
capricious acts it would find itself engaged justly to render the satisfaction Your Majesty
deserved.”159
Throughout July the senate avoided formal diplomatic satisfaction to the king. Estrées
explained that the nature of the Venetian system meant that the three sitting inquisitors would
finish the six months of their appointments by the end of August; the senate intentionally delayed
responding to the king’s demands until this time.160 The senate had no intention of publicly
admitting the contradictions in its polity. The city was alarmed at the thought of French reprisals
stationing available warships at its ports, reinforcing the earthworks of the Lido, and building up
“batteries” in the case of a bombardment.161 News that the king increased his troops in Northern
Italy and that Philip V arrived in the peninsula to take up command of Franco-Spanish forces
heightened the panic.162 Imperial reinforcements were not set to arrive for some time still, and, at
this time, Forbin was attacking Venetian merchant vessels. Ultimately, the added horror that the
Ottomans considered renewed conflict in the Mediterranean at French urging pressed the senate
to satisfy Louis XIV in regards to the Rizzati.163
By August it had been decided that Estrées would leave Venice and join Philip V as
French ambassador to his court. The cardinal, however, took special care to finalize the Rizzati
Affair before his departure demanding resolution. Undoubtedly the months in which Capello and
the senate duped Estrées through the politics of neutrality compelled the cardinal to end his
embassy with some successful negotiation. The senate first suggested to Estrées in late August
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“the idea of a letter” in which the republic expressed in submissive terms its apologies to the
king.164 Estrées informed Capello that a letter was still only rhetoric, and that the king expected
decisive action on the part of the republic.165 A second suggestion was punishing the captain of
the sbirri, Giorgio Aliprandi, blaming him for not reporting the letters to the inquisitors.166
Neither of these acts sufficed for the king who found especially risible the idea of a “simple
letter.”167
Louis XIV asked the cardinal what measures he believed would embarrass the senate the
most.168 Estrées believed nothing less than a command extraordinary embassy led by two highranking patricians would humiliate the republic demonstrating the extent of its submission.169 At
last on 30 September, the senate decided upon a two-fold act of obedience: it would send the
letter of apology to Louis XIV in the hands of an extraordinary ambassador, and it would send a
copy of the letter to Pope Clement XI with a request that the pontiff notarize, publish, and send
official copies of it to all of the courts of Europe “in such a manner that the whole world would
be convinced of the high respect and sincerity of their sentiments.”170 Estrées departed from
Venice in late September to join Philip V. Before his departure he helped Capello edit the letter
of submission.171 The senate elected Lorenzo Tiepolo extraordinary ambassador to deliver and to
read the letter to the king. Tiepolo presented the letter on 1 January 1703 ending the Rizzati
Affair.172 With the permission of Louis XIV and the senate, Tiepolo’s title then changed to
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ordinary ambassador to France. He replaced Alvise Pisani remaining at the French court until
1708.173
The time-tested ludovician politics of subjugation through diplomatic bullying finally
reached Venice. Its submission was not as spectacular as the bombardment and subsequent
ceremonial humiliation of the Republic of Genoa in 1684-1685. Unlike the senate of its sister
republic, the Venetian senate chose prostration before French demands rather than risk the
possible further destruction of its war-weakened state and the inevitable humiliation that would
have followed. Tiepolo’s extraordinary embassy signalled that Venice recognized Louis XIV’s
international superiority. The republic feared armed retaliation in the terraferma or in the
Mediterranean Sea either through Forbin’s squadrons or diplomatic machinations with the
Ottomans. Louis XIV could not force Venice to abandon its attachments to Leopold I; the king
seemed satisfied, however, that the republic recognize his authority and that it could no longer
pretend to see France as a diplomatic equal in the future.174 The Venetian government’s affinity
for the emperor in 1701-1702 neutralized eighteenth-century Franco-Venetian diplomatic
relations; the Rizzati Affair was the instrument with which the Cardinal d’Estrées rendered the
Republic of Venice impotent before louisquatorzien might.
Conclusions
Believing Venice respected the benefits he offered, Louis XIV sent Estrées to the
republic to persuade it to ally with France and Spain against Leopold I. The king initially
underestimated the extent to which the Venetians favored Leopold in their Mediterranean
policies and engagements since the Morean War. Venetian distrust for the king since the loss of
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Crete in 1669 and the subsequent growth of his authority in Europe and the Mediterranean
pushed the republic closer to the emperor. Leopold provided the republic with tangible
diplomatic and strategic benefits over the course of their war with the Ottomans in the last two
decades of the seventeenth century; it was presumed he could continue to do so.
Belligerents for the Spanish Crown poured into Northern Italy in 1701-1702, and
Venice’s senate presented itself to the French as a neutral state to forestall a French onslaught.
Eager to cement an alliance between Venice and Pope Clement XI, Estrees initially accepted the
senate’s neutrality at face value. Forbin’s reports combined with mounting evidence of Venice’s
regard for Leopold I’s military needs in the terraferma signalled that neutrality was a mask to
dupe Louis XIV. The senate bought time providing resources for the augmentation of imperial
authority in Italian lands belonging to the Spanish Crown. Venice’s reliance upon the emperor in
the event of a future conflict with the Ottomans compelled the republic to favor Leopold’s
dominance in Italy. Events and evidence forced Estrées to recognize his miscalculation. As
French armies experienced temporary dominance in Italy in mid-1702, the Rizzati Affair
presented the cardinal with an opportunity to correct his error.
Cardinal d’Estrées’s manipulation of the Rizzati Affair confirmed three points. First, the
republic’s financial and naval resources were too over-extended in its recent Mediterranean
acquisitions to disavow Leopold or to maintain its traditional sovereignty in the Adriatic against
French squadrons. Secondly, the republic’s financial and naval distress left it incapable of
forcing Franco-Spanish troops out of its terraferma states; the senate tolerated the French while
continually favoring Eugène’s armies with provisions on land and sea. Finally, the affair
demonstrated the republic preferred humiliation before Louis XIV rather than face a potential
bombardment and jeopardize hard-won gains in the distant Mediterranean. For modern scholars
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the Rizzati Affair indicates that the republic’s international and diplomatic “decline” was not a
totalizing process. Students of Venetian history should reconsider individual cases of withered
diplomatic relations between Venice and neighboring states in the early-modern period; each
deserves separate analysis to draw accurate conclusions.
The kings of France maintained ordinary ambassadors in Venice until the revolution, but
the post was important more as an entrepot for the collection and passage of information from
and with the distant Mediterranean and Italy.175 The relazioni of two Venetian ambassadors to
the court of France in the first decades of the eighteenth century, Lorenzo Tiepolo and Nicolo
Foscarini, confirmed the cause of Venice’s diminished relations with France after 1702. Tiepolo
wrote in 1708:
Thus I cannot conceal the continuous laments coming from that court against the alleged
partiality demonstrated for the Germans. The repeated, rather the never-ending, reports
that officials and generals sent to the court, produced such a disadvantageous effect...that
even the most distinguished persons, the ministers and princes, showed themselves
persuaded…that if the Eccellentissimo Senato had wanted it so, Lombardy would not
have suffered war, and the States of the King of Spain would still be under his
dominion….176
In a later dual relazione of 1723 Tiepolo and Foscarini again echoed these sentiments:
But the profound subtlety and penetration of that court seems to consider with little favor
the present direction and aims of the eccellentissimo Senato. It is well known, that the
distraction of Ottoman power and the always stronger links that have formed between
Caesar and the Republic, against this power, created the results even for Italy of the
recent treaty (Treaty of Passarowitz 1718)... There is the inherent notion that Vostre
Eccellenze will never enter into hazardous negotiations that would displease
Caesar….The Court of France, having by custom to treat with a distinct superiority,
betimes exceeds the limits towards those from whom it cannot hope to profit sometimes
maybe to its own detriment.177
France came to disregard the Serenissima as a viable partner after 1702. The advent of the War
of the Spanish Succession debunked Venetian neutrality from the French vantage confirming the
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republic’s allegiance to the Emperor. For the French, like its famed political stability, Venetian
claims of neutrality were a myth. With no irony, it would be the French to demand the final
sacrifice of the Serenissima to their war aims against the Habsburgs ninety-five years later
through the Treaty of Campo Formio.178
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Conclusion
One generally regards an embassy to Venice as an unimportant commission; this is why courts
have for some time stopped sending capable ministers to this post. It is correct that it does not seem
necessary given the little influence that the Republic of Venice has in European affairs. However, I do not
know of a better school for the formation of ambassadors…. No ambassador before me sent detailed
mémoires about every part of the Venetian government; I fulfilled my service there then with the most
ample attention, and I dare say that my mémoires revealed the inner workings of the Republic of Venice
more than anyone before me who had written about that celebrated and singular government…and I
examined all of the dispatches of the king’s ambassadors to Venice from the last fifty years.1

The Abbé de Bernis served as resident ambassador to the Republic of Venice from 1752
to 1754. Bernis’s later critiques serve as fitting prompts to draw conclusions about FrancoVenetian diplomatic relations in the late seventeenth century and the careers of the five
ambassadors examined in my work. If one takes him at his word, Bernis prepared for his role as
envoy to Venice by reading the fifty years of correspondence of former French ambassadors
preceding his departure for the republic – roughly that would have been dispatches written from
Venice since 1702. Based on his research, Bernis concluded that French relations with the
Serenissima – indeed with all European courts – were of little international importance by the
mid-eighteenth century. I have agreed with Bernis on this point regarding the rapport between
France and Venice, but I contend that the abbé would not have made the same observations of
Franco-Venetian relations before 1702.
I have used three principle arguments in my dissertation: First, the dynastic imperative to
expand the boundaries of France undergirded Louis XIV’s diplomatic relations with the Republic
of Venice, and the same imperative informed the personal motivations that led the five
ambassadors I have examined. Secondly, I argued that a mutual though antagonistic interest in
the commercial and political dynamics of the Mediterranean Sea connected the French and the
Venetians. Finally, I have claimed that the personal choices and preoccupations of the individual
1
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ambassadors that Louis XIV and his ministers chose to serve in diplomatic posts effected the
development of subsequent French domestic and international policies. Louis XIV was forced to
react to their decisions rather than being the sole author of them. Framing these claims has been
the contention that the government of Venice remained a vital diplomatic factor in Louis XIV’s
international and hegemonic strategies.
Contrary to the Abbé de Bernis’s blanket allegation that previous ambassadors reported
little useful information in their dispatches from Venice prior to 1752, the ministers that I have
introduced here demonstrated a punctilious and thorough attention to detailing the domestic and
international affairs of the republic. Their correspondence contained ample evidence that the
French ministries of foreign affairs and the marine interacted vigorously with the Venetian
government to further specific French policies in the Mediterranean Sea, the Italian peninsula,
and in Western Europe. French dynastic politics relative to the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs,
the papacy, and the Ottoman Empire in the forty years from 1662 to 1702 benefitted from the
rapport with the Venetians.
Ambassadors’ desire for personal advancement required that they satisfy the king.2 I have
investigated ambassadors from two different social orders: three were drawn from the clergy and
two from the noblesse de robe. In both cases, the ministers went to Venice with the
understanding that their role afforded opportunities to promote their interests. Even Cardinal
d’Estrées, who arguably had achieved the highest rank possible (save the papacy) in his career,
expected that his service in Venice could promote the advancement of his nephew, the Abbé
d’Estrées. The cardinal had vetted the abbé’s nomination as a future ambassador to Spain while
serving in Venice. Ambassadors in my work operated within the constraints of the centralizing
louisquatorzien monarchy. The results of their performance while in the Venetian republic have
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been sketched looking then through the dual lenses of personal and royal interests. This has been
the dynamic of louisquatorzien monarchy that I have described at work between Louis XIV, his
government, and ministers working in that governement who were sent abroad to represent him.
Of the five ambassadors I investigated four went on to hold other diplomatic or
ministerial posts. The Bishop of Beziers served in Poland until 1668 returning then to France to
succeed in higher ecclesiastical positions including the cardinalate in 1672. The Abbé d’Estrades
was ambassador in Turin until 1685. After returning from Venice in 1685 Louis XIV elevated
the Sieur d’Amelot’s lands to a marquisite. The Marquis Amelot de Gournay then served the
king as envoy in Portugal and Switzerland. Later he became a counselor in the royal conseil de
commerce before serving again as envoy in Spain and Rome.3 Denis de la Haye-Vantelet had
passed his long life in diplomatic service to Louis XIV, and at the end of his tenure in Venice the
king allowed the aged la Haye and his family to retire to his lands in France where he died later
in his ninety-sixth year.4 Finally, Cardinal César d’Estrées continued to serve the king as the
second ambassador to Felipe V of Spain.5 The Venetian embassies of these men, in spite of the
challenges each faced in the republic, secured their personal advancement or that of their
families in the French government and aristocracy.
Describing the forty years during which these ministers served in Venice and through
their correspondence under succeeding French secretaries of state for foreign affairs I have also
wanted to provide evidence of bureaucratic developments occurring within the louisquatorzien
foreign ministry. The directives ambassadors received and with which they complied during the
ministries of Colbert de Croissy after 1679 and Croissy’s son, Torcy, after 1696 provided further

3
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evidence of the “management of information…of a ‘brain trust’ of diplomatic personnel” under
the Colberts’ leadership.6 Ambassadors in Venice, most notably Michel d’Amelot, received
direct instructions of how to write diplomatic correspondence and the types of information that
the ministry believed appropriate for official dispatches as the foreign ministry coalesced under
the Colberts’ leadership.7 The correspondence of Amelot’s successor, Denis de la Haye followed
the same guidelines, and the work of both ministers was markedly different in style and content
than those of the Bishop of Beziers and the Abbé d’Estrades prior to 1679. I would argue that the
long experience and the nature of Cardinal d’Estrées mission exempted him to some degree from
following the same guidelines as his predecessors in Venice who were both of less exalted rank
and whose diplomatic tasks did not exhibit the same immediacy as that of Estrées who sought
with all haste to impede the troops of Leopold I entering the Venetian terraferma.
Moreover, I would argue that the turbulent experiences of the Abbé d’Estrades and
Michel d’Amelot were exactly the types of scenarios that Colbert de Torcy had in mind when he
began to formalize and then institute a curriculum for and training of ambassadors and embassy
sercretaries through the formation of the académie politique in 1710.8 Estrades’s
mismanagement of information related to the composer Alessandro Stradella and the secret
negotiations for Casale undertaken without royal command resulted from a lack of experience –
although the abbé was able to defend and then remedy his errors. The distasteful and
embarrassing domestic controversies that plagued Michel d’Amelot and his secretary, Rogers de
Piles, likewise, provided an example of the awkward position of ambassadorial secretaries in the
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seventeenth century. Piles was loyal to his master and not to the Crown per se.9 His plodding
oversight of a contraband ring to pay spies for information for his employer ended in scandal and
repeated royal and ministerial rebukes to the ambassador. Torcy’s objective in developing the
académie politique, although it did not survive long after the death of Louis XIV, was to train
ambassadors but especially to train competent secretaries loyal to the Crown with an
understanding of the requirements of their role.10 The ambassadors I have discussed and their
embassy staffs served in Venice before the appearance of “diplomatic” treatises in France; they
received on-the-job training along with its pitfalls and humiliations.11
These ambassadors’ experiences in Venice do more than demonstrate the precariousness
of the life of diplomats in the Venetian republic and the ways in which service there shaped their
subsequent personal careers in their socio-cultural context. Louis XIV sought to present his
domestic and international authority as an all-encompassing emanation of royal will. This was
far from the reality that diplomatic correspondence revealed. During the decades of the king’s
personal rule, the relationship of ambassadors in the republic with the Venetian government and
its spies and with ministers at the French court highlighted that royal policy emerged sometimes
piecemeal after ambassadors’ decisions had been made far from the king’s gaze.
The example of the Franco-Venetian rapport demonstrates that the French Crown’s
foreign policies were often reactions to circumstances that emerged on a quotidian basis.
Louisquatorzien foreign policy was often dependent upon diplomats’ abilities to mitigate
extensive webs of intelligence, political institutions, and the personal interests that motivated the
9
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individual actors composing these same webs and institutions. French envoys’ frequent
dispatches from the republic relayed the intelligence details required to fulfill the prompts of the
king and the secretaries of foreign affairs – and after 1687-1688 the secretary of the marine – in
regards to the official direction of foreign policy. The vignettes that opened five chapters of this
dissertation, however, illustrated the varied and sometimes tense circumstances that arose in an
ambassador’s day-to-day tenure in Venice that could alter Crown policy and either threaten or
promote a diplomat’s career. Ambassadors received instructions only to include details relevant
to the construction of foreign policy in relation to the Venetian government. In light of such
direct commands to relate relevant information the facets surrounding these extraordinary events
stood in contrast to the other many pages in dispatches that recounted the minutiae of
international politics. Upon investigation and reconstruction it became apparent that ambassadors
included these experiences because they believed them pertinent to the development of French
relations with the republic and to their individual performance as the king’s creatures.
Viewed from this perspective two points emerge. First, ambassadors became the author’s
of foreign policy as much as they were the mouthpieces of the official royal will. I argue that the
received narratives of early modern European international and diplomatic history – those of
late-seventeenth century France in this case – resulted as much or more from the efforts and
failures of ambassadors like those I have examined as they did from the commands of the
governments that sent them. These narratives can be understood and appreciated more fully only
after scholarly reappraisals present the fraught circumstances diplomats underwent in the
process. In this way I have drawn attention to the personal nature of what Sharp called the
diplomat’s predicament.
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Second, scholars agree that Louis XIV sought to consolidate or centralize his authority
through robust chains of command at the ministerial level that required the final decision of the
monarch in council. Paradoxically, for the Crown’s authority to coalesce in what has come to be
understood as absolute rule, royal authority had to accommodate – adapt to – the demands and
assumptions of individuals like ambassadors and institutions – be they domestic or foreign –
such as the government of Venice. The politics of accommodation between the French Crown
and its ministers and with the Venetian government that I have described are further indications
that a putatively absolute authority was ultimately dependent upon a series of institutional
accommodations that would characterize the French monarchy until the end of the ancien régime
contributing to its ultimate dissolution.
Additionally, I have suggested that relationships between larger states such as Louis
XIV’s France with smaller polities like Venice in the early modern period deserve further
scholarly attention. One could argue that Louis XIV’s willingness to tolerate and accommodate
the often vexatious foreign policies and diplomatic strategies of the diminutive republic were
unusual when compared to the king’s bullying approach to states like Genoa. It could be argued
that the king, although disdainful of republics in general, maintained Cardinal Mazarin’s respect
for the venerable Republic of Saint Mark. I contend, however, that although Mazarin may have
inculcated a level of respect for Venice in the monarch, it was the state’s proximity and long
experience in Mediterranean and Italian affairs that tempered the king in his policies with the
republic for forty years.
Venice’s government and geographic situation represented a strategic relationship that, as
I have shown, Louis believed could be manipulated to counter Habsburg and papal foreign
policies on the Italian peninsula and in Western Europe. Throughout the early decades of his

269

personal rule, the king and his foreign secretaries pressed Venice to comply with Bourbon
hegemonic aims while leaving the republic’s government to believe that it could benefit from
French military and monetary support during its struggle for Crete. Venetian interests in the
Mediterranean Sea left the republic vulnerable to Louis’s Ottoman allies, and the king attempted
to use this threat to inspire Venetian compliance. From the 1680s, however, the republic’s
tolerance of the French king’s territorial expansionism and authority in Italy and the
Mediterranean weakened and Venice turned instead to Leopold I as an ally. Louis had
underestimated the republic and its unwillingness to be easily controlled. The Franco-Venetian
rapport finally diminished when the king realized he could not use diplomacy to dissuade the
republic from its ties with the emperor as the War of the Spanish Succession began. Moreover, I
believe that I have argued persuasively that discussions of Venice’s diminishment in European
and Mediterranean politics should be reexamined through the breakdown of individual
diplomatic rapports such as I have described to understand better the nuanced circumstances that
result in a state’s international “decline.”
For as much as the small Venetian republic’s relevance faded in the context of its
relations with Louis XIV so too did the king’s aspirations to command the politics of Italian
states. The momentary French dominance in Northern Italy that existed after Cardinal d’Estrées
departed Venice in 1702 did not survive the long years of the War for the Spanish throne. The
1713 Peace of Utrecht laid the foundation for almost thirty years of diplomatic and military
tensions in Italy between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Spanish Bourbons.12 Any aspirations
that Louis XIV maintained to expand French authority into the peninsula had vanished by 1697.
The king’s efforts to cement Spanish rule on behalf of his grandson in Northern Italy dissolved
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too after his death when Felipe V faced diplomatic pressure from European states, including his
native France, to maintain Spanish states in the peninsula.13
The Venetians again lost the preponderance of their Mediterranean gains since 1699
through the Second Morean War (1714-1718), and it’s government and merchants fought
thereafter to remain a vital and relevant Mediterranean port city as the great dynastic states
encircling it forced the Venetians into a position of a truly neutral and secondary importance – a
medio stato as the eighteenth century theorist, Vattel, posited – in international and
Mediterranean affairs.14 The Republic of Venice, although independent, grudglingly accepted
Austrian dynastic pretensions over those of France and Spain in Italy until after 1748 when the
Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties at last released Italy from their territorial ambitions for a short
period of peace until the advent of Napoleonic armies.15
The Abbé de Bernis observed that Venice had relinquished the elements of its former
international relevance in European affairs when he arrived there in 1752, but a relative domestic
stability, a level of commercial prosperity, and the cultural renown of the republic continued
until its dissolution in 1797.16 Post-revolutionary European historians, expecially in France,
would be left to initiate “modern” interpretations of Venice’s history and the mythologies – myth
and antimyth – associated with its government and society.17 The correspondence of the
ambassadors I have examined contained no discussion of any Venetian myth as an interpretive
model through which to understand the social and political dynamics of the state in which they
13
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served. They did not refer to the “Myth of Venice.” They functioned, rather, as envoys of Louis
XIV in a vigorous republic undergoing the continued evolution in institutions that contributed to
later articulations of a myth.
The envoys investigated here often described the contradictions of the republic’s famed
stability and liberty. Their clashes with the recondite Venetian government and its allegedly
repressive instruments like the Council of Ten and the state inquisitors provided additional
evidence no doubt for later nineteenth century French scholars’ who sometimes villainized
Venice’s government and society for alleged brutality and suppression.18 In their service to Louis
XIV ambassadors sought royal favor, but Pierre Daru described the Venetian polity on its own
terms in his controversial analysis as, “…a shadowy government that placed among the number
of its maxims the careful humbling of the pride or the glory of those who elevated themselves
through brilliant (notable) services.”19 Perhaps French ambassadors’ unflattering descriptions of
Venice can be partially explained through such republican maxims or at least through later
commentators’ creation of them. Ambassadors in the last half of the seventeenth century had
judged Venice while seeking to justify their actions for personal advancement and for the
dynastic aims of Louis le Grand at the expense of the republic.
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Appendix I:
Chronologies of Pertinent Political Figures
Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs during the personal rule of Louis XIV
Henri-Auguste Lomenie, Seigneur de Brienne (1643-1663) [Hugues de Lionne served along with the
elderly Brienne in the early 1660s]
Hugues de Lionne, Marquis de Fresnes

(1663-1671)

Simon-Arnauld de Pomponne

(1671-1679)

Charles Colbert, Marquis de Croissy

(1680-1696)

Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy

(1696-1715)

Doges of Venice during the personal rule of Louis XIV
Domenico II Contarini

(1659-1674)

Nicolo Sagredo

(1674-1676)

Alvise Contarini

(1676-1683)

Marc-Antonio Giustiniani

(1684-1688)

Franceso Morosini

(1688-1694)

Silvestro Valiero

(1694-1700)

Alvise II Mocenigo

(1700-1709)

Giovanni II Cornaro

(1709-1722)
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Venetian ambassadors to France during the personl rule of Louis XIV20:

Alvise Grimani

(1660-1664)

Alvise Sagredo

(1663-1665)

Marc-Antonio Giustiniani

(1665-1668)

Giovanni Morosini

(1668-1671)

Francesco Michiel

(1670-1674)

Ascanio II Giustinian

(1673-1676)

Domenico Contarini

(1676-1686)

Sebastiano Foscarini

(1678-1683)

Girolamo Venier

(1682-1688)

Pietro Venier

(1688-1695)
Nicolò Erizzo

(1695-1699)

Alvise Pisani

(1699-1702)

Lorenzo Tiepolo

(1702-1707)

Alvise Mocenigo

(1707-1721)

Popes during the Personal Rule of Louis XIV
Alexander VII

[Chigi]

(1655-1667)

Clement IX

[Rospigliosi]

(1667-1669)

Clement X

[Altieri]

(1670-1676)

Innocent XI

[Odescalchi]

(1676-1689)

Alexander VIII

[Ottoboni]

(1689-1691)

Innocent XII

[Pignatelli]

(1691-1700)

Clement XI

[Albani]

(1700-1721)

20

N.B. Ambassadors mentioned in the preceding chapters are bolded. The presence of three overlapping Venetian
ambassadors in the late 1670s and early 1680s will be noted. I believe this demonstrated further evidence of
Venetian anxiety towards Louis XIV’s growing authority in European affairs. This anxiety also explained the reason
for which the sieur d’Amelot faced the difficulties described in Chapter Four above.
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Ottoman Sultans during the Personal Rule of Louis XIV
Mehmet IV

(1648-1687)

Suleiman II

(1687-1691)

Ahmed II

(1691-1695)

Mustafa II

(1695-1703)

Ahmed III

(1703-1730)
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Appendix II:
“Des Droits et prérogatives utiles,” 16641
F. 180r/ La principale des prérogatives des ambassadeurs, et celle du droit de Franchise dans un
certain district marqué par la Republique autour du Palais qu’ils occupent, et c’est pour cela
qu’ils ne logent jamais aûpres de la Place St. Marc.
Ces franchises consistent en ce que
Il ne peut etre fait aucun acte de justice, soit pour enlever des gens et les mettres en prison, soit
pour y donner des assignations, sans la permission expresse de l’Ambassadeur. Il est seul le
maître de permettre qu’on y vende de la viande, du pain, et du vin seules marchandises dont le
commerce n’est pas libre à Venize. Cette permission se donne rarement a cause de
l’inconvenient des contrebandes.
Toutes les Gondoles des Ambassadeurs conduites par sa livrée sont exempte de toutes visites tant
dedans qu’en dehors de Venize et si par hazard les Sbirres en arrêtoient quelques unes
l’ambassadeur s’en plaint au Senat qui lui fait rendre ce qu’ils pouroient y avoir pris.
L’Ambassadeur a droit en tout tems de faire venir à Venize pour sa personne ou sa Maison, et
sous son adresse, ou avec son passeport, tel ballot que bon lui semble, sans qu’il puisse etre
visité, ni sujet a payer aucune Douanne. Nota. Il y a [ ] souvent des difficultés pour la visite.
Tout criminel qui se sauve sur les franchises de l’Ambassadeur ne peut etre enlevé de force et
sans la permission de l’Ambassadeur Lorsqu’il est obligé de permettre qu’on donne sur ses
franchises une assignation pour dettes, l’Huissier doit y venir sans aucune
F. 180v/ [ ] qui derangent sa charge.
L’Ambassadeur est le maître de recevoir qui il veut sur ses franchises et l’en chasser qui bon lui
semble, il est aussi le maître de donner des passeports pour faire entrer de la farine et du vin a
qui il veut de ses gens, memes Vénitiens logeants hors de son Palais.
L’Ambassadeur a droit de faire porter des armes, meme à feu, a toute sa Maison. Tout ceux qui
la composent ne peuvent etre arrêtés ni insultés dans Venize, et si cela arrivoit on lui en feroit
justice.
L’Ambassadeur a droit de donner ce qu’on apelle des lettres de familiarité; ceux qui les ont
jouissent de tous les droits des gens de l’Ambassadeur; comme pour d’armes, droit de ne
pouvoir etre arrêtés ni insultés. Mais ces lettres ne s’accordent que rarement et avec une grande
conoissance de la personne a cause des inconvenients.
Les Ambassadeurs ont de droit des Loges dans tous les Théatres, quand ils en demandent. Le
Doge les leur fait donner pour un prix reglé tres anciennement, et pour éviter les disputes entre
les Ambassadeurs des differents Couronnes le Doge lui meme les tires au sort pour eux; il leur
en envoye les clefs, et les Ambassadeurs gardent ces loges s’ils veulent tout le tems de leur
ambassade

1

The above document outlined the privileges or franchises French ambassadors claimed in Venice in 1664 and
thereafter. This piece can be found in the following: AAE, MD, France, vol. 45, 1664, Des Droits et prérogatives
utiles, Fs 180r-180v.
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Appendix III:
Il Te Deum, Sopra il Re di Francia, 16831
Te Deum Laudamus Gallicum
Te Ludovicum Damnamus
Te Hereticum Confitemur
Te errorium Patrem omnis ecclesia detestatur
Tibi omnes Angelli et Laici, incessabili voce proclamunt
Sathan, Sathan, Sathan; Rebelis Pape, et Deo Sabaot.
Pleni sunt cœli, et Terra horrende Heresis tue.
Te Luxuoriosis Apostatorum chorus,
Te Hypocritum damnabilis numerus,
Te Fornicatorum maculatus Laudat exercitus;
Te per Orbera Terrarum Sancta Anathemizat Ecclesia;
Patrem immense pravitatis:
Venenum Docinatum, et iniqui Consilij,
Falsum quoque per tuum decipientur spiritum,
Tu Rex impie scite;
Tu Patris Diaboli execrandus es Filius;
Tu, ad perdendus Fideles Homines, non horruisti excutere Pape jugum;
Tu, abiecto Veritatis fundamento aperuisti tibi portas Inferorum;
Tu, ad Dexteram Luciferi Sedes,
Judicandus crederis in Eternum Arsurus:
Te, ergo quæsumus tuis Gallis subveni, quos pernicioso sanguine perdedisti;
Eternum fac eos in reprobis flammis cruciari.
Salvum fac Populum tuum Ludovice, et maledic impietatis;
Revocas eos, et non conculies eos in Eternum.
Per singulos dies maledicimus Te,
Et damnamus Heresia Tuam in sæculum sæculi.
Dignare Ludovice, quam primum, a peccato tuo resilire:
Miserere tui Ludovice, miserere tui.
Sic fiat Justitia Dei super Te et tuos quemadmodum speraverunt in Te.
In Ludovico Sperantes confundantur in Eternum

1

ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Enclosed in an avviso from Badoer to the inquisitors of state, 25 Aug. 1683. The Te
Deum reflects the venom hurled at Louis XIV and the French in Venice during the early 1680s.
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